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Abstract
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the ways in which Japan can contribute to UN peace 
operations. In particular, it looks into the political history of Japan as well as its foreign 
policies in order to understand how Japan’s contributions were implemented and why they 
are characteristically distinct from other countries.
During the 1990s, Japan encountered heavy criticism for the way it responded to the Gulf 
War crisis. This prompted many discussions on the willingness and ability of Japan to 
contribute to the resolution of international crises. The main criticism was its unwillingness 
to send personnel to locations in need and instead, only offered financial assistance. The 
reasons for Japan’s behaviour were deeply rooted in the interpretation of its constitution 
which was established right after the end of World War II.
Despite the constraints on Japan’s initial offer, the way Japan was subsequently able to 
contribute was highly effective. This started a new way in which to take part in peace related 
activities that was distinct from the traditional approaches to peace operations.
In order to substantiate this argument, this thesis will look at analyses Japan’s involvement 
in the UN missions in Cambodia and East Timor and draws on this analysis of those 
operations in order to identify future opportunities.
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Chapter 1 -  Javan’s challenses in the United Nations veace
activities in the vost-Cold War period
Introduction
How can Japan be recognised by other countries as one of the developing 
countries that can take responsibility in international society? Since the beginning 
of the 1990s, Japan has been looking for some way to prove its capability to take a 
more active role especially within the framework of the United Nations. A new 
world order has required Japan to become more active -  rather than simply as a 
financial contributor -  in UN peace operations which have become a serious issue 
for the United Nations and its member states. The increased numbers and size of 
operations need more actors, and opens a door for Japan in an area that it had 
never thought of. Until the Gulf War crisis and criticism of Japan’s limited role in 
international issues, there never was a question of what Japan could do to 
contribute or what kind of potential Japan had. Nearly 50 years of Japan’s 
invisibility at the United Nations was no longer acceptable by either domestic or 
international society, and Japan was forced to make a transition in its politics in 
order to become a leading country in which its economic and political power were 
equal. However, the transition process was not easy due to the many obstacles that 
were present both internally and externally.
Background
Japan’s foreign and national security policy has been a serious issue within the 
constitution ever since the US occupation began at the end of World War II. 
When the Alliance occupation started in 1946, the US (which was a leading 
country in Japan’s occupation) aimed to rebuild Japan as a democratic state with a
pacifist constitution. The famous Article 9 of the Japanese Constitutional Law was 
set as the representative example of Japan’s future -  as a permanent neutral state1. 
However, the change of the international power struggle between the US and the 
Soviet Union, the Cold War, brought a shift in the US policy on Japan from a 
“military containment policy (fujikome)” to an “important partner of East Asia 
(kyouryoku)”. With the increased tension between two big powers, Japan was 
seen as the key to the future balance of power in Asia. The critical moment for 
Japan’s post-war strategy arrived in 1950, when the Korean conflict crystallised 
the structure of the new world order. Transforming Japan into a democratic 
political economy was no longer a priority of US: the US proposed to draw Japan 
into a regional defence system and remilitarise it for the Cold War. In 1953, US 
Vice President Nixon admitted that the imposition of Article 9 and the 
disarmament of Japan were mistakes. The US continually pressured Japan to 
participate actively in its alliance system, and tried to persuade the Japanese 
government to agree to upgrade the National Police Reserve which MacArthur 
had established in July 1950 (with 75,000 personnel) to the status of National 
Security Force (with 110,000 personnel) in January 1952.
The situation surrounding Japan’s security and foreign policy became more 
complex after the signing of the Japan-US Security Treaty on 8 September 1951 — 
the same day that the San Francisco Peace Treaty was signed. It preserved many 
of the occupation prerogatives of the UN military and in effect made Japan a 
military satellite of the US. Finally, in 1954, the Defence Agency was established 
with responsibility for the ground, maritime, and air Self Defence Force with total
1 Soeya, Y. (2005) Nihon no middle power gaikou: sengonihon no sentaku to kousou. 
Chikumashinsyo. P36
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of 152,000 personnel. The establishment of the SDF and the Defence Agency 
became a big issue on how to interpret Article 9. Prime Minister Yoshida and the 
Cabinet Legislation Bureau (CLB) drafted a new interpretation of Article 9: it 
would permit possession of a military with only “the minimum necessary” for 
self-defence in the event of invasion2. In addition, according to this interpretation, 
the SDF could not be send abroad or participate in any collective defence 
arrangements. This narrow interpretation of the constitution was officially 
expressed (seifutouitsukenkai) by Prime Minister Ichiro Hatoyama -  first leader 
of the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan (Jiyuminsyutou) -  in 1954 during the 
Diet meeting, and has endured for nearly four decades. This is how Japan’s 
complex difficulties in its foreign and security policy started. The basic dilemma 
of Article 9 and the existence o f the SDF, both of which Japan has dealt with for 
more than half a century, was started as US occupational policy.
The Yoshida Doctrine, formally named after Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida 
(May 1946-May 1947, and October 1948-December 1954), has been the 
mainstream of Japan’s foreign and defence policy during the Cold War period. 
Yoshida’s primary concern in foreign affairs was to restore Japan’s reputation and 
gain acceptance by the international community. No one can deny that the 
Yoshida Doctrine kept Japan out of military conflict, brought about its 
resurrection as a democratic nation and led to prosperity as the world's second- 
largest economic power. The revision of the basic principle of the Yoshida 
Doctrine was finally started as a result of Western Society’s humiliating response 
to Japan’s so-called “check book diplomacy” in the Persian Gulf War of 1990. For
2 Samuels, J, R. (2004) Politics. Security Policy, and Japan’s Cabinet Legislation bureau: Who 
elected These Guys Anyway?” JPRI Working Paper, no99.
15
the first time in Japan’s post-war history, Japan tried to shake the shackles of 
WWII from their politics. Many other countries have enacted change in their 
domestic system to accommodate change in the international system during the 
Cold War era. However none of the Japanese leaders wanted to touch the sensitive 
issue of Article 9 or the existence of the SDF until the beginning of the 1990s. 
Therefore, even with the drastic change in the international arena (maybe the first 
big movement in the post World War II period), Japanese politicians needed to be 
careful in the process of changing the course of their foreign and security policy in 
order to obtain both domestic and international agreement. Since Japan’s 
diplomatic attitude caused a storm of international criticism, revolutionary policy 
changes were started by the establishment of a new Law to send the SDF to UN 
peace operations.
The developments that were rapidly made during the 1990s included changes in 
Japan’s foreign and security policy. The most remarkable achievement was the 
establishment of the peacekeeping Cooperation Law which was passed on 15 June 
1992. The legislation ended the ban on sending SDF Forces abroad. (It limited 
SDF deployment to logistical and humanitarian support for UN missions, 
monitoring elections, and providing aid in civil administration.) The Gulf War 
experience woke Japan to the realization of the urgent need for revising its 
“biggest issue” in post WWII history: the controversial legislative interpretation 
of Article 9 and SDF, and the Yoshida Doctrine. Japan’s new challenge was not 
easy, even though it was necessary in order to take the responsibility Japan had 
always been looking for. The Cambodian peace process took place at just the right 
time for the MOFA and those politicians who were willing to make this change in 
the legislation.
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It began with an active diplomatic role in peace settlement by sending personnel 
to the UN peacekeeping operations in Cambodia in the early 1990s and they have 
continuously supported several peace missions around the world: Japan has been 
actively playing a unique role in the issues of peace settlement (including peace 
operations) by the United Nations. Japan’s achievements were seen not only by its 
participation in the many UN peace operations (and peace settlements) but also in 
the areas of peace building and preventive action. Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi 
expressed his view on Human Security in the “International Dialogue on Building 
Asia’s Tomorrow” in December 1998. He also announced the establishment of a 
Trust Fund for Human Security in the UN with a 500 million Japanese Yen 
contribution3. The concept of Human Security is an idea in foreign policy which 
Japan is conveying to the international community (especially to those countries 
willing to support developing countries in need) to focus more on the life of the 
individual human being rather than on the national level. This new concept that 
Japan brought to the table has become a core principle in the support for 
developing countries in the 21st century.
UN operations in East Asia: Javan s role in both cases
It is well known that most of the peace operations are deployed in the African 
region, and many of them have been “problematic” operations. On the other hand, 
only two locations, Cambodia in 1992 and East Timor since 1999, have 
experienced UN peace operations in the East Asian region. Missions in both 
locations while generally defined as being “successful”, have given an insight into
3 Prime Minister K, Obuchi’s speech in Hanoi Vietnam December 1998. With this speech, the 
Trust Fund for Human Security was established in March 1999.
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several weaknesses of the United Nations organizations which the Brahimi Report 
highlighted. The significance of UNTAC and UNTAET are that both operations 
had unique functions and tasks: UNTAC was one of the first multifunctional 
operations. It had both administrative and military components, and its mandate 
included several aspects relating to human rights, the organization and conduct of 
elections, military arrangements, civil administration, and the maintenance of law 
and order, etc. UNTAET was established to administer the territory, to exercise 
legislative and executive authority, and to build self-government during the 
transition period. Both operations while complicated and problematic in terms of 
their historical background, however achieved their mandate. Why were these two 
cases in the East Asian region successful with all the weaknesses from which 
other “failure” cases have suffered? As the Brahimi report indicated, active 
cooperation from the neighbouring countries is an essential factor for the success 
of UN peace operations. For both the Cambodia and East Timor peace processes, 
Japan, Australia, and major ASEAN states played their role well to accomplish 
the peace process. Since Japan was looking for a chance to demonstrate its ability 
in the area of diplomacy4 (rather than in their famous role as financial contributor), 
they played a major role in both cases. Since Japan has a restriction on sending 
troops outside of its own territory5, the military role was played by Australia and 
it always fulfilled the part Japan could not. Therefore, the combination of these 
two nations made a good balance in Cambodia and East Timor. Usually, the 
United Nations suffered a lack of finance and personnel required for deployment 
in a full scale peace operation. However, in the East Asian region, there were two
4 Japan’s desire to play a role in the areas of peace and security with the UN started soon after it 
jointed the UN in 1948. Y. Tanaka (ed) (2004) Ima Kokuren Soshite Nihon. Kabushikigaisya 
Jiyuukokumin. P49
5 See Chapter 2 for a details.
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countries (followed by other regional states) that were willing to offer their help 
on this matter. This certainly was one of the factors for success in both cases. In 
the East Asian region, the presence of the US force in the region has been a 
central security mechanism. There has not been a regional super power for the last 
60 years. However, the end of the Cold War has changed the regional structure 
and a new security dimension required the presence of leaders from its own region. 
The PRC is one of the UN Security Council’s permanent members and a desirable 
candidate for leadership within the East Asian region. However, with its 
communist political regime and poor human rights records, this is unlikely to 
happen. Therefore, the next strong candidate, Japan, is the most appropriate 
choice -  with its strong political influences and being an economic power in the 
region, it has been playing an active leading role for the past few decades.
The Research Questions
Since Japan successfully participated in both operations, and also played original 
roles outside the operations, what was its distinctive characteristic? What Japan 
has been trying to do is become a more responsible and active player in the field 
of the UN in a manner which will match its political and economic power. The 
growing numbers and size of UN peace operations required more support from 
member states, especially from countries like Japan, which has been mainly an 
observer in this area, and others willing to participate in the operations. Japan, 
particularly, has potential to become one of the leading countries in this area, not 
only as a financial contributor, but also in more wide-ranging areas -  diplomatic 
negotiations, technical and logistic support, humanitarian support, rehabilitation 
support etc. This research will focus on two questions of Japan’s role in the UN’s 
peace missions in the two East Asian cases.
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The first question is about Japan’s role in both cases. Most developed countries 
provide available financial and personnel resources to the UN peace operations as 
required, therefore since Japan’s contributions were significant to the two Asian 
cases, what kind of influence did Japan have? Therefore, the first question is:
1. How and why were Japan’s contributions to the UN peace operations 
developed and implemented in Cambodia and East Timor? What were the 
distinctive characteristic contributions made by Japan?
When the Cold War ended, an opportunity for Japan to take a step forward into 
the international arena fell into its hands: pressure from US and the UN for Japan 
to become more involved in peace related activities under the authorization of the 
UN presented Japan a reason to open Pandora’s box: revising the Yoshida 
Doctrine and the interpretation of Article 9. Discussion on the interpretation of 
Article 9 in the Japanese Diet was rather chaotic but it achieved an advance in 
Japan’s foreign and security policy. It is well known that Japan has a strong desire 
to become a permanent member of a newly reformed Security Council, thus the 
establishment of the new law which would allow dispatching SDF abroad was a 
necessary step for Japan to show its pledge to the other member states. In addition, 
not only with troop contribution, but Japan was also searching for some 
alternative way to become involved in UN peace missions which would allow 
Japan to use its national strength more effectively. What kind of answer Japan has 
found out from their experiences in two cases?
2. What did Japan learn from its experiences in the Cambodian and East 
Timorese cases, and what is its future role in the areas of UN peace 
operations?
During the 1990s, Japan experienced changes both domestically and 
internationally: an aftermath of the post Cold War movement opened a new door 
for Japan to take on a new responsibility as one of the world’s leading countries. 
Since Japan has been maintaining its position as a neutral state without military 
power (a power which could become a possible threat to neighbour states), its 
drastic policy changes in foreign and security policy sometimes was misread by 
other regional countries. However, Japan proved that it was no threat to the region, 
and its ability in peace related activities were a valuable resource for the region 
with its simmering disputes (the Korean peninsula, the Taiwan-PRC relation, the 
nuclear threat from the DPRK, etc). Moreover, what is the value of Japan’s 
existence in the East Asian region in terms of peace related missions from the 
perspective of the United Nations? To what extent did the active engagement of 
Japan in regional and neighbouring states affect the design and implementation of 
the UN mission in Cambodia and East Timor?
Chapter Structure
Chapter 1 will explore the basic focus of the United Nations peace operations and 
Japan’s foreign policy towards the UN including its financial commitment to the 
UN, its policy shift during the 1990s, and the new concept of Human Security.
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These factors are necessary to understand for Japan’s commitment, and its strong 
desire to play a more active role at the UN. As for the United Nations, those issues 
raised by UN peace operations will be highlighted. In order to consider the 
context in which the two main case studies of peace operations took place, 
Chapter 2 will review the history of the UN peace operations, and particularly the 
changes caused by the end of the Cold War. It will also highlight Japan’s relation 
to UN policy and its political movement from the occupational period to the end 
of the Cold War. It will enable us to understand why Japan did not participate in 
UN peace operations until the early 1990s. Since most of the operations were 
deployed after 1989, and Japan did not participate any of the peace related 
activities during the Cold War era, the post-Cold War period will be the main 
focus of the analysis in this chapter. It is thus important to look at the ideas and 
choices which Japan had for its policies, and to pay attention to powerful US 
influence on Japanese politics.
In Chapter 3 and 4, two peace processes led by the United Nations, and the peace 
operations in Cambodia and East Timor will be analysed. In this research, there 
are two separate actors, the United Nations (the planner and organizer looking for 
the resources to conduct the operations) and Japan (a contributor and co-operator 
for the UN operations). The end of the Cold War caused an expansion in the need 
for UN peace activities and this necessitated additional resources and support 
from its member states. Japan was thrown into this new era completely 
unprepared. It did, however, try to maximise this opportunity to involve itself 
more visibly (not only by making financial donations) in the UN peace keeping 
activities. Therefore, the basic needs of both the UN and Japan are consistent, 
with the exception of Japan’s domestic restriction. By analysing the two Asian
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cases, this research will focus on Japan’s distinctive characteristic contribution 
and the difficult processes of political reform including the sensitive issue of 
Article 9 of the constitution. Thus, the main focus of these chapters will be on 
Japan’s involvement in the UN’s peace related activities in both cases as well as 
the wide-ranging efforts by the Japanese government. Japan’s domestic 
discussions and decision making process related to the UN peace operations since 
the beginning of the 1990s will highlight the process of UN peace operations on 
the ground in both cases. In addition, the focus will be on the characteristics and 
uniqueness of Japan’s role in both cases.
In considering the findings from the above two cases, Chapter 5 will focus on the 
details of Japan’s contribution to the two Asian cases. Japan’s contribution in both 
situations was wide ranging. The first section will focus on the four areas which 
clearly show Japan’s distinctive characteristics. Moreover, the concept of Human 
Security became a major concept in peace building and preventive action in the 
21st century. Since Japan was the leading country on this subject, its experiences 
in Human Security will be highlighted. Japan’s contribution in this area can not be 
a substitute for its lack of personnel dispatched to UN peace operations, however, 
it might be the best alternative for Japan in taking responsibility in peace activities 
under the UN. Also, this chapter will focus on the positive impact Japan has had 
on the UN in planning and conducting peace operations in Cambodia and East 
Timor. As for the conclusion, Chapter 6 will consider Japan’s future with the UN 
peace operations.
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Methodology
This research focuses on identifying what Japan can do in the area of UN peace 
operations. It looks at the role that Japan can play from two perspectives: from the 
point of view of Japanese interests and also from UN interests. In order to 
consider many of the issues surrounding Japan, it has focused on recalling 
historical records, events and statement of those involved. The primary sources of 
evidence in many cases are the academic literature books, journal articles, 
conference papers. Also used were the UN’s official records of Security Council 
resolutions, Secretary General’s recommendations and reports, several 
Conference reports on UN’s peace operations, and also statistics on UN peace 
operations will be use as evidences. Moreover, Japanese Diet proceedings 
(including all committee meetings and governmental publications) helped to 
identify momentum shifts in Japan. In addition, the Diplomatic bluebook and 
ODA white paper provided details of Japan’s contributions including statistical 
evidence of Japan’s financial support (since the beginning of 1990s).
Due to poor record keeping of many of the events that took place during the 1990s, 
the interviews helped to supplement the formation of the view that many Japanese 
government officials had as well as UN officials.
In order to incorporate as much first hand information as possible, interviews 
were conducted in London, New York, and Tokyo during the years 2004-2008 
with personnel from following organizations: United Nations headquarter (DPKO, 
DPA, and OHCR), and UNDP in New York City, WFP, UNDP, UNHCR and 
UNICEF in Tokyo. Heads of WFP, and UNDP of Tokyo office were able to
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provide details of Japan’s contribution on their organizations, and its necessity 
and effectiveness.
In addition, interviews were also conducted with Japanese diplomats including 
those who served in Indonesia and East Timor during UN peace operations. 
Further, there were interviews with Japanese bureaucrats from the Ministry of 
Financial Affairs, Prime Ministers Office, and Secretariat of the International 
Peace Cooperation Headquarter from Cabinet Office. Lastly, interviews were 
conducted with SDF personnel who served in East Timor. These interviews were 
incredibly insightful; what was intriguing was that many MOFA officials voiced 
similar concerns as well as favored direction about Japan’s current state of affairs.
Interviews with personnel from both the Japanese government and UN officials 
have supported the objectivity of this thesis. In addition, the interviews have 
helped to reveal much of the diplomatic efforts that Japan has been making. This 
is something that has not received much documentation and resources have been 
scarce because of its lack of recognition.
The above sources have been used to support many of the arguments and have 
helped to identify the many ways in which Japan can contribute to UN peace 
operations.
The Brahimi Report: what Japan can do in the context o f  UN peace operations? 
This study is mainly focuses on Japan’s policy in UN’s peace operations by 
examining the two East Asian cases which took place in the post Cold War era. It 
was a very difficult time for the UN coping with crises all over the world and its
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capacity was overstretched. As a result, many issues within the UN surfaced. To 
get the situation under control, the UN began a review of its system and method of 
planning and conducting peace keeping operations.
In the year 2000, Secretary General Kofi Annan convened a high-level panel for a 
review of the United Nations peace and security activities. The need for change 
has been rendered even more urgent by events in Sierra Leone and by the 
daunting prospect of expanding United Nations operations in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo. Over the last decade, the UN has repeatedly failed to meet 
one of the challenges of its Charter, which is to save succeeding generations from 
the scourge of war.6 During the post-Cold War period, there had not been a major 
war (except the second-Gulf War). However, the increase in the number of local 
conflicts, especially civil wars, acted as a threat for world peace and security. The 
UN peace operations are necessary to manage international and humanitarian 
crises, and there have been more operations established than ever before in the 
past 15 years. Maintaining world peace and security has been the primary purpose 
of the UN, and peace operations are one of the necessary conditions for the UN 
even if the Charter did not define its existence.
Therefore, none of the countries including Japan were ready to face this new era, 
and only the US, a leading country in the world, was willing to take on the job to 
“maintain world peace”, at least at the beginning of the 1990s.
6 Executive Summary “The report of the panel on the United Nations Peace Operations.’ 
(A/55/305-S/2000/809).
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“ The report o f  the panel on the United Nations Peace Operations” (known as the 
Brahimi Report) examined the weakness of the UN Secretariat in planning and 
managing peace operations in the year 2000, however, it does not directly address 
the broader issue of the weakness of the United Nations organization and its 
Security Council as a body of states in approaching peace operations. As Brahimi 
himself admitted, the Security Council plays a key role in the field of “Peace and 
Security” and there will be much more international support for the United 
Nations when the Council becomes more representative than it now is. As it 
stands today, the Security Council almost certainly reflects the world as it existed 
in 19457, when there were no more than 50 or so independents states, and is 
dominated by the victors of World War II. The reform of the Security Council8 is 
already on the table but it was definitely not within the mandate of the Panel to 
address the issue.9 Japan is the one of the leading countries in the reform of the 
Security Council with India, Germany, and Brazil. Under Article 24 of the Charter, 
the Security Council has the primary responsibility for maintaining international 
peace and security and the authority to act on behalf of all members of the UN. 
The five permanent members (P5): the United States, Great Britain, France, 
Russia (successor state to the seat of the Soviet Union in 1992), and the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC replacing the Republic of China in 1971) are the key to 
Security Council decision making since each has veto power. Also, the ten non­
permanent members are elected for two-year periods by the General Assembly. 
The Security Council is the only UN body that incorporates both permanent and
7 The memberships for the UN Security Council were expanded from 11 to 15 in the 1960s. There 
were some marginal changes to accommodate states from other regions.
8 The new High Level Panels set up by the Secretary General in year 2003 is handling the wider 
issues of UN reform.
9 Brahimi,L. (2000) Overview of the Brahimi Report. Lin, C. L., N. d. Rham-Azimi, et al. (2001). 
The reform process of United Nations peace operations: debriefing and lessons, report of the 2001 
Singapore Conference. The Hague, Boston, Kluwer Law International.
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non-permanent members, and has primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security. The Security Council has also had a central role 
in establishing UN multinational forces normally called the “coalition of the 
willing”. While only a smaller number of states are desirable to make the UN 
effective, it must reflect world realities and be more representative of its 
diversity.10 The challenges posed by different types of conflicts, changing 
normative expectations, and uncertain bases of intervention must be considered in 
the context of a more complex, diverse cast of players on the international stage.11 
The question of whether or not Japan, Germany and other powerful countries will 
become permanent members of the Security Council must be considered in the 
context of the politics related to Security Council reform.
Because it is essential for the members of the Security Council to match the 
current international power system, and since most of the issues discussed at the 
UN Security Council are of a global scale, more permanent members from 
different locations is the necessary change the UN is urgently considering. In 
addition, since most of the conflicts have occurred in the African region, more 
opinions from African states will help both preventive and settlement actions.
Moreover, the majority of the Brahimi report was spent on those lessons from the 
UN’s experiences in the 1990s. One of the important issues for the United Nations 
in this decade was the numbers of troops needed for each peace keeping operation. 
The important lesson from past experiences was that there always has to be a
10 India Defence Consultants. What’s hot? -  Analysis of recent happenings. Democratisation of the 
United Nations. New Delhi, 27 April 2003. http://www.indiadefence.com/UN.htrn
11 Kams, P,M. and Mingst, A, K. Peacekeeping and the changing role o f the United Nations: Four 
Dilemma. Thakur, R. C. and A. Schnabel (2001). United Nations peacekeeping operations: ad hoc 
missions, permanent engagement. Tokyo ; New York, United Nations University Press.
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political will by member states for deploying troops in peace operations: if the 
member states are not willing to offer their troops to the UN, the United Nations 
cannot deploy operations on the ground. As the Brahimi report indicated, a close 
relationship with the regional organization could be an alternative to the lack of 
personnel and finance. Also, the concept of regional peacekeeping could be more 
effective when operations have taken into account the historical relations between 
various countries. In particular, the presence of the “white man” in certain regions 
has negatively influenced operations generated by anti-white sentiments. 
Understanding the cultural, religious, ethnic background becomes a vital part of 
peace operations. However, in the context of Cambodia and East Timor, the 
operations experienced a mixture of circumstances and events. In both cases, the 
major regional actors actively played their roles. This included the French and 
Portuguese (both former Suzerain states) who also played a major role in 
Cambodia and East Timor respectively. Moreover, Australia was one of the 
biggest troop contributors in both cases. Even with strong regional support, the 
“white man” was still the main actor in the peace operations12. In general, for the 
past few years, 77% of troops were contributed by developing countries with 
Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, Nigeria, Kenya, and Ghana as the significant active 
contributors13.
In both cases the host countries rejected negatively to die participation of the 
former Suzerain states. However those claims were resolved by the appointment 
to positions of leadership nations friendly to the host country. Japan’s financial
12 Mr. Akashi said “at the end of the day, it is not about who’s contributing in what area, but what 
they can do on the ground”. Ex-Suzerain countries have enough knowledge of the host country, 
and are the best participants for emergency based operations like the UN peace operation.
13 The Brahimi Report paragraph 103-104, and also the monthly summary of military and civilian 
police contribution to the UN peacekeeping operations on the UN web-page show the data on this 
subject.
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support for those countries wishing to take a part in INTERPET operations is 
worth mentioning. In addition to the possible sacrifice of their troop’s lives, those 
member states that decided to participate in UN peace operations needed large 
financial resources to maintain their troops abroad. The case of Japan’s financial 
support to INTERFET could be a model for the future of UN peace keeping 
operations. The recommendations made by the Brahimi report are suggesting new 
approach in the planning of UN peace missions, and changes have already started 
including the raising of a numbers of participants from developing countries, and 
the active participation by regional organizations or arrangements (especially in 
the African region).
It is essential to understand the recommendations the Brahimi report has made 
which underline issues of the UN peace operations since this will allow us to 
understand how Japan can possibly implement some of them.
UN missions in Cambodia and East Timor: Javan s role
There were only two locations in East Asia in which the UN peace missions 
achieved its given mandate. In addition to that, some of the operations included 
missions that had never historically been experienced by the UN. For example, 
UNTAC in Cambodia was the first occasion in which the UN had taken over the 
administration of an independent member state, organised and ran an election, had 
its own radio station, and had been responsible for promoting and safeguarding 
human rights at the national level14.It was set up in February 1992 to implement 
the Paris Peace Accords of October 1991 -  the product of intense diplomatic
I4In this case, UN did not gain control of the country’s administration. The existing government 
devised means to maintain its control and authority. Dobbins, J. (2001) The UN’s role in Nation 
Building: From the Congo to Iraq. RAND Corporation. P90
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activity over many years. Moreover, UNTAET in East Timor was in all respects 
the formal government of the country. Its full legislative and executive powers 
made it unique among experiments in the transitional administration, since it was 
the first time sovereignty had passed to the UN independently of any competing 
authority.15 In both operations, the Japanese government attempted to play an 
active role both within and outside the framework of the United Nations: Japan’s 
diplomatic effort on the Cambodian conflict was one of the major factors behind 
the success of UNTAC (it will be reviewed in Chapter 3). Japan is a potential 
security actor both within and beyond the Asian region: its defence force is 
amongst the largest (except for those of the USA and PRC) and the best equipped 
in the region. Nevertheless, until the Cambodian operation, Japan’s efforts to 
contribute to the international community were based on its traditional policy of 
providing only financial assistance16. Japan may have been well known due to the 
following three factors: it is the UN’s second largest financial contributor after the 
USA17; it is one of the biggest creditor nations18; and is one of the top three 
defence budget spenders in the world19, however, it had moved beyond merely 
playing these roles
The end of the Cold War has raised questions about Japan as to the future role it 
could play in the areas of peace and security, especially within the East Asian 
region. During the 1990s, Japanese foreign and security policies underwent the
15 Chopra, J. The UN’s Kingdom o f East Timor. Survival, vol. 42, no3, Autumn 2000, pp 27-39
16 Kimijima, A. (1993) Peace in East Asia and Japanese Constitution : A Re-examination 60 years 
after its making. Ritsumeikan Annual Review of International Studies. P 171
17 As shown in Table 1, Japan provides approximately 20.6 % of the UN budget. Japan is second 
only to the USA in financial support of the Organization. Source: An Argument for Japan to 
become a permanent member at the United Nations Security Council. 2 Financial contribution. 
http ://www.mofa. go.ip/policv/q a/faq 5 .html
18 Total GNI 2002. http://www.'worldbank.org/data/databvtopic/GNI.pdf
19 “Anzen hosyou ni kansuru kokusai hikaku ” A Comaparative Study in Defence Security 2001. . . 
http://www.drc-ipn.org/kihonkenkvuu/B-97-03/kokusaihikaku2001 .pdf
31
most remarkable change. Japan can now legally dispatch its Self Defence Force 
(SDF) outside of Japan (in non-combat roles under the United Nations peace 
operations). It has been over 15 years since the Japanese government first 
dispatched its SDF to UN peace operations, and there is a possibility for them to 
perform more actively in future operations. Also, Japan’s active involvement in 
the regional forum with its financial and diplomatic cooperation with 
neighbouring states has made remarkable progress. Since Japan joined the United 
Nations in 1956, cooperation with the UN has always been one of its main foreign 
policies20. Based on its economical strength and world wide diplomatic network, 
Japan has the capacity to assume greater global responsibilities through the efforts 
of the United Nations, and its contribution to the UN’s peace operations has most 
certainly opened the door for its future21.
The 1992 UN PKO Law permitted the SDF to engage in overseas operations but 
only in non-combat roles, including humanitarian assistance, election monitoring 
and logistical support. However, the Japanese SDF’s involvement in UN peace 
operation in East Asia raised an extremely sensitive question: the legacy of WWII 
remains a real burden to Japan in its relations with its East Asian neighbours. 
After over half a century, the presence of Japanese troops, even in non-combat 
roles, would have a profoundly negative impact upon any regional collective 
security or peace support operation. Nevertheless, those negative responses from 
neighbouring countries have started to diminish especially within the past few 
years. Since Japan started to participate in UN peacekeeping operations, most of 
the regional states realised they had overreacted to Japan’s new policy, and
20 Generally Japan’s foreign policy was called as”UN centred” policy. Coicaud, J.M. (2007) 
Kokuren no Genkai. Kokuren no Mirai. Fujiwarasyoten. P201
21 Akashi, Y. (2001) Japan Should Expand Peacekeeping Role. Yomiuri Shinbun.
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dynamic debates around Japan’s position in the new world order somehow 
promoted Japan’s pacifistic constitution. Also, the Japanese government’s 
response to those “non-sense” criticisms on remilitarisation and the “remaining 
legacy” are not without sensitive apologies anymore. The last official apology was 
made by Prime Minister Murayama, (the first Prime Minister after the Japan 
Socialist Party joined with the LDP), and since then, none of the Japanese leaders 
made this an issue in bilateral relationships with neighbouring countries. Japan’s 
strong stance on this long remaining issue started to change: in 1998, in the Japan- 
Korea joint declaration a few sentences of apology from Japan were mentioned, 
but the focus was more on the future strong bilateral relationship22. Also, a similar 
statement between the PRC-Japan mentioned Japan’s invasion of China and its 
formal apology, however, most of the statement was spent on Japan’s ODA 
support for China’s economic development. This does not mean there will not be 
the same kind of negative responses to Japan’s new challenges, however should 
not get any more difficult from now on.
There are new multilateral institutions attempting to bring East Asian nations 
together to deal with common problems. Japan had played an active role in 
promoting new changes in the region, including its involvement in the 
establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), a periodic meeting of 
foreign ministers to discuss security issues, with ASEAN Plus Three (Japan, the 
PRC and the South Korea), principally dealing with economic issues. It seemed 
obvious that Japan had begun to change its US-centred foreign policy to focus 
more on regional stability during the 1990s23.
22 Inoguchi, T. (2005) Kokusaiseijinomikata:9.11gononihongaikou. Chikumashinsyo. pl02
23 Irie, A. (1991) Shin Nihon no Gaikou. Cyukou shinsyo. P I92
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When the Cold War ended, it became possible for Japan and the East Asian 
nations to engage more intensively in joint networking to maintain regional 
stability and prosperity in the future. Future relations will largely depend upon the 
question of networking as a way to promote the new regionalism in this part of the 
world. There are two regional organizations or arrangements existing in the East 
Asian region. ASEAN is a diplomatic association for political and security 
cooperation that concentrates on conflict avoidance and management driven 
initially by the goal of regional reconciliation. On the other hand, the ARE is a 
more extensive inter-governmental grouping, which focuses on dialogue and 
confidence-building measures as a first step in promoting cooperative security. 
The establishment of ARF has been a diplomatic success, at least from the 
Japanese perspective.24 In the 1990s, ASEAN had been concerned with security 
problems that stem from both internal and external environments. ASEAN 
intended to include external powers, especially Japan, as a safeguard against 
actual and latent regional problems. This was because of ASEAN’s dependence 
upon Japan both economically and politically25. Now, the East Asian region has 
potential “regional problems” such as the issues of the Korean peninsula, China- 
Taiwan relations, Indonesia and Myanmar’s political situation, etc. Also, many 
parts of the region have territorial disputes with neighbouring states which include 
Japan and Russia, the PRC, and South Korea. North Korea’s nuclear issue is, 
however, die most serious problem in this region. In many of these cases, Japan is 
making effort through bilateral diplomatic discussions or cooperation with the 
regional organizations.
24 Sudo, S. (2001). The international relations of Japan and South East Asia : forging a new 
regionalism. London, Routledge. P88
25 Kuroyanagi, Y. (2003) ASEAN 35nen no kiseki. Yushindoukoubunsya. P101
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With the acceptance and will from other regional countries, Japan is ready to play 
an active role in economic cooperation and development support which is in the 
best interests of both sides. Moreover, Japan was willing to play the role of 
mediator in issues between regional states with international organizations and 
Western countries.
Japan s financial contribution to the UN budget
When UNTAC was deployed in 1992, the cost of peace operations increased 
fourfold from $700 million to approximately $2.8 billion. This was even before 
the operations in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia. Faced with increasing 
shortages of finance27, the UN attempted to cut comers which would affect 
operations on the ground. By the end of January 1994, the UN had accumulated a 
deficit of more than $2.7 billion in assessed contributions, of which $1.3 billion 
was owed for the regular budget and $1.4 billion for peace operations. The annual 
cost of peace operations had risen to around $3.2 billion a year, compared with the 
$9.4 billion for all the UN operations since 1948. By the year 1995, the UN’s 
financial situation had still not improved. Boutros-Ghali made two proposals for 
reforming the UN financial system in An Agenda fo r Peace. These proposals were
9 8either to deal with the high level of unpaid contribution by member states , or to
26 By the end of the year 1992, the UN had deployed over 5,000 peacekeepers in 13 operations, at 
an annual cost of $3 billion. This exponential increase in the costs was exacerbated by the 
reluctance, and in some cases refusal, of some member states to pay their duties. By the end of 
1991 only 60 % of the assessments of the regular budget had been paid. As of June 1992, 35% of 
the 1991 assessments remained outstanding, together with 65% of the dues for the first half of 
1992.
27 unpaid contributions from 1992-2002. Global Policy.
<http://www.globalpolicv.org/finance/tables/htm.>
28 When An Agenda for Peace was adopted by the Security Council in 1992, only 60% of the 
assessments of the regular budget had been paid. As of mid-1992, the UN was short by an amount 
equivalent of a full year’s funding. The greatest debtor in 1994 was the US -  which owed 
approximately $530 million for the regular budget and $288 million for peacekeeping.
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establish a United Nations Peace Endowment Fund with an initial target o f $1 
billion. However, none o f these instruments could be used unless national 
governments provided the necessary financial resources -  the UN has no other 
sources o f funding. The financial crisis in peace operations was afflicted by 
member states’ difficulties in providing troops, police and equipment on the scale 
required by the current volume o f peace operations activities.
Total A ssessm ents vs Payments by All Member States 
to  the UN Regular Budget
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Fig 1. 1
The U N ’s regular budget covers its administrative machinery, major organs, and 
their auxiliary agencies and programs. Peace operations expenses constitute a 
separate budget, as do the expenditures o f the specialized agencies. These three 
types o f budget expenditures are funded by contributions assessed among member 
states according to a formula based on their ability to pay.29 As o f September 
1998, member states owed the UN over $2.5 billion for current and past 
assessments to cover both regular and peace operation expenses. The financial 
crisis prompted by the unpaid assessments threatened the U N ’s ability to fulfil its 
mandates given by member states and illustrated the second dilemma -  the tension
29 The General Assembly’s Committee on Contributions considers national income, per capita 
income, any economic dislocations and member states’ ability to obtain foreign currencies. 
Initially the highest rate (for the United States) was set at 40% of the assessed budget. The 
minimum rate was 0,04% for state with the most limited means.
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between demands for governance and the institutional weakness arising from 
states’ unwillingness to pay their assessed contributions.
The financial contributions from member states to the peace operations budget are 
assessed according to their ability to pay which is based on gross domestic 
product (GDP), as well as, for smaller states, the level of external debt. This is 
translated into a graded scale:
• Group A (the Five permanent members of the Security Council) 
pays 63.15% of mission costs;
• Group B pays 34.78 %;
• Group C pays 2.02%;
• Group D, the poorest states, pays 0.05%.31
This means that nearly all the costs of peace operations are met by member states 
in group A and B, with the US having the largest assessed contribution of any 
member state. The Permanent Five have complained about the size of its assessed 
contributions vis-a-vis states in Group C and D. There are several problems with 
the standard method of financing peace operations, and there are at least 2 
alternative methods of financing peace operations. The first method was used for 
the UNFICYP, which is paid for by the government of Cyprus, the troop- 
contributing states and voluntary donations.32 The second method is related to the 
Multinational Forces (MNFs) which, although authorised by the Security Council,
30 Mingst, K. A. and M. P. Kams (2000). The United Nations in the post-Cold War era. Boulder, 
Westview Press. P42
31 Source: http://www.unausa.org/newindex.asp?place=http://www.unausa.org/programs/scale.asp
32 United Nations, and United Nations. Department of Public Information. (1996). The Blue 
helmets : a review of United Nations peace-keeping. New York, N.Y, United Nations Dept, of 
Public Information.
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are not an actual UN force. They are coalitions made up of, and financed by 
willing states, such as the Australian-led force initially deployed to East Timor in 
late 1999. These types of operations do not depend upon the lengthy procedures 
outlined above for securing funds, and can be deployed much more quickly.33
As mentioned above, Japan is the second largest contributor to the United Nations 
budget after the United States. It is, in practice, however the largest consistent 
paying member state. Despite efforts to establish a unified peace operations 
budget, the United Nations continues to assess member states separately for 
individual peace operations. UNTAC was the largest and most expensive peace 
operation at the beginning of the 1990s, first estimated from November 1991 to 
the end of July 1993 at approximately $1.9 billion. Secretary General Ghali had 
requested $200 million for the first phase of UNTAC’s deployment and $600 
million in operational expenditures for the May-October 1992 period, and Japan 
paid its assessment in full by the end of 1992.34 Also, in comparison with other 
member states, Japan’s contributions in 1996 accounted for more than 15% of the 
total peace operations budget, second to the United States (31%) but ahead of 
Germany (9%) and France (8%).35
The table below shows the assessments for the ten leading contributors to the 
UN’s regular budget for the year 2000.
Top 10 leading contributed member states to the UN regular
budget for year 2000.
33 The Financial Crisis of Peacekeeping. Source: http://www.una-uk.org/UN&C/costs.html.
34 McDermott, A. “Japan’s Finanical Contribution to the UN System: IN Pursing of Acceptance 
and Standing”. P76. International Peacekeeping. Vol6 Summer 1999. Number 2.
35 Heinrich. P80
38
1. United States of America 25% $300 million
2. Japan 20.57 % $216 million
3. Germany 9.86 % $104 million
4. France 6.546% $69million
5. Italy 5.44% $57million
6. United Kingdom 5.09% $53million
7. Canada 2.73% $29million
8. Spain 2.59% $27milion
9. Netherlands 1.63% $17million
10. Belgium 1.1% $12million
Table 1 .136
Japan’s contribution to the peace operations budget between 1998-2002 is as 
follows:
• 1998 - $ 10,971 (0.0007% of a total PKO budget of $ 1,594 million),
• 1999 - $9,809 (0.0007% of a total PKO budget of $ 1,482 million),
• 2000 - $437,434,417 (21.99% of a total PKO budget of $ 1,989 
million),
• 2001 - $592,864,602 (32.52% of a total PKO budget of $1823 
million),
• 2002 - $443,024,790 (33.19% of a total PKO budget of $1335 
million)37.
Japan’s contribution in this area is more than that paid by four of the UNSC 
permanent member states. Japan sees this financial contributor role as part of its 
diplomatic skills, and one area it can actually take responsibility as expected by 
UN and its member states. However, with Japan’s economic depression, the 
amount of contributions was reduced from 20% of its regular budget in 2000 to 
16% in 2007 (but still the second largest contributor after the US). The Japanese
36 http://www.un. int/france/frame anglais/france and im/france contribution to un budget/contri 
bution to un budget.htm
37 Because of the active involvement in the East Timor peace process since 1999, the amount of 
financial contributions has rapidly increased.
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government also saw this role as financier as a way to keep Japan’s voice at the 
United Nations. Thus the large amount of financial contributions to the PKO 
budget, especially when operations on the ground are in Japan’s interest, makes 
Japan more willing to put extra money into the United Nations. Japan’s financial 
diplomacy was sometimes criticised by other Western countries, however, none of 
the UN missions and activities can work without sufficient financial support from 
top financial member states. From this perspective, Japan has a strong element of 
national pride in its financial diplomacy, and the debate on whether Japan should
-IQ
have more power at the UN equivalent to its financial responsibility has been 
expanding outside the political arena for the past few years (especially after 
attempts to reform UNSC failed). And yet, those debates by the media, academic 
society and NGOs have had no effect on the political decision making processes 
yet. Nevertheless, the changing awareness o f the Japanese public on Japan’s 
position in the international arena might put pressure for a political decision in the 
near future. If it happens, the UN will need to rethink the balance of power in the 
UNSC more seriously.
Javan as a middle power country in the vost-Cold War era 
Japan’s uncertain role in the international arena started soon after the Alliance’s 
occupation started in 1946. The main complications of Article 9 and the SDF still 
remain after 60 years, and the US-Japan treaty continues as the centre of its 
foreign and defence policy. The famous Yoshida Doctrine - economics-first 
national security strategy - was advocated primarily by pacifists and liberal 
internationalists and widely accepted by the general public during the cold war. 
Later in the 1960s, Yoshida expressed his regret for his policy and admitted that
38 Kitaoka, S. (2007) Kokuren no seijirikigaku. Cyukoushinsyo. P28
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“Japan should possess a military force as a matter of national honour” while 
feeling “deeply responsible over the situation on the national defence issue”39. 
Yoshida may have thought of his strategy in the short term with the idea that once 
economic recovery was achieved, Japan would become like a normal country and 
have to not rely on the US security guarantee. However, as the years of Cold War 
system stretched out, and his successors took his tactical approach making it 
national doctrine, Japan expanded the Yoshida doctrine into a grand strategy that 
would be mainstream for many years to come.
The Yoshida doctrine guided Japan to economic success, however it left the 
country unprepared to deal with the newly obtained national economic power40. 
The sudden changes in the world order unexpectedly disrupted Japan’s state-led 
capitalist system. Because Japan’s success in the Cold War era was a benefit of 
the unique conditions of the bipolar order which allowed Japan to develop, the 
major changes in the external environment caused profound issues in the politics 
such as the Yoshida strategy and the internal political order known as the 1955 
system41. As Japan was under the protection of the US for entire post-war era, 
they were not ready to adapt to this new environment. During the Cold War era, 
no opportunities were given to Japan to rethink the fundamental issue of whether 
the constitution permitted collective security or not. However, the first 
international crisis of this new era -  the Persian Gulf War -  touched Japan in the 
one place it could to take an active part in supporting the coalition (authorised 
under the UN). Japan obviously lacked both a political consensus on how to 
respond and a legal framework that would enable it to proceed. In the end, the
39 Yoshida’s letter to one of the LDP member in early 1960s. Yoshida, S. (1963) Sekai no Nippon.
40 Pyle. P270
41 1955 was the first year that this political order took firm root.
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Japanese government concluded that dispatching the SDF to join the coalition in 
any form was constitutionally prohibited (details of this period will be analysed in 
the next chapter). In a post Cold War era, a gap between the reality and 
understanding of Japan stretched rapidly because of Japan’s ambiguous position. 
The demands for Japan to take more responsibility outside the country as one of 
the world’s leading nations created the wrong image of Japan in this new era (as 
misunderstood by some countries). Japan’s image is far from the reality: for 
example, when the PKO Law was established, or the SDF began to be dispatched 
to the operations outside Japanese territory under the command of UN or UN 
authorised missions, some of the neighbouring countries criticised Japan’s policy 
as “re-militarisation, and Japan should play a non-military role”. However, Japan 
had been working actively in the areas of non-military development support or 
financial contributions, and sending personnel or SDF units to international 
operations was the least of its engagement. Japan has been referring to itself as a 
“humanitarian nation” because of its wide-ranging development support as 
method of diplomacy.
Japan had been struggling to make radical changes in its politics to adapt to this 
new world order for the nearly two decades, and finally began to shape its role by 
the beginning of the new century. Japan is not a “super power” or “great power. 
However, it is comfortably playing a role as a “middle power”, if there is such a 
category of power in the international arena. The difference between a 
“super/great power” and a “middle power” is that a super power can use its power 
into to influence events and the decision making process of world issues42, and 
they are not afraid to push through their own values and policy. A typical country
42 Soeya. P7.
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in this category is of course the US. On the other hand, a “middle power”, while it 
might have a constant power, cannot continue without a super/great power’s 
existence. It can only exert an influence in the areas in which a super power shows 
no interest, and it only exists in a multinational forum (including the bilateral 
relationship). There has been a misleading idea of Japan’s ability as a “possible 
super/great power” because of its strong economy. However, Japan still remains 
in its post-war structure in terms of its foreign (Yoshida doctrine) strategy and 
security policy (US-Japan treaty. Unless domestic changes in the above two areas 
are achieved, there is no chance for Japan to possibly become more than a middle 
power country. Regardless of some sceptical views, Japan knows its limitations 
and possibilities, and started to establish its own style of foreign policy which will 
enable it to contribute its strength and knowledge to international society. The 
promotion of a concept of Human Security is one such area, Japan has been 
working on in cooperation with other middle power countries such as Australia 
and Canada.
Human Security: new approach for the preventive action and peacebuilding 
It is clear that Japan has been playing a major role in UN peace operations, 
particularly from a financial standpoint. It has also dispatched Japanese personnel 
to several UN operations (including humanitarian relief operations). However, 
this contribution has not had the recognition (by Western countries and the UN) 
that the Japanese Government expected. When Japan started to commit itself to 
the areas of peace and security for the United Nations, one of its main objectives 
was to receive recognition from other countries in order to strengthen its cause in 
becoming a new permanent member of the UN Security Council -  which has been 
a core desire Japan has had since joining the UN in 1956. In order to achieve this,
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Japan must shift its style of contribution from “financial alone” to that of 
“assistance with human power”.
In 1998, when Prime Minister Obuchi expressed his view of “Human Security”,43 
the Japanese government started to promote its new policy approaches in several 
areas of development. In addition, at the Millennium Summit in September 2000, 
Prime Minister Mori described the concept of Human Security as one of its main 
pillars of diplomacy and intended to establish an international committee for 
human security to deepen the idea of a human centred approach to the issues of 
development. The official description by the Japanese government on Human 
Security is:
a perspective to strengthen efforts to cope with threats to human lives, 
livelihoods, and dignity. The most important element o f  Human Security 
is to enhance the freedom o f individual human beings and their abundant 
potential to live creative and valuable lives.
This concept of Human Security is not merely a symbolic concept but rather a 
practical necessity that should be used as a tool for bringing about specific actions. 
44 Thus, Japan started applying this new concept to its Official Development 
Assistance (ODA), and all other development support. Japan’s new ODA Charter 
that was issued in August 2003 reflected the concept of Human Security, and also 
JICA (Japan International Cooperation Agency) announced a new reform plan
43 It was in the policy speech “Towards the Creation of A Bright Future for Asia” at Hanoi in 
December 1998.
44 From a speech by Dr. Sadako Ogata at the International Symposium on Human Security. 2 
August 2000.
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which underlies human security. This means the emphasis on Japan’s support to 
the developing countries is shifting towards human security action. Generally, a 
three-stage approach is needed to address this concept, particularly in the post­
conflict peace building phase or in conflict prevention: (1) preventing possible 
disaster, (2) stopping disasters already underway, and (3) bringing a halt to the use 
of armed force and building circumstances favourable to preventing a recurrence45. 
The concept of human security first drew global attention in the UNDP’s 1994 
Human Development Report. The report’s definition of human security argues 
that the scope of global security should be expanded to include threats in seven 
areas: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, 
personal security, community security, and political security46.
The new concept of Human Security Japan proposed particularly focuses on 
aspects of developmental activities and approaches to dealing with the problems 
caused by conflicts. In general, human security can be considered freedom from 
death, poverty, pain, fear or whatever else makes people feel insecure. In this 
sense, almost any matter concerning people's lives can fall within the scope of 
human security, rendering it conceptually vague and of little practical use47. In 
practice, most of the activities and approaches of Human Security are no different 
from before. However, assistance for development will concentrate more on the 
achievement of sustainable security to prevent recurrence of conflicts from micro­
level perspectives. These include securing individual life from death, poverty, 
pain, fear or whatever else that makes people feel insecure. It has been the case
45 JFIR report. Towards Collective Human Security: A New Internationalism and Japan. Paragraph 
2 .
46 Summary from the UNDP Human Development Report 1994.
47 Ogata, S. (2003) Overview for the Commission for the Human Security. Section 1. 
http://www.humansecurity-chs.org
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that when peace operations withdraw from the ground, the subsequent peace 
building process is taken on by specialised UN agencies such as UNDP, UNICEF, 
and WFP. There has always been a gap between humanitarian assistance (peace 
operation) and a long term development and reconstruction programme. However, 
the concept of human security can connect these two different elements of the 
missions. In some cases, after the withdrawal of the UN peace operations, the host 
countries throw themselves into armed conflicts again because of social instability 
and poverty. One important fact is that the UN peace operation is designed to 
restore peace in conflict situations but not to build a new stable society. In the 
1990s, many peace operations’ mandate was to re-build a society, hold an election 
and to build a new government48. Far too many of the operations focused on the 
macro basic function of countries as opposed to the needs of the individuals 
involved. Despite efforts to rebuild the country, many of the basic human needs as 
defined in Human Security were not met.
From this standpoint, Japan has had long term experience in development support 
in several countries through the ODA and has been successful through its 
initiatives from the point of view of Human Security. Moreover, Japan itself has 
had the experience of rebuilding a sustainable society from a crippled state 60 
years ago. Since Japan has had its own legal limitation to participation in UN 
peace operations, this new concept of Human Security gave it wider opportunities 
to play an active role in the areas of humanitarian assistance.
48 Yamada, M. Nomoto, K. Ogawa, H. and Uesugi, Y. (ed) (2005) Atarashii Heiwakouchikuron. 
Akashishoten. Chapter 4. Uesugi, Y. Heiwaiji to Heiwakouchiku no setten..P91
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The concept of Human Security has been the backbone in supporting the ways in 
which Japan has been a leading and effective contributor to peace operations. 
Furthermore, Japan’s experience and success in relation to peace keeping and 
peace building will be used as model cases for considering future operations in a 
more innovative light.
What Japan can do: its challenges in peace related activities
In the post-Cold War period Japan started to face a reality outside its borders. 
While looking at its possible role in the United Nations -  Japan’s idealised 
situation -  Japan is facing the most difficult time in its history. Of course, both 
changes are occurring for the same reasons. However, for Japan, its awaited 
moment has finally come. With the Yoshida strategy and its bilateral treaty with 
US, Japan has been hiding under the shadow of the US for long time. The changes 
Japan made in its domestic politics have received popular support: a distinct 
majority of the Japanese population favoured sending the SDF to UN peace 
operations. There are still major issues such as the revision of the pacifist 
constitution to allow Japan to participate more actively as a “normal” country, but 
Japan has begun to change quietly and slowly to adapt to this new world order 
through the United Nations’ mission.
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Chapter 2  -  UN veace operation and Japan's contribution
This chapter will review Japan’s political history, particularly it’s foreign and 
security policy shift since 1945 along with the history of UN peace operations. 
Japan has had difficulties with its constitution and introverted political style which 
was established more than 60 years ago and is something that still continues to 
dominate the Japanese political system. When the Cold War came to an end, 
Japan was unprepared for the new international order which required Japan to 
become a more extroverted player. This study will first focus on Japan’s domestic 
political history and policy shifts until the 1980s in order to understand its 
difficulties. Because of Japan’s bilateral US focused policy, the spotlight will be 
on the US-Japan relationship. As for the UN peace operations, most of the 
missions have been deployed in the post-Cold War era. Thus this chapter will also 
focus on UN’s difficulties experienced during the 1990s, along with its trends and 
the characteristics of its peace operations. These two separate analyses will come 
together and help us to understand how and why Japan’s participation in the 
UNTAC operation in 1992 resulted. It will look at how the UN required urgent 
cooperation from member states, and how this new movement influenced Japan’s 
policy shift towards UN peace operations. This was because during the Cold War 
period, the UN did not require countries such as Japan to cooperate in peace 
operations (there were only a limited number of operations on the ground, and the 
size and number of missions were within the UN’s capabilities). Japan was also 
still in the recovery process from its painful destruction in World War II (its main 
concerns were on the rehabilitation and economic development of the country, 
and it had no interest in becoming involved in UN missions for maintaining peace 
and security). However, the situation had changed. Japan had become one of the
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strong economic powers with political connections to developed Western 
countries, while the world had started to shift into a new order with the decline of 
the Soviet Union in the late 1980s1. Japan’s desire to play a more active role in the 
United Nations, especially in the area of peace operations became clear later, 
particularly after receiving criticism for its failure to participate physically in the 
Persian Gulf War crisis.
This sets the tone for the fundamental basis in understanding the issues regarding 
Japan and UN peace operations, and provides an essential building block in 
understanding the arguments for this thesis.
Cold War period
When the United Nations was established, the creators did not intend for missions 
to be about “keeping and re-building peace” on the ground. The purpose of both 
the League of Nations and of the United Nations was to promote international 
peace and security. When the UN was created, the world needed a new 
international organization to re-establish world order after the end of World War 
II. The creation of an international organization was undertaken by the Big Four 
(USA, USSR, UK and France), and then in January 1942, 26 allied states issued 
the “Declaration of the United Nations” drafted by the US State Department.2 In 
March 1943, the Advisory Committee had produced a draft charter for the new 
organization, and in October 1943, the foreign ministers of the Big Four issued 
the “Moscow Declaration of the Four Nations of General Security”. Finally,
1 Mingst, K.A. and Kams, P. M. (2000) The United Nations in the Post-Cold War era. Westview. 
P55
2 Pamphlet No. 4, PILLARS OF PEACE Documents Pertaining To American Interest In 
Establishing A Lasting World Peace: January 1941-February 1946. the Book Department, Army 
Information School, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., May 1946
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nation-states did indeed agree that there would be a post-war international 
organization, global in its membership and based on the principle of sovereign 
equality3. Moreover, the creation of the post-war security system took a major 
step forward at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference in Washington on August 1944, 
and the principal features of the UN were agreed on. The conference was held in 
two stages: first, the US, UK and the USSR, and then the US, UK and China 
agreed on a working document -  “Proposal for the establishment of a General 
International Organization”.4 Most of the organs from the League of Nations 
became primary features of the UN. Some issues could not be resolved at 
Dumbarton Oaks and had to be addressed at the next meeting involving the 
leaders of the “Big Three”, which took place in Yalta. Finally, on 25th April 1945, 
the representatives of 50 countries met in San Francisco at the UN conference on 
international organizations to draw up the UN Charter. The Charter was signed by
th  <51 countries on 26 June by the representatives .
The idea of the peace operations is not something written on the UN Charter. How 
did the United Nations arrive at this? On 29th May 1948, the first decision by the 
Security Council was to create the first peace operation UNTSO to supervise the 
truce in Palestine. There were two operations (UNTSO and UNMOGIP) 
established in the first 10 years of the UN’s history. The primary operational 
focuses were observation, monitoring, establishing facts and reporting the 
findings on the ground. By the middle of the 1970s, the UN had established six 
new operations that included three operations with more complex duties. A
3 The Founding of the United Nations. 24 October 1945.IBM World Book 1999.
4 The plan for the UN agreed at Dumbarton Oaks meant that France was now included as a 
permanent member.
5 Poland was not represented at the Conference, but signed it later and became one of the original 
51 Member States.
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number o f significant developments were made in this period which affected the 
development o f peace operations in later years. The operations in this period 
established the fundamental characteristics o f peace operations as well as 
exposing any problems. UNEF I was the first large scale armed operation 
established in response to the 1956 Suez Crisis6. In deploying UNEF I, the UN 
proved it could do more than serve as a forum for debate by helping to maintain 
the peace for more than a decade7. When UNEF I succeeded in fulfilling its 
mandate to secure a cease-fire and monitor the withdrawal o f foreign forces, there 
was optimism about the potential for peace operations8.
Peacekeeping Operations 1947-1987
Name Date Location Mandate
UN Truce Supervisions 
Organization (UNTSO) 1948-present Middle East Monitor Ceasefire Line
UN Military Observer 
Group in India and 
Pakistan (UNMOGIP)
1949-present
Kashmir- 
India and 
Pakistan
Monitor Ceasefire Line
UN Emergency Force I 
(UNEF I)
1956-1967 Sinai Occupy buffer zone & 
supervise disengagement
UN Observation Group 
in Lebanon (UNOGIL)
1958 Lebanon Monitor border violations
UN Operation in the 
Congo (ONUC)
1960-1964 Congo Supervise troop 
withdrawal & restore 
order
UN Temporary 
Executive Authority 
(UNTEA)
1962-1963 West New 
Guinea
Monitoring 
administration transfer
UN Yemen Observation 
Mission (UNYOM)
1963-1964 Yemen Monitor disengagement
UN Force in Cyprus 
(UNFICYP)
1964- present Cyprus Occupy buffer zone 
(from 1974)
UN India Pakistan 
Observer Mission 
(UNIPOM)
1965-1966 India & 
Pakistan
Monitor case-fire
UN Emergency Force II 
(UNEF I!)
1974-1979 Sinai Occupy buffer zone & 
supervise disengagement
6 Strength: 6,073 military personnel, supported by international and locally recruited civilian staff. 
Expenditures: $214,249,000 (http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unefi.htm)
7 T, Tsugeyama. (1995) PKO hou Ririon Jyosesu. Toushindou. PI71
8 UNEF I is particularly important for UN peace operations as it established a number of principles 
which were used in subsequent operations including, among others, ONUC, UNIFIL, UNDOF and 
UNFICYP
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UN Disengagement 
Observer Force 
(UNDOF)
1974-present Golan
Heights
Supervise disengagement
UN Interim Force in 
Lebanon (UNIFIL)
1978-present Lebanon Occupy buffer zone
Table 2 .19
Before the 1960s, the UN peace operations had only monitored ceasefire along 
tense (though structured) cease-fire lines and borders such as those in the Middle 
East and between India and Pakistan. Also in most cases, operations revolved 
around keeping two belligerents apart. The UN operation in the Congo (ONUC) 
between 1960 and 1964 was one of the largest, including nearly 20,000 troops10 at 
its peak strength. During ONUC, the UN ignored the principles that had been 
established from the experiences with UNEF I such as non-use of force, 
impartiality, and the consent of the all parties. This was the first time UN had 
intervened in a civil war with armed forces without a clear mandate for 
enforcement action. (To restore order in the Congo, enforcement action was 
taken.) By the end of this operation a total of 126 peacekeepers had been killed, 
including the UN Secretary General Dag H. Hammarskjold. Because of the 
violence involved and the ambiguity concerning the mandate of the operation, 
ONUC was, for a long time, also an example of how UN peace operations should 
not work.
In the late 1970s, two large scale operations were launched in the Middle East: 
UNDOF in the Golan Heights, and UNIFIL in Lebanon. This was the first time 
the United Nations experienced difficulties in operating large scale peace missions. 
The experiences of UNIFIL demonstrated all that could go wrong with UN peace
9 All information of peacekeeping operations in the tables are based on the information from The 
Blue Helmets: a review of United Nations peace-keeping / United Nations.
10 Strength: Maximum (July 1961) 19,828 all ranks, supported by international civilian and 
recruited staff. At withdrawal (December 1963) 5,871 all ranks 
(http://www.im.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/onucF.html)
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operations: high costs; refusal from the part of Member states to pay their 
assessment; and the lack of consent and cooperation from the parties involved in 
conflicts. Bitter lessons the UN had learned from ONUC and UNIFIL was that 
peace operations could only fulfil their mandate successfully if most of the criteria 
for peacekeeping were present.11 During the Cold War, peace operations were 
mainly deployed in the Middle East, and did not carry multifunctional mandates. 
However, since its mandate was primarily ceasefire monitoring and border patrol, 
the duration of the operation has been particularly long.12 At the end of the Cold 
War period, the UN was restricted to the maintenance of ongoing operations in the 
Middle East13 and those in Cyprus and Kashmir.
In this period, the UN started to experience difficulties in conducting large scale 
peace operations, particularly with receiving necessary cooperation from member 
states. However, at this time, the number of operations on the ground was 
manageable by both UN organizations and its limited member states. There was 
no need for a small country like Japan to take a part in this particular area. As for 
Japan, the Cold War period was the era for rebuilding a new national purpose (for 
the next few decades), and its main interests were on rehabilitation and economic 
recovery -  domestic recovery -  and not on international movement.
11 Hill and Malik. P49
12 Both of UNDOF and UNIFIL are still active, with force levels of over a thousand in the former 
and over five thousand in the latter.
13 Such as UNTSO, UNDOF, and UNIFIL.
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Javan in the post-World War II: Yoshida doctrine as the main stream o f national 
politics
The key person in shaping post-war politics and conceived the national purpose 
was Yoshida Shigeru, the prime minister for most of the first decade of the post­
war period. Yoshida is one of the most important figures in modem Japanese 
history14. When he formed his first cabinet in 1946, tensions between the US and 
the Soviet Union were apparent, and Yoshida tried to use the disputes between the 
victors over the post-war settlement to Japan’s advantage. The primary focus in 
foreign affairs was to restore Japan’s reputation and gain acceptance by the 
international community. However, to achieve the goal, Japan needed to prove to 
other countries that Japan had changed and committed itself to peace and stability. 
Yoshida was determined that Japan should associate as closely as possible with 
the US which he saw as a new hegemonic power15.
The first critical moment for Japan’s post-war strategy arrived in 1950 when the 
Korean conflict broke out and Japan was in the risky position of being drawn into 
Cold War politics. The US realised Japan’s geographical vulnerability to the 
Soviet block and started to rethink its occupational objective, shifting from 
“reform” to “recovery”. The first few years of the occupation of Japan were aimed 
at rebuilding Japan as a pacifist country by the imposition of Article 9 and the 
disarmament of Japan. However, the Cold War made Japan strategically important 
to the US. When John Foster Dulles, the Republican’s leading expert on foreign 
policy came to Tokyo in June 1950 to negotiate a peace treaty and the end of the 
occupation, he urged Japan’s rearmament. As a response to the US request and to 
secure Japan’s safety from the Cold War movement, Yoshida made minimal
14 Wakabayashi, T,B- (1998) Modem Japanese Though. Cambridge University press. P168
15 Fujii, W. (2008) Japan’s foreign and security policy in the 21st century. GRIN. P7
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concessions to Dulles’ request: he consented to US bases on Japanese soil and 
limited rearmament. This resulted in a US agreement to a peace and security 
treaty with Japan for the post-occupational period16.
On September 8, 1951, on the same day that the San Francisco Peace Treaty was 
signed, the US-Japan security treaty was also signed. However, since Japan 
already had a pacifist constitution, this bilateral treaty could not fit anywhere into 
Japan’s constitutional and political system. The interpretation of Article 9 and the 
existence of the SDF became untouchable issues for the Japanese government. 
During the occupational period, Yoshida made a maximum effort to establish a 
base for Japan’s foreign policy which could be accepted by international society. 
His choices to concentrate on economic development and rehabilitation resulted in 
Japan becoming the world second largest economy a few decades later, and his 
successors have maintained this strategy as the main focus of Japan’s national 
policy until now17. The most controversial part of the Yoshida doctrine was that 
his strategy was established to avoid unnecessary conflict Japan might throw itself 
into due to the international movement.
The Yoshida doctrine was not a product of Yoshida-Duelles negotiations, 
however a reflection of political compromise between those Japanese who 
preferred alliance to autonomy and those who valued autonomy over security 
depend on American guarantees. As the sacrifice of national pride or 
sovereignty18. Moreover, Yoshida doctrine provides he ideational foundation for 
the US-Japan relationship from the late 1940s till now19.
16 Graham, E. (2006) Japans sea lane security 1940-2000. Routledge. P93
17 Cooney, J. K. (2002) Japan foreign policy maturation: a quest for normalcy. Routledge. P39
18 Finn, B.R.(1983) United States -  Japan Relations: Toward a New Equilibrium. The Program on
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The US Ambassador John Allison concluded in 1954 that “Japan has no basic 
convictions for or against the free world”, and that Japan chose its position as a 
country with “no interest in the outside world”, which disappointed US leaders for 
the next few decades20.
The Yoshida Doctrine is as follows:
US-Japan Relations Centre for International Affairs, Harvard University. PI 85
19 Vogel, K,S. (2002) US-Japan relations in a changing world. The Brookings Instituion. P75
20 Kataoka, T. (1991) Price of a Constitution: The Origins of Japan’s post-War Politics. Crane 
Russak, New York. PI22-123
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Yoshida Doctrine
1. Japan’s economic rehabilitation must be the prime national goal. 
Political-economic cooperation with the US was necessary for this 
purpose.
2. Japan Should remain lightly armed and avoid involvement in 
international political-strategic issues. The SDF would not be deployed 
abroad. Japan would not participate in collective defence arrangements. 
Not only would this low military posture free the energies of its people 
for productive industrial development, it would prevent divisive 
domestic political struggle.
3. To gain a long-term guarantee of its own security, Japan would provide 
bases for the US Army, Navy, and Air Force.
Pyle, B, K. Japan Rising. P242
However, the US pressure for military obligation continued, and in 1954, the 
Defence Agency established the self defence force (SDF) with a total of 152,000 
personnel (for ground, maritime and air self defence forces) which was less than 
half of what the US had demanded. Yoshida took a stand against the increasing 
demands from the US for Japan to expand its contribution to the Cold War system. 
If Japan had moved toward re-militarisation with demands by the US, there would 
have been no Japanese Economic miracle21. However, this was how the narrow 
interpretation of Article 9 began. This new interpretation of Article 9 would only 
allow a military for self-defence in the event of invasion and was set as a limit to
21 Pyle, B,K. (1996) The Japanese question: power and purpose in a new era. The AEI Press. P25
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the US demands. The SDF was established in 1954 and until the end of the Cold 
War the Japanese government held that the constitution did not permit SDF 
participation in collective defence arrangements or deployment abroad.
In December 1954, Yoshida fell from power but his influence continued for 
several more decades. Nobusuke Kishi, an anti-Yoshida conservative who served 
as prime minister from 1957-1960, tried to eliminate the un-equal aspects of the 
peace treaty22 with the US. What Kishi wanted was a fixed treaty and an explicit 
guarantee of US protection in case of an attack on Japan. The left wing of the 
Japan Socialist Party (JSP) mounted public opposition which resulted in an 
historical demonstration23 against the approval of the new security treaty. It was, 
nevertheless, signed in 1960. As a result Kishi resigned, and the conservatives 
retreated to Yoshida’s economic strategy again. For the next two decades, 
Japanese leaders avoided this sensitive issue which could destabilise the national 
political order. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which was formed in 1955, 
was to be in power for the rest of the Cold War period24. The LDP maintained 
Yoshida’s strategy because of its effectiveness in dealing with the domestic 
political environment: the doctrine was a political compromise between the 
pacifism of opposition groups and the security concerns of the right-wing 
conservatives25.
22 The most unequal part of the peace treaty (from Japan’s standpoint) was permitting US 
intervention in domestic disturbances. Kishi also wanted a voice in the deployment of US forces 
stationed on Japanese soil.
23 As the final deliberations in the Diet were being completed, hundreds of thousands of protesters 
gathered in front of the Diet building and over 6 million workers went to strike.
24 Except during the Nakasone Administration (1982-1987), the LDP was dominated by people 
from the Yoshida wing.
25 Pyle. P242
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However, Yoshida himself never had any intention of seeing Japan remain 
dependent on the US for security indefinitely. As Ozawa notes in his book -  
Blueprint for a new Japan Japan should not continue to remain at the level 
where it depends on another country for its defence26. As the end of the Cold War 
changed the dynamics of the international world, pressure for a revision of the 
Yoshida doctrine started to mount. Yet, most of the attempts to revise the Yoshida 
doctrine were, almost always, a further institutionalisation of Yoshida’s view and 
a more tight alliance with the US.
The Post-Cold War period: New era
The sudden end of the Cold War made the UN take on the impossible tasks of 
intervening in conflicts all around the world. This drastic change in the 
international movement created a new concept of peace operations which was 
different from the Cold War period in which operations were mostly deployed to 
monitor cease-fire and supervise buffer zones. The size and number of operations 
were beyond the capacity of the UN, and it was very difficult for member states to 
support this particular part of the UN’s activities financially and materially. The 
first decade of the post Cold War period was a struggle for United Nations. 
Despite the increasing demands for peace operations, the will to cooperate in this 
area from its member states was in rapid decline. Like many of the other member 
states, Japan was under strong pressure from the UN and leading member states to 
become a “responsible member of the international society” and involve itself in 
UN peace activities by sending its own personnel. Until the Persian Gulf War in 
1991, neither the UN nor the US and other western countries demanded Japan’s 
presence in possible military activities, and Japan had no interest in taking part in
26 Ozawa, I. (1993) Blueprint for a new Japan. Nihonkeizai Shinbun. P132
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an unconstitutional role outside its borders. However, this new international trend 
finally put enough pressure on Japan to make drastic changes to its political 
system.
Currently, Japan is one of the strongest economic countries, and its role in 
international affairs is no longer invisible. Japan’s SDF have now been dispatched 
to UN peace operations in Cambodia, Mozambique, East Timor, and the Golan 
High among other places. After the 11 September 2001, Japan joined the 
“coalition of the willing” by dispatching SDF forces to the Indian Ocean for non­
combat roles, and later to Iraq. Japan finally began to fulfil its role in world 
security. What caused the drastic changes Japan had made during the 1990s? And 
how did the UN’s difficult experiences in peace operations relate to Japan’s 
motivation to make such changes?
F irst Expansion (1988-1991): rapid  erow in2 numbers and drastic character changes 
By the end of 1991, the UN had established ten new operations covering many 
areas of the world. This rapid expansion and growth in peace operations was 
caused by a change in the nature and number of conflicts by the end of the Cold 
War. There were a growing number of civil wars within countries27 that involved 
religion and/or race issues more than there had ever been before.
Peacekeeping Operations 1988-1991
Name Date Location M andate
UN Good Offices Mission in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan 
(UNGOMAP)
1988-1990 Afghanistan/Pakistan Monitor troop 
withdrawal & 
disengagement
UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer 1988-1991 Iran/Iraq Border Monitor cease-
27 The growing number of peace missions and the decline of war as a conflict between states can 
both be seen in the statistics: in the 21 missions deployed between 1988-1995, 13 related to 
intrastate conflicts.
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Group (UNIMOG) fire/withdrawal
UN Angolan Verification 
Mission (UNAVEM I)
1988-1991 Angola Monitor troop 
withdrawal
UN Transitional Assistance 
Group (UNTAG)
1989-1991 Namibia Supervise cease­
fire & 
government 
transition
UN Observer Group in Central 
America (ONUCA)
1989-1991 Central American 
States
Monitor
withdrawal & 
demobilization
UN Angolan Verification 
Mission II (UNAVEM II)
1991-1995 Angola Monitor cease­
fire & administer 
election
UN Iraq and Kuwait Observer 
Mission (UNIKOM)
1991-
present
Iraq/Kuwait border Monitor cease­
fire
UN Mission for the 
Referendum in Western Sahara 
(MINURSO)
1991-
present
Western Sahara Monitor cease­
fire & administer 
referendum
UN Observer Mission in El 
Salvador (ONUSAL)
1991-1995 El Salvador Monitor human 
rights, elections 
and government 
restructure
UN Advance Mission in 
Cambodia (UNAMIC)
UN Transitional Authority in 
Cambodia (UNTAC)
1991-1991
1992-1993
Cambodia Disarm factions, 
maintain order 
and supervise 
election
Table 2. 2
The increase in the number of operations was beyond the capacity of the UN 
Secretariats and the UN started to suffer a lack of finance for deploying new 
operations. With the increased number of peace operations deployed around world, 
the cost of the operations grew ever greater than before in 1992-1993 (see a table 
below). In addition, the failure of some of the member states (including the USA, 
Japan, and other major financial contributors) to pay their contributions has 
caused disastrous results in on-going operations on the ground. It was because the 
radical increase in the cost of peace operations put serious pressure on member 
states’ national budget, and it was impossible for them to contribute the full 
amount requested regularly.
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Graph 1- UN Peacekeeping Budget: Assessment vs Payments 
1990-1995
Fig 2. I 28
When the UN organizations and its Secretariats were struggling to conduct peace 
operations on the ground, the Egyptian diplomat Boutros Boutros-Ghali replaced 
De Cuellar as Secretary General at the start o f 1992. This new Secretary General 
quickly took action to reform the existing UN system to manage peace operations. 
In January 1992, at the first ever meeting o f the Security Council with the heads 
o f state and governments present, the Council asked Boutros-Ghali to offer an 
analysis o f ways for strengthening the United Nations’ organization in the realm 
o f international peace and security. He responded with a definitive statement 
about the role o f the UN in the post-Cold War world, entitled An Agenda for  
Peace29 in the middle o f June 1992. This report reflected the changing attitude 
towards conflicts resolution, indicative o f the changing nature o f the U N ’s actions 
in the post-Cold War era. However, the growing number and size o f operations 
and difficulties o f conflicts did not stop. The UN was to face more difficulties 
over the next few years.
28 UN Peacekeeping budget 1990-1995: Assessments vs Payments.
http://www.globalpolicv.org/finance/index.htm
29 A Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to the Statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of 
the Security Council on 31 January 1992. A/47/277 - S/24111. 17 June 1992
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The first three years of the post-Cold War era started with unqualified success for 
UN peace operations. This gave unwarranted confidence in the conduct of peace 
operations and led the UN to establish larger, more costly and complex operations 
in the next phase. However, those successes masked many of the serious problems 
which contributed to the failure of subsequent operations.
Japan s first attempt: to become more active participant
Once the Cold War system disappeared, the impact on both Yoshida’s strategy 
and “the 1955 system” of political order faced profound disruption. How Japan 
was unprepared for this new international environment become clear at the very 
beginning of the 1990s. It began with a major event, which was of course the 
Persian Gulf War in 1990, when the UN organized an international coalition 
under its resolution in which Japan could not participate because of its pacifist 
constitution prohibiting any involvement in military activities30. As a result, Japan 
lost its reputation and respect in the international arena, and its national pride was 
threatened. Now, its foreign policy and narrow interpretation of its constitution 
which had kept Japan from international involvement had to be confronted with 
the reality outside Japan.
The most fundamental issue was whether the constitution permitted collective 
security or not. According to the CLB’s interpretation, even under the 
authorization of the UN, the dispatch of SDF personnel to join the coalition in any 
form was constitutionally prohibited31. With no hope of sending its own personnel
30 Ismael, Y. T. (1994) The Gulf War and the new world order: international relations of the Middle 
East. The University Press of Florida. PI 39
31 The CLB refused to approve a proposal by the Defence Agency to send transport planes to 
rescue refugees. Samuels, J.R. “Politics, Security Policies, and Japan’s cabinet legislation bureau: 
Who Elected these guys anyway?” JPRI Working paper, no99 (March 2004), p i06.
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under the current constitution, the Japanese government decided to make US$13 
million contribution to support the coalition. This ended up as criticism by other 
developed countries as “check book diplomacy”. This experience of the Gulf War 
was very humiliating in the eyes of the majority of the Japanese people and shook 
the very foundation of the Yoshida doctrine for the first time in its post-World 
War II history32.
In the early 1990s, Germany -  another defeated country named as an “enemy 
state” in UN Charter -  started to find its role in this new world order. Germany 
also had strict limitations on maintaining or deploying military forces outside the 
country. In 1994, Germany’s Constitutional Court decided that German forces 
could be deploy on UN missions when supported by majority vote in the federal 
parliament. Involvement in UN peace mission was a contentious political issue for 
Germany as well . For Germany progress to adapt to the post-Cold War 
environment began with participation in UN peace operations in Somalia and 
Bosnia in medical and logistical roles34. Japan’s intention was exactly the same. 
Now, the majority of the Japanese public supported this intention, and with 
expectations from the international society already proved, the bases for radical 
change were complete. However, many conservative politicians believed that 
Japan must adhere to its established politics regardless of the foreign criticism.
In September 1991, the Japanese Government introduced a new draft legislation 
that would permit the dispatch of the SDF to peace operations, only under UN
32 Nakanishi, H. “The Japan-US alliance and Japanese Domestic Politic; Sources for change, 
Prospects for the Future”, Armacost, H.M. and Okimoto, I. D. (2004)The Future of American’s 
Alliances in Northern Asia, edited (Stanford: Asia-Pacific Research Center), p i06
33 Whitworth, S. (2004) Men, Militarism, and UN peacekeeping: a gendered analysis. Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, Inc. P35
34 Samuels. P87
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command35. The final product was the Law Concerning Co-operation fo r United 
Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations technically known as 
“the International Peace Co-operation Law” which passed the Diet on June 15 
1992.36 This new legal framework enabled Japan to participate in UN peace 
operations and international humanitarian relief activities for the first time in post 
World War II history. The law empowers the Japanese Government to dispatch 
SDF personnel to UN peace activities, going beyond the logistical nature of any 
action being “frozen” until a new legislation is enacted. However, conditions for 
dispatch were quite restrictive in scope. This law stipulated five conditions which 
must be satisfied before a Japanese contingent could be dispatched:
•  a cease fire must be in place;
•  parties to the conflicts must have given their consent to the operation;
•  activities must be conducted in a strictly impartial manner;
•  participation may be suspended or terminated if  any o f the “above
conditions ceases to be satisfied; and
•  use o f weapons shall be limited to the minimum necessary to protect life
or person o f the personnel.37
Since its enactment in 1992, Japan has been involved in several operations by 
sending its personnel, including the SDF to Angola (1992), Cambodia (1992), 
Mozambique (1993), El Salvador (1994), Rwanda (1994), former-Yugoslavia 
(1998, 2000), and East-Timor (1999, 2001).38 On 8th September 1991, just a week
35The definition of “under UN command” was unclear in this first legislation.
36 Japan’s International Peace Cooperation Law.
37 “The International Peace Cooperation Law 1992”. An Article 3 defined the necessary conditions 
to dispatching Japanese personnel to UN peacekeeping operations.
38 These are the operations in which Japan sent its personnel under the International Cooperation
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after the Peacekeeping Law had gone into effect, the cabinet approved the 
dispatch of 600 SDF engineers to Takeo Province and 8 military observers to sites 
throughout Cambodia for the UNTAC operation. In addition, 75 policemen were 
to be sent to UNTAC’s CIVPOL unit. Since the Japanese government had been 
looking for an opportunity in Cambodia long before the UN started the peace 
process there in late the 1980s, when the UN peace operation was set to take place, 
the LDP party and Miyazawa administration took advantage of this opportunity. 
In addition, Japanese participation in UNTAC was a big achievement for MOFA, 
and it was relatively easy to generate support and enthusiasm for the Cambodian 
operation because Japan had a strong interest in East Asian affairs and numerous 
ties with the region.39
Crisis of Peace Operations : new challenges (1992-1994)
The first ever Chapter VII enforcement action by the UN in the Gulf Crisis 
indicated that the world had entered a new era. Most of all, the war was 
undertaken by a Security Council resolution and for the first time since the 
Korean War, the collective security provisions (Chapter VII) were successfully 
brought into play on the use of force. Since the Gulf War, the role of the UN with 
military involvement in international peace and security has become more 
complicated, which effectively limits the role member states can possibly play in 
peace operations.
Law during the period 1992-2002.
39 Heinrich, L. W., A. Shibata, et al. (1999). UN peace-keeping operations : a guide to Japanese 
policies. Tokyo ; New York, United Nations University Press.
P26
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In An Agenda for Peace, Boutros-Ghali opined that political consensus was easier to 
achieve on the Security Council, the UN could undertake more complex 
operations in international arena.40
Peacekeeping operations in 1992-1994
Name Date Location M andate
UN Operations in 
Somalia I 
(UNOSOM)
1992-1993 Somalia Protect humanitarian 
supplies
UN Protection Force 
(UNPROFOR)
1992-1995 F ormer-Y ugoslavia Protect delivery of aid, 
supervise Cease-fires
UN Operation in
Mozambique
(ONUMOZ)
1992-1994 Mozambique Demobilization and 
Disarmament
UN Operation in 
Somalia (UNSOMII)
1993-1995 Somalia Protect Humanitarian 
Supplies
UN Observer Mission
Uganda-Rwanda
(UNOMUR)
1993-1994 Uganda-Rwanda Monitor Border Violation
Table 2. 3
The growing number of peace operations in the post-Cold War era took place 
without appropriate analysis on how the problems posed by past operations could 
be useful for the future. Both the UN Secretariats and member states had no time 
to consider anything else but the operations on the ground. The year 1992 became 
a “key year” for the UN to reconsider the definition o f peace operations. The 
crises in Somalia and Yugoslavia represented the beginning o f a realization 
amongst the UN member states that the “New World Order” was not easy to 
build.41 The basic mission for traditional peace forces was to help implement 
negotiated agreement. In Somalia and Yugoslavia, however, no such settlement 
seemed possible. In both situations, the UN ended up providing only humanitarian 
comfort to civilians suffering the consequences o f violence. This humanitarian
40 J,Hillen. (2000) Blue Helmets. The Strategy of UN Military Operations. Brassey’s. US. PI 39.
41 Ex-president Bush’s speech on victory of the operation and the new world order in the 1990s, 
after the Gulf Crisis of 1990-1991.
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intervention type o f mission was established in the early 1990s42 in line with U N ’s 
new policy on disaster situations. This new principle became one o f the central 
approaches for the UN. The fundamental principle o f the UN peace operation was 
gradually being ignored with the chaotic requests from UN forces present in 
conflict zones. The purpose o f the UN peace operations is not to mediate between 
the conflicting parties. The fundamental role is “to restore” peace on the ground 
and provide security and safety for civilians”. This important principle became 
sidelined for the next few years. The U N ’s painful experiences in Somalia and 
Yugoslavia left many lessons for future operations. The UN most significant 
lesson learned is that it lacked the ability and experiences to plan and conduct 
large complex operations.
Peacekeeping operations 1994-1995
Name Date Location Mandate
UN Confidence Restoration 
Operation (UNCRO)
1994-
present
Croatia Provide secure environment
UN Protection Force 
(UNPROFOR)
1992-
present
Bosnia Continue with its existing 
mandate
UN Preventive Deployment 
(UNPREDEP)
1995-
present
Former
Yugoslavia
Monitor border area
UN Assistance Mission in 
Rwanda (UNAMIR)
1994-
present
Rwanda Supervise cease-fire & provide 
secure environment
UN Verification Mission in 
Angola (UNAVEM III)
1995-
present
Angola Supervise cease-fire & provide 
secure environment
Table 2. 4
One other issue is that regarding cooperation from member states. The experience 
in Somalia left huge impact on the way the UN planned and conducted future 
peace operations. The murder o f  American soldiers in Somalia in October 1993 
was a turning point for both the United Nations and the United States. The US 
attitude towards UN peace operations became restrictive - Congress began a series 
o f measures designed to limit American contributions to peace operations. This
42 It was used for the first time to protect the Kurdish minority in northern Iraq.
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incident showed how difficult and complex to deploy peace operations (especially 
with the enforcement power) in failed states to compared with the operations 
which the UN had undertaken before the Cold War end43.
However, the changing US attitude opened the door for external participants on 
this area. Japan, for instance, was one of the countries which took this opportunity 
to show its abilities in one of UN’s main activities. India, Pakistan and many 
African countries also began to contribute personnel to the peace operations44. 
With careful planning and conduct, the United Nations could now deploy peace 
keeping forces with cooperation from member states which has never put 
themselves forward to take a role in UN operations before. This new era definitely 
gave opportunities for both the UN and its member states to share responsibilities 
which had previously only been shared by the super powers (sometimes as part 
their power game in the Security Council). What the painful experiences of the 
1990s have left for the United Nations is a slight hope for the next phase which 
includes more willingness on the part of the member states to actively participate 
in peace operations.
Javan and their role in UN peace operations
Within the framework of the International Peace Cooperation Law, Japan also 
sent about 400 members of the SDF engineer or transport units to Goma (Zaire) 
and Nairobi (Kenya) in response to an appeal from the UNHCR. The Japanese 
government was not keen to send their SDF to operations in Africa -  the Japanese
43 Rotberg, R. (2000) Peacekeeping and peace enforcement in Africa: method of conflict 
prevention. Brooking Institution Press. P69
44 Sorenson, S.D. and Wood, C. P. (2005) The Politics of peacekeeping in the post-Cod War era. 
Frank Cass. P205
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public showed their pessimism for participation due to the loss o f Japanese lives 
in Cambodia. However, the government and MOFA did not miss this second 
opportunity. Dr. Sadako Ogata - director o f UNHCR - made a direct approach to 
the Japanese government for Japan’s presence in the UNHCR mission in Rwanda, 
and after a month of discussion, the government finally agreed to send the SDF45.
In a refugee relief mission, the SDF engaged in humanitarian assistance in 
medical services, sanitation, water supply and aircrafts, and accomplished 
missions without any serious incidents. Ever since the Cambodian operation, over 
3000 Japanese personnel have participated in UN peace operations and 
humanitarian intervention activities.
Japanese Participation in UN Peace operations
Dispatched personnel based on the International Peace Cooperation Law 1992
August 1992: International Peace Cooperation Law enacted
UNAVEM 1992.9-10 Electoral Observers 3
UNTAC 1992.9-1993.9
Cease-fire Observers 8 
Civilian Police Officers 75 
Engineer Units 600 
Electoral Observers 41
ONUMOZ 1993.5-1995.1
Staff Officers 5 
Transport Units 48 
Electoral Observers 15
ONUSAL 1994.3-4 Electoral Observers 15
The UNHCR mission on the 
relief of Rwanda Refugees 1994.9-12
Ground Units 283 
Air Transport 118
UNDOF 1996.2-present Staff Officers 2 Transport Units 43
June 1998: The Amendment o f  International Peace Cooperation Law
UNAMET 1999.7-9 Civil Police Units 3
The UNHCR mission on the 
relief of East Timorese 
Displaced Persons
1999.11-2000.2 Air Transport Units 113
East Timor International 
Peace Cooperation Units 2001.8-2001.9 Electoral Observers 14
45 Dobson. PI49
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The UNHCR mission on the 
relief of Afghan Refugees 2001.10-present Air Transport Units 140
UNTAET 2002.2-present Staff Officers 10Engineer Units 522 (in 10 months shifts)
Table 2. 5
According to the results of a public opinion poll on diplomacy conducted by the 
Prime Minister’s office in November 2002, over 70% of the Japanese public 
supported their country’s participation in UN peace operations (and_only 13 % 
were against it)46. A similar poll conducted earlier in 1991 had indicated that only 
45% of the population was in favour of participation, so there had clearly been a 
great change in public opinion 47 Since the first personnel dispatch to Cambodia, 
both the Japanese government and public were getting used to the idea of sending 
troops to both UN operations and to international humanitarian interventions. 
However, difficulties and criticism on what Japan’s participation should be 
continued. In 1998, the Japanese Diet passed an amendment to the International 
Peace Cooperation Law which enabled Japan to take part in election monitoring 
activities. As a result, at the request of international humanitarian relief operations, 
Japan started providing personnel for international election monitoring activities 
in areas disrupted by conflict48 The amendment in 1998 also allowed the SDF to 
use weapons for self-defence only, for the first time 49
UN peace operations in the new era: reform for the future
The crisis of the mid-1990s prompted some serious analysis of peace operations at 
the UN Headquarters in New York. In 1999, two inquiries were made into the
46 Source: Prime minister’s Office. Kokusaiheiwagyoumu nikansuru kokumin no ishiki cyousa. 
Year 1991 and 2002.
47 Morrison, A., K. Eyre, et al. (1997). Facing the future : proceedings of the 1996 Canada-Japan 
Conference on Modem Peacekeeping. Clementsport, N.S., Canadian Peacekeeping Press. 
Nishimura, M. “A Japanese Perspective on Peacekeeping” (P71-75.) P74
48 Amendment to the International Peace Cooperation Law. (Houritsu dai 102 gou. 1998)
49 Amendment to the International Peace Cooperation Law on Self-Defence. 
http://www.mofa.go.ip/mofai/gaiko/pko/ho kaisei.html
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well-known peace operation failures in Rwanda and Yugoslavia. By exploring the 
failings of the UN system and the uncooperative attitudes of member states, 
recommendations for reform were offered. Further review by the UN itself 
resulted in more criticism. The Brahimi Report, released in August 2000, 
attempted to formalise the reform process to improve the capacity of UN peace 
operations.
One significant step taken by the UN in the 1990s was deploying peace operations 
under Chapter VII of its Charter. During the 1990s, a shared understanding of the 
necessity of peace enforcement action emerged amongst academics and the major 
Western militaries that contributed troops to peace operations. These included the 
Australian-led force in East Timor (INTERFET), the NATO’s Balkan operations 
-  the Implementation and Stabilisation Force in Bosnia (IFOR and SFOR) -  and 
the Kosovo Force (KFOR). Despite the US foreign policy on the UN peace 
operations, more countries started contributing troops to operations. In Sierra 
Leone (UNOMSIL), the main contributors to the operation were the United 
Kingdom50, Nigeria and India. In the year 2000, the top 4 states contributing 
military personnel were India (3233), Nigeria (2931), Jordan (1816) and 
Bangladesh (1774) followed by Ghana, Australia, and Kenya51. This is one of the 
obvious changes to UN peace operations in the 1990s. Also, there was active 
cooperation by regional organizations such as ECOWAS, AU and ECOMOG. 
Since the late 1990s, active involvement by regional organizations helped the 
United Nations to deploy adequate peace operations. The United Nations was still 
suffering from a lack of personnel and finances for planning and conducting peace
50 The UK took the leading role in the mission in Sierra Leone.
51 Source: UN DPKO. Miltary personnel contributions: Monthly averages of the top twenty 
contributors for the period from January to November 2000.
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operations at the end o f 1990s. Therefore, cooperation with regional organizations 
and neighbouring states became an essential part o f a successful peace operation. 
However, with regards to financial contribution for peace operations, the major 
contributors have not changed dramatically with the US at 54.5%, Japan 14.4%, 
Ukraine 9.1%, France 3.7%, and Russian Federation 3.2%52.
Since the middle o f the 1990s, the UN has launched peace operations in Haiti, the 
Democratic Republic o f the Congo (DRC), East Timor, Ethiopia/Eritrea, Kosovo, 
Sierra Leone and Liberia, and there has been a corresponding increase in the 
number o f UN peacekeepers (the operations in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and 
Congo are large complex operations in difficult environments to which the United 
Nations has directed significant military forces). By the year 2003, the number of  
military personnel and civilian police serving in peace operations had risen to 
45,732.53 The late 1990s and the beginning o f the 21st century also revealed a new 
level o f complexity for UN peace operations. The UN assumed the role o f  
transitional administration in the missions in Kosovo and East Timor, and to some 
extent, Afghanistan and Iraq.
Peace operations 1996-
Name Date Location Mandate
UN Transitional 
Administration for 
Eastern Slavonia, 
Baranja and Western 
Sirmium (UNTAES)
1996-
present
Eastern Slavonia, 
Branja, and Western 
Sirmium
Transitional
Administration
UN Mission of 
Observers in Prevlaka 
(UNMOP)
1996-2002 Croatia Monitor border area
UN Support Mission in 
Haiti (UNSMIH)
1996-1997 Haiti Modernize police 
and army of Haiti
52 Source: UN DPKO. Total outstanding financial contributors for prior period as at 31 October 
2000. The peacekeeping budget cycle from July 2000 to June 2001.
53 United Nations peacekeeping operations on going missions. Background Note: 15 January 2004.
Source: http:/Avww.un. org/peace/bnot eO 10101 .pdf
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UN Verification 
Mission in Guatemala 
(MINUGUA)
1997-1997 Guatemala Monitor ceasefire in 
Guatemala’s civil 
war
UN Observer Mission 
in Angola (MONUA)
1997-1999 Angola Monitor ceasefire 
and disarmament
UN Transitional 
Mission in 
Haiti(UNTMIH)
1997-1997 Haiti Help stabilize Haiti
UN Civilian Police 
Mission in 
Haiti(MIPONUH)
1997-2000 Haiti Modernise Haiti’s 
Police forces
UN Mission in the 
Central African 
Republic (MINURCA)
1998-2000 The Central African 
Republic
Maintain security 
and stability in The 
Central African 
Republic
UN Observer Mission 
in Sierra Leone 
(UNOMSIL)
1998-1999 Sierra Leone Monitor
disarmament and 
demobilization in 
Sierra Leone
UN Interim 
Administration Mission 
in Kosovo (UNMIK)
1999-
Present
Kosovo Exercise 
administrative 
authority, including 
administration of 
justice in Kosovo
UN Mission in Sierra 
Leone (UNAMSIL)
1999-
Present
Sierra Leone Help Stabilize and 
disarm Sierra Leone
UN Transitional 
Administration in East 
Timor (UNTAET)
1999-2002 East Timor Transition East 
Timor to 
independence
UN Organization 
Mission in Democratic 
Republic of the Congo 
(MONUC)
1999-
Present
Congo Monitor ceasefire in 
Democratic 
Republic of the 
Congo
Table 2. 6
What has been chansed?
In the history of UN peace operations, the role and purpose of peace operations 
has changed from that of being a simple mediator to a nation-builder. The United 
Nations deployed few observer missions in its early years, however, UN missions 
did not receive public attention, thus, the term "peacekeeping” was not popularly 
used until 1956. The initial observation type missions presented minimal 
management challenges to the UN. These missions consisted of no more than a 
few hundred military observers who were equipped only with side arms. On the 
other hand, subsequent traditional peacekeeping operations were deployed with a 
slightly more complex military task than just observation. These traditional peace
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operations consisted of a few thousand lightly armed troops, typically deployed in 
an international buffer zone to separate warring belligerents. Their mandates were 
mainly on monitoring a ceasefire, and controlling buffer zones. Most of the 
operations were temporary arrangements but they lasted a longer time if 
peacemaking efforts were slow to succeed -  UNTSO has been deployed in the 
Near East for more than 50 years and UNFICYP in Cyprus for almost 40 years.54 
Traditional peacekeepers were not authorized to use force to fulfil their mandate -  
force was only to be used for self-defence.
Peacekeeping operations after year 2000
Name Date Location M andate
UN Mission in Ethiopia 
and Eritrea (UNMEE)
2000-present Ethiopia and 
Eritrea
Enforce ceasefire 
between Ethiopia and 
Eritrea
UN Mission o f Support in 
East Timor (UNMISET)
2000-present East Timor 2 years mission while 
East Timor develops 
government
UN Mission in Liberia 
(UNMIL)
2003-present Liberia Oversee ceasefire and 
train national people
Table 2. 7
The United Nations’ experiences in the 1990s made one thing clear: regardless of 
the difficulties, UN peace operations could settle conflict situations and build 
stable societies provided necessary conditions were in place. With the increased 
number of brutal conflicts around the world, the UN deployed more peace 
operations than ever before in the 1990s. However, deploying peace operations is 
not the solution for states in chaos. Without “will” from host countries (including 
the fighting parties), peace missions will not achieve their mandates. A UN peace 
operation is only a support system for a state in crisis in order to re-build social 
systems. Furthermore, because of the complexity and violence of conflicts in the
54 Goulding, M. The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping. International Affairs. July 1993.
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post-Cold War era, several peace operations were deployed under Chapter VII of 
UN Charter. It was a necessary measure to protect the lives of thousands of 
peacekeepers on the ground, and enable a smooth transition for the operations. 
Nevertheless, the UN should not use enforcement action unless it is necessary. 
The experiences in Somalia and Yugoslavia highlighted the risks for the UN in 
becoming another party in battle. When the UN calls for personnel contributions 
to missions to unstable situations, member states should have the right to protect 
their troops should the mission be life threatening and decline cooperation.
Because o f the bitter experiences from unsuccessful peace operations in the 1990s, 
and the urgent need for reform of the UN organizational structure in deploying 
more adequate undertakings, the UN made the most out of this opportunity to re­
examine the environment surrounding peace operations. There are two 
remarkable reports reviewing UN peace operations in the 1990s, and both reports 
gave vital recommendations and analysis on how UN peace operations can 
become more effective -  which the UN is still working on55. For the future, 
member states, regional organizations and all related organizations must cooperate 
more effectively in order to deploy operations.
Japans experiences in the 1990s
Through the 1990s, Japan made remarkable changes in its policy towards UN 
peace operations and humanitarian relief operations. On occasions, Japan’s 
presence in UN operations has made an impact on the host country and conflicting 
parties. Several Japanese diplomats said that both Cambodia and East Timor
55 United States Department of State (2007) United States Participation in the United Nations: A 
report by the Secretary of State to the Congress for the Year 2007. P63
76
leaders requested Japan’s presence in UN operations56. In most cases, Japan has 
strong relations with East Asian countries, and a strong influence in the region as 
a result of Japan being a super economic power in the region with its development 
assistance being very successful in many of the countries. The UN lacked reliable 
financial and personnel contributions and this is something the organization could 
not have since its chaotic peace missions in the early 1990s. There are still 
limitations for Japan’s personnel contribution due to its legislative restriction, 
however, what Japan offered to UN peace missions was not enforcement power, 
but rather something that was related to the peacebuilding phase. It is apparent 
that the increase in Japanese involvement in peace operations in the 1990s was by 
and large due to the lack of resources experienced by the UN. The timing was 
perfect as Japan had been looking for a way to make a significant and noticeable 
contribution.
56 Source: interview by author.
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Chapter 3 UN peace operations in Cambodia 1992: Javan's first
attempt
The focus of this chapter will be on UN peace operations at the beginning of the 
1990s as well as Japan’s first involvement in the area of peace operations. It will 
study the development of UN peace operations in the 1990s from the viewpoint of 
the UN and from Japan. There will be analyses of the many difficulties that the 
UN faced during this period and also how Japan was able to find its place amidst 
the crises that the UN was facing. Thus, it will identify why and how Japan began 
to contribute in UN peace operations, and discover the distinctive ways in which it 
did. In order to understand this, the progression of events as well as historical 
developments will be referred to as well as some of the key events for the 
transitions in policy/strategy that took place.
The operations in Cambodia were the UN’s first attempt to deploy 
multidimensional operations in the post-Cold War era. This was also a first time 
opportunity for Japan to show its presence in an international dispute in its post- 
World War II history. Prior to the Gulf War crisis, no structure had been placed in 
the way that would allow it to react to international crises. Japan was under the 
protection of the US and was comfortable being able to justify the non-existence 
of a military force due to its constitution. The Japanese public as well as members 
of the Diet were not prepared to send Japanese troops into risky environments. 
There had been debates about whether Japan had the responsibility of contributing 
but it was only after the humiliating criticism regarding Japan’s response to the 
Gulf War crisis that Japan’s domestic politics took a transition to adopt a new 
international outlook. The case in Cambodia was the perfect opportunity for Japan
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to pressure the Diet to make changes1. Japan’s new foreign policy was on being 
“Asian central” and in addition, Cambodia and neighbouring states requested 
Japan’s active involvement. Therefore, it was the perfect timing for Japan to take 
advantage of this opportunity. In order to avoid unnecessary conflict with 
countries in the region apprehensive about what appeared to be Japan’s 
remilitarization, Japan’s stance was to act under UN authorization2. The most 
remarkable progress that it had made was allowing for the dispatch of SDF units -  
this was seen as a symbol of Japan’s new attitude to international matters and 
collective security. However, this was not die only contribution Japan made 
during this peace process. During the peace process and peace operations, Japan 
not only provided material support to the United Nations but also provided a 
diplomatic structure to pave the foundations for the road to peace.
The increase in the number of conflicts and the complexity of each UN operation 
required ever more support from its members. In particular, new participants such 
as Japan, Australia, and Canada -  “middle power” countries -  could play 
distinctive roles in their own capacity3. What the United Nations needed was 
varying contributions from each member state, and there was no requirement or 
definition on the ways in which they could contribute to each mission. Therefore, 
the resulting contribution by Japan was very distinct from other countries and 
characteristic of a country that had rebuilt its nation from ruins to an economic 
powerhouse with much political influence. The distinctive nature of its 
contribution was not due to Japan wanting international recognition but was a
1 Irie, A. (1990) Nihon no Gaikou. Cyukoushinsyo. P200
2 Rose, C. (2000) Japanese Role in peacekeeping and Humanitarian Aid. From Japan Foreign 
Policy Today. Ed. Inoguchi, T. Palgrave. P I28
3 Cooper, F. A. (1993) Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in Changing World Order. 
UBC Press. P I8
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natural consequence given its strength and experience in rebuilding a nation. The 
UN Secretariat’s role proved vital in recognizing the different ways in which 
countries can contribute to peace operations. What Japan portrayed through this 
peace process was that Japan -  the world’s second largest economic country with 
the experiences of rehabilitation and rebuilding the society -  could be relied upon 
as an active participant in the field of UN peace operations4.
UN and Cambodia until the late 1980s
Until the late 1980s, Cambodia had experienced frequent and drastic changes in 
its political and economic regimes since its independence in 1953. The country 
had suffered not only the effects of the overspill of the war in Viet Nam, but also 
devastating civil wars and the destructive totalitarian regime of Pol Pot. A number 
of attempts were made by the United Nations to negotiate peace between the 
nominal Cambodian government and the three resistance factions within the 
country. However, these attempts ended in failure. An international effort to make 
a possible peace process was first considered by UN Security Council in early 
1979. It was due to the military coup in 1970 which launched Cambodia into a 
civil war. On 17 April 1975 radical Khmer Rouge forces were released in the 
country, overthrowing the America-backed Lon Nol military government, and 
establishing Democratic Kampuchea. The horror of the preceding years of civil 
war was replaced with a new kind of terror as the Khmer Rouge embarked upon a 
grotesque social experiment of anti-development.5 Under the Khmer Rouge rule, 
most of the county’s economic and social infrastructure was dismantled. Over the
4 Warren, S. (1997) Japan's quest: the search for international role, recognition, and respect. 
M.E. Sharpe. Inc. P26
5 Curtis, G and United Nations. Research Institute for Social Development. (1993). Transition to 
what? : Cambodia. UNTAC and the peace process. Geneva, United Nations Research Institute for 
Social Development.
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course of 3 years, 8 months and 20 days of the Khmer Rouge experiment, as many 
as 1 million people (1 in 7 Cambodians) were tortured and executed, or died of 
hard labour, malnutrition and disease -  a manifestation of auto-genocide in world 
history6.
The Vietnamese invaded Cambodia in 1978 in response to repeated border 
violations by the Khmer Rouge, and the forces of Democratic Kampuchea were 
pushed to the Thai border. Progress was made in 1982 when the Khmer Rouge 
entered into an alliance with Cambodia’s non-Communist resistance forces, 
establishing the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) under 
the nominal leadership of HRH Prince Sihanouk. Meanwhile, the Vietnamese 
installed a Communist style regime known as the People’s Republic of 
Kampuchea (PRK)7. Cambodia’s social reconstruction demanded the creation of 
a normal economic and social structure from an almost complete void. During the 
1980s, international emergency relief efforts provided necessary equipment and 
helped to re-establish more than 100 clinics and hospitals and some 6,000 schools. 
With the progress of social reconstruction in Cambodia, the UN decided to 
involve itself in the peace process with cooperation from member states.
Javan and Cambodia until the peace process
The rising domestic and international pressure for Japan to play a practical role 
found an opportunity in the Cambodian peace process. MOFA had been seeking 
more active roles in UN activities long before the Gulf War crisis. Japan was
6 Bergin, S. (2009) The Khmer Rouge and the Cambodian Genocide. The Rosen Publishing Group. 
P29
7 Hughes, C. (2009) Dependents Communities: aid and politics in Cambodia and East Timor. 
Cornell Southeast Programme Publications. P I76
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seeking a more diplomatic role in the region as one of the developed countries, 
and it had no interest in participating in UN peace operations by sending its own
Q
personnel. Japan’s position in relation to the Cambodian conflict was in line with 
the majority of Western countries: the Japanese government acknowledged the 
CGDK and supported the position of Prince Sihanouk. However, Japan was in no 
position to take a larger part in this case due to complicated regional 
confrontations9. By the end of the 1980s, only Vietnam and the USSR supported 
the Phnom Penh government, while all other countries (PRC, USA, ASEAN 
nations) including Japan supported the CGDK. Since Japan proclaimed its “Asian 
Central Foreign Policy” as “a member of Asia10”, MOFA began to analyse 
Japan’s possible contributions for future opportunities and at the beginning of the 
1990s, an opportunity was presented by HRH Prince Sihanouk and the 
government of Thailand.
In April 1990, the government of Thailand offered the Japanese government a 
bilateral collaboration on the Cambodian peace settlement at a top-level 
conference held in Tokyo11: Prime Minister Chatichati suggested hosting a peace 
conference in Tokyo in June with participation from all Cambodian parties. 
Because MOFA had been actively establishing connections between all 
Cambodian parties, especially with Prince Sihanouk since the beginning of the 
1980s, Japan could not hope for better chance. Also, because this opportunity was 
provided by the Thai government, Japan was able to accept without hesitation its
8
9 The USA versus USSR, PRC versus USSR, and PRC versus Vietnam were the typical 
confrontations on Indo-Chinese Peninsula during the Cold War Period. After the end of the Cold 
War, the confrontation between the PRC and Vietnam was the central issue to resolving 
Cambodian Conflict.
10 Y, Hirono. (2000) Nihon Gaiko-shi Note. Koyo syobou. P I81
11 Y, Imagawa. (2000) Cambodia and Nihon. Rengo-syutupan. P93
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involvement in this peace process in the East Asian region. Despite its ambition to 
play an active role in the East Asian region, the fresh memory of Japan’s acts of 
aggression in WWII was something not easily forgotten by most countries. Japan 
feared that its involvement in the region would provoke much uneasiness in 
neighbouring countries. Thus, Japan had been waiting for an opportunity like this 
(an offer from other Asian states to get involved) for a long time12. As soon as the 
Thai-Japan conference was over, MOFA sent Ambassador Ikeda to Prince 
Sihanouk, with Ambassador Imai to the Phnom Penh Government and the 
Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK)13 to discuss details of 
a peace talk which Japan was planning to host14. The main purpose of the Tokyo 
conference was the meeting of Sihanouk (President of NGC15) and Hun Sen 
(Prime Minister of Phnom Penh government) -  the two key parties in Cambodian 
conflict. As Japan was beginning this new role in the international arena, it started 
to make use of its major strength -  its diplomatic skills. At the same time, the 
Japanese government was trying to enact a new bill which would allow SDF to 
participate in UN peace operations. However, given the narrow interpretation of 
Article 9, the process was not easy.
According to Hook, there are four different interpretations of Article 9 of the 
Japanese Constituion.
1) The LDP government’s interpretation that, as the first clause of Article 9 does 
not go so far as to deny the right of self-defence, necessary minimum defence
12 Source: Interview with Shinsuke Shimizu, (Director of Southwest Asia Division.
13 Japanese Diet Proceeding Record. January-June 1990.
14 Ambassador Ikeda and Imai were the key persons behind the scenes to the Cambodian peace 
process: their personal connection with Cambodian parties especially with the trust of Prince 
Sihanouk was an advantage for Japan’s diplomatic activities until the end of UN mission in 
Cambodia.
15 The CDGK changed its name to National Government of Cambodia (NGC) in 3 February 1990.
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can be maintained based on the second clause.
2) The Ashida interpretation that, although the first clause if Article 9 does deny 
aggressive wars, as it does not deny wars of self-defence, was potential for 
self-defence can be maintain.
3) The dominant interpretation of constitutional scholars that, as the first clause 
of Article 9 renounces all wars, second clause prohibits the possession of all 
forms of war potential.
4) The Naganuma court decision that, although the first clause of Article 9 does 
not deny wars of self-defence, as the second clause prohibits all forms of war 
potential, the result is that wars of self-defence also are prohibited.16
There is no easy way to settle with one particular interpretation, and ever since the 
establishment of the Constitution under US occupation, the Japanese government 
and public have recycled the same argument time and again over its interpretation. 
Therefore, given its restrictions, Japan found a way to use diplomacy (which was 
without restriction) as a first step to involving itself in international affairs.
Japan’s diplomatic effort was a success; at the Tokyo conference, Sihanouk and 
Hun Sen made significant progress in the peace process. Both leaders agreed to a 
cease-fire, and a power sharing formula during the transition period before 
elections. Japan’s effort was recognised by the UN and its member states for the 
first time. This achievement was possible due to the strong support from the Thai 
government: Bangkok and Tokyo made a draft of agreement before the Tokyo 
conference in consultation with the three Cambodian parties of CGDK17. One
16 Hook, G, D. (1996) Militarisation and De-militarisation of Japan in contemporary Japan. 
Routledge, NY. P78
17 A comment of Japanese Foreign Minister Nakayama’s at the Special committee for the
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issue remaining from this conference was that the Khmer Rouge refused to 
participate in any of the meetings, so therefore, an agreement was signed only by 
Sihanouk and Hun Sen. This was the beginning of the resistance movement and 
the isolation of Khmer Rouge in the peace process. MOFA sent their officials 
before the Tokyo conference, and again at the beginning of 1991 to Phnom Penh 
to establish a diplomatic channel. Japan made its move very quickly behind the 
scenes. Because of its economic and political influence, and also as a neutral 
country in the Cambodian conflicts, Japan was able to gain the trust of all parties18.
With the success of the Tokyo conference, the Cambodian peace process was well 
on its way. Most of the process though, especially the preparation for the peace 
agreement was handled by the UN Security Council, and taken out of Japan’s 
hands. However, the Gulf War crisis in January 1991 became the centre of 
attention at the UN, and the Cambodian peace process took a back seat until April 
1991 when the war ended. During this period, the Japanese government earnestly 
showed its diplomatic skills. Firstly, it made a supplemental suggestion19 to the P5 
proposal for the peace agreement, and had several meetings with each Cambodian 
party. The suggestions were not agreed upon by all Cambodian parties and this 
made it clear to the permanent 5 that their proposal was inadequate for all parties 
to accept.
At the same time, debate in Japan’s National Diet concentrated on whether or not 
Japan should send SDF troops to the UN peacekeeping operation in Cambodia.
Peacekeeping operations.
18 Source; Interview with MOFA official.
19Japan’s proposal was not an “official” proposal. It was a supplemental plan (or more like a 
suggestion) for the ceasefire and disarmament of the “P5 proposal” to the Cambodian parties.
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Because of the restriction by Article 9 of the Constitution, if the United Nations 
requested a troop contribution to the Cambodian operation, Japan would require 
an amendment to its Constitutional Law. It is well known that the Japanese SDF is 
one of the best equipped and trained militaries in the region and in the world. 
Several tasks for peacekeeping operations required military experts,20 and the 
future operation in Cambodia was to involve military elements. Therefore, the 
participation of Japan’s SDF was to be of significant benefit for the Cambodian 
people, the United Nations, and most of all Japan itself. For this particular 
opportunity, what Japan feared most was the lack of recognition from the 
international community (especially from other Western developed countries). 
Receiving international acknowledgement and recognition in a way that would 
contribute to Japan’s reputation was certainly an objective. However, this 
“reactive” foreign policy has its limit. In many respects, the PKO bill was 
monumental, but as with most groundbreaking legislation in any country, an 
impetus from out-side will at best serve to initiate the legislative process; it will 
not guarantee its ratification21.
Prince Sihanouk who keenly wanted Japan’s assistance was actively meeting with 
Japanese officials including Foreign Minister Nakayama22 . Most of the 
Cambodian parties, particularly Sihanouk and his son Prince Ranariddh, preferred 
the East Asian states, especially Japan, to play a major role in the UN operation in 
Cambodia rather than Western countries. Nakayama also visited several East 
Asian countries to discuss the Cambodian peace process. He visited the
20 Many of the tasks of peacekeeping operations are “peaceful military operations” such as 
monitoring a cease-fire, cantonment, and disarmament. Since peacekeeping operations are 
deployed into the country in conflict, military experts from the UN member states are the essential.
21 Kato, M.E. (1995) Japan’s role in the post-Cold War World. Greenwood Press. P76
22 Foreign Minister Nakayama visited Prince Sihanouk several times to discuss Japan’s future 
involvement in Cambodia, and also as a negotiator for the Peace Process.
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Vietnamese government to ask its support in persuading Fun Sen to accept the P5 
proposal and he also had a meeting with the Foreign Minister of the PRC on 25 
June about the Cambodian peace process, particularly regarding the Khmer Rouge. 
Japan’s continuous diplomatic effort influenced the peace process until the end of 
the UN operation in Cambodia.
The UN and the Paris Peace Accords: deployment ofUNAMIC and UNTAC 
The Paris Peace Accords were signed on 23 October 1991 by the four contending 
Cambodian factions23, and eighteen other nations including Japan, Australia, and 
the UN Permanent Five24. The initial schedules made by the Paris Agreement 
were too tight and impossible to establish. Therefore the Secretary General 
recommended deploying a small advance mission to assist the Cambodian parties 
to maintain the cease-fire and to prepare for the deployment of UNTAC. Based on 
this recommendation, the Security Council supported resolution 717 (1991) of 16 
October 1991, and decided to establish the United Nations Advance Mission in 
Cambodia (UNAMIC) which became operational immediately after the 
Agreement was signed. Due to its limited mandate as a fact-finding mission 
involving a small number of personnel, the UN was able to gather the necessary 
finances and personnel on time. UNAMIC was headed by Mr. A.H.S. Ataul Karim 
(Bangladesh) as Chief Liaison Officer of UNAMIC in Phnom Penh, and 
Brigadier-General Michel Loridon (France), a Senior Military Liaison Officer, 
commanding the military elements ofUNAMIC25. By the end of December 1991,
23 Such as Front uni National pour un Cambodge ind, pendant, neuter, p’cifique et coop, ratif 
(FUNCINPEC); Khmer People’s National Liberation front (KPNLF); Party of Democratic 
Kampuchea (PDK); and State of Cambodia (SOC)
24 Australia, Brunei, Canada, India, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, 
Viet Nam, Yugoslavia which had replaced Zimbabwe as the chair of the Non-Aligned Movement, 
and the Permanent Five.
25 Necessary personnel were contributed by the following countries such as: Algeria, Argentina, 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, China, France, Germany, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Ireland,
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the Secretary General reported (S/23331. 1991) to the Security Council on the 
need to expand the mandate o f UNAMIC to undertake (on an urgent basis) a 
major de-mining effort in Cambodia for the preparation and safety of UNTAC 
personnel. In addition, the Second session of the Paris Conference on Cambodia 
met from 1 to 23 October 1991. Cambodia was represented by SNC, with Prince 
Sihanouk as its Chairman. Also present with the 5 UN Security Council 
permanent members were 6 members of the ASEAN: Australia, Canada, India, 
Japan, Laos and Viet Nam.
Since this was the first experience of the UN Secretariats to deploy a 
multifunctional peace operation, the whole process was difficult and chaotic, 
especially with the tight schedule (The UN Secretariats lacked the experience, 
resources, and qualified personnel to organize a mission of such complexity, at 
such short notice). The negotiation process of the Paris Peace Accords apparently 
gave little thought to how the Secretariats could cope with the amount of work or 
whether they would require additional resources to organize and maintain 
UNTAC. Theoretically, the peace operations are deployed with 3 key principles:
•  the consent of the parties,
•  the impartiality of the peacekeepers, and
•  the non-use of force26.
In Cambodia, there was no consent from all 4 parties (especially from the Khmer 
Rouge), and also the concept of the non-use of force was somewhat uncertain. 
The lack of necessary conditions, particularly on maintaining peace during the 
deployment phase, was a serious misjudgement on the part of the UN Secretariats.
Malaysia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Poland, Russia, Senegal, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United 
States and Uruguay.
26 The basic principles of the UN peacekeeping are not set in the UN Charter.
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Later in the operation, this incomplete agreement caused a number of deaths of 
UN peacekeepers, and created doubt on about the fundamental principle of UN’s 
peace operations that it was “not to become another conflict party”. Brahimi 
report stated that “If there is no peace to keep, the UN should not deploy peace 
operations”. This was one of the basic mistakes made by the UN at the beginning 
of the 1990s. Nevertheless, UNTAC was deployed with two essential conditions: 
the full support of the Security Council, and the necessary financial resources 
provided by member states in a full and timely manner.27 The creation of 
UNAMIC was not able to alleviate the UN’s , lack of preparation and resources 
which caused a serious delay in UNTAC’s deployment28 In addition, UNAMIC’s 
mandate was extremely limited with minimum personnel, and was unable to fulfil 
its role as a fact-finding mission. However, the presence of the United Nations 
soon after the signing of the Paris Agreement on Cambodian soil made people 
believe that the peace process was finally on the right track.
UNTAC: mandate and structure 
While UNAMIC struggled to maintain the semblance of a UN presence in 
Cambodia, the Secretariat in New York was preparing a detailed plan for 
UNTAC29. On 19 February 1992, the Secretary General submitted to the Security 
Council a report detailing the proposed implementation plan for UNTAC. The 
Council then endorsed the report, and finally by resolution 745(1992), established 
UNTAC under its authority for a period not to exceed 18 months. The brief 
schedule for UNTAC was: Election will be held sometime in April/May 1993 and
27 UN, Report of Secretary General on Cambodia, UN document S/23613, 19 Feb. 1992, pp.40-41
28 Hill, S. M. and S. P. Malik (1996). Peacekeeping and the United Nations. Aldershot, Hants., 
Dartmouth.
29 The Security Council Resolution 718 on 1 November 1991. (S/RES/718)
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the deadline for agreement on a new constitution and the establishment of a new 
government would be in August 1993.
Besides the traditional UN peace operations role of monitoring and supervising 
cease-fires, additional mandates given to UNTAC covered wide areas in both 
military and civilian administrative sides.
®  supervision, monitoring and verification o f withdrawal and non-return 
o f  foreign military forces;
(D cantonment, disarmament and demobilization o f the four factions;
(3) location and confiscation o f caches o f  weapons and military supplies;
®  the conduct o f a free and fair election
(5) promotion and protection o f human rights;
(6) oversight o f military security and civil administrations and o f the 
maintenance o f law and order;
(7) repatriation and resettlement o f Cambodian refugees and displaced 
persons;
®  assistance with mine clearance and establishment o f training 
programme in mine clearance and mine awareness; and
®  rehabilitation o f essential infrastructure and the commence of 
economic reconstruction and development.
Since there are no provisions within the UN Charter for peace operations, the 
legal basis for each operation was its mandates30. Therefore, if the mandate was
30 “Final Report on the In-Depth Evaluation of Peacekeeping Operation: Start Up Phase," UN 
Office of Oversight Services, 17 March 1995. Paragraph 11.
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unrealistic, too vague, or too weak, it would cause several problems for the 
operations after deployment. It is well known that UNTAC’s mandate went far 
beyond that of traditional peace-keeping. It postulated major tasks in institution- 
building and social reconstruction as integral parts of a peace-building package. It 
was designed to secure an end to armed conflict, and a transition to a democratic 
society. However, without the consensus from all the parties in the fighting, the 
first task of the termination of armed conflict was difficult from the beginning. 
Despite this, UNTAC achieved most of the mandates within the time schedule and 
also accomplished its primary objective of organizing and conducting free and fair 
elections in May 1993. During the transitional period, UNTAC directly controlled 
all administrative agencies and offices acting in the field of foreign affairs, 
national defence, finance, public security, and information. According to Article 2 
of the Agreement o f the Comprehensive Political Settlement o f  the Cambodia 
Conflict (A/46/608. 30October 1991), UNTAC was under the direct responsibility 
of the Secretary General of the United Nations. As for the Cambodian 
representatives, the United Nations set up the Supreme National Council (SNC) as 
the unique legitimate body and source of authority for the Cambodian side. 
UNTAC’s mandate in Annex I of the Agreement indicated how UNTAC and SNC 
should cooperate with the situation in Cambodia during the deployment phase31. 
This shows the UN’s willingness to include the local powers in the process. It was 
the very first experience for the UN organization to take the responsibility of a 
sovereign nation during the transition period, and the UN achieved the remarkable 
transformation of Cambodia into a democratic country by the end of the UNTAC.
31 Sutresna, S. N. "How the Paris Agreement Affected UNTAC Operations”. PI 16 From Rham- 
Azimi, N. d., Institute of Policy Studies(Singapore), et al. (1995). The United Nations Transitional 
Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) : debriefing and lessons : report and recommendations of the 
international conference. Singapore. August 1994. Boston, Kluwer Law International.
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UNTAC was to be structured into seven components: military, civil police, 
electoral, civil administration, repatriation, human right, and rehabilitation. As for 
the SRSG, Mr. Yasushi Akashi (Japan), (former head of the Department of 
Disarmament Affair) was appointed, on 9 January. In addition, Lieutenant- 
General John Sanderson (Australia) was appointed as a Commander of UNTAC’s 
military force32. The total number of international personnel within UNTAC was 
more than 20,000, including some 16,000 military and 3,500 civilian police33. 
Troops and polices were provided by 46 countries, and the largest contingents 
were from France, India and Indonesia34. Most of the countries contributing 
personnel had never participated in UN peace operations before35. The biggest 
personnel contributor France (former suzerain state), provided 1,500 personnel 
which made up the main contingent assigned to UNTAC. In addition to that, 
Australia contributed over 500 personnel including 488 Force Communications 
Unit, and 14 staff at UNTAC’s Headquarters under Lieutenant General Sanderson. 
Both France and Australia had interests in the Cambodian peace process, and 
were willing to play a significant role in different ways. The contribution of 
personnel to UN peace operations always comes with the will and desire o f each 
member state. As for Japan, its national interest in taking part in this peace 
process was clearly recognised by the UN and Cambodia, and Japan was willing 
to maximise this opportunity in support of Cambodia.
32 The Cambodians preferred an Indonesian because of their cultural affinities.
33 c, P245
34 The exact number of troops and civilian personnel contributed by each country is not available 
due to the limited resources.
35 Among them Brunei, Bulgaria, Germany (medical personnel only), Japan (an engineering 
battalion), Namibia and Uruguay. Findlay, T. (1995) The lezacv and Lessons o f UNATC. SIPRI 
Research Report No9. Oxford University Press.. P27
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The basic starting point for planning a peace operation is information gathering. 
Until all the necessary information has been collected, there is always some gap 
between reality and the ideal scenario. In the case of Cambodia, once the final 
round of negotiations among all parties to the Paris Agreements was under way, 
preparations for the implementation of UNTAC could begin. It is well known that 
the first condition needed for a successful peace operation is a conceptually sound 
and appropriately detailed peace plan and adequate contributions from member 
states. Part o f the difficulty in planning UNTAC was the limited availability of 
information. Cambodia had been deliberately isolated by the international 
community and was destroyed by a long-term internal war . Therefore, the 
United Nations used the most common way to collect information from the 
ground: they dispatched a fact-finding mission. When UNAMIC was deployed, 
the area outside of Phnom Penh was remote and inaccessible37, so the resulting 
field report did not reach the heart of any issue. UNAMIC’s main responsibility 
was for maintaining contact with SNC in preparation for the deployment of 
UNTAC, and since they were headquartered in Phnom Penh, they had no access 
to the rural areas of Cambodia. Until January 1992, the cease-fire was generally 
maintained. However, due to the limited mandate of UNAMIC in maintaining a 
cease-fire and its de-mining programme, it could not operate as a fact-finding 
mission.
The official establishment o f UNTAC was scheduled for February 1992, however, 
various departments of UNTAC were gradually being established and it took a
36 During the Pol Pot regime, most of the educated class and the public officers were executed, and 
all the official documents was destroyed.
37 All the main road and bridges were destroyed, and unlimited mine fields were spread outside of 
Phnom Penh.
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few extra months to become fully operational. By August 1992, only 3 of the 5 
section heads of the Administrative Division had arrived. Moreover, by the end of 
April 1992, only 3 out of the 24 military checkpoints which planned to monitor 
the withdrawal of foreign forces and verify that new military equipment and 
supplies were not entering the country had been established. What the UN and 
committee members of the Paris agreements did not realise was the complexity in 
preparing an operation of this magnitude given the limited amount of time. Since 
the end of the Cold War, UN peace operations had become more militarily 
involved and complex than traditional peacekeeping, where most missions were 
deployed in clearly delineated linear buffer zones between consenting nation­
states38.
A significant reason for the late deployment of UNTAC was the complete 
inadequacy of its advance planning. As Roberts described, “the United Nations 
lacks a satisfactory command system that is capable of making quick decisions 
and effectively coordinating the many different types of forces and national 
contingents it deploys”39. It is not only criticised in the UN Secretariats, but also 
shares the responsibility with its member states for the efficient running of an 
operation40. It is well known that the United Nations is an intergovernmental 
organization the main participants of which are its member states whose decisions 
are made by government representatives in political organs such as the Security 
Council and the General Assembly41. The Secretariat is usually defined as a
38 Hillens, J (2000). Blue Helmets. The strategy of UN Military Operations. Brassey’s. P140
39 Robert, A. The Crisis in UN Peacekeeping. Crocker, C.A. (1996) Managing global chaos : 
sources of and responses to international conflict. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of 
Peace Press
40 Robert, A. The Crisis in UN Peacekeeping.
41Shimamura, H. The role of the UN Secretariat in organizing peacekeeping.. Thakur, R. C. and A. 
Schnabel (2001). United Nations peacekeeping operations : ad hoc missions, permanent 
engagement. Tokyo ; New York, United Nations University Press.
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supporting role to implementing the decisions made by the political organs. Thus, 
the success of a peace operation somehow depends on member states’ willingness 
and generosity. In the case of Cambodia, gathering financial and personnel 
contribution from related counties went smoothly from two reasons. Firstly, it was 
the very first UN peace operation in the East Asian region, and most of the related 
countries were willing to contribute necessary assistance. Secondly, when the 
Cambodian peace process started, the UN did not yet have its hands full with 
ongoing missions, and consequently, the UN concentrated mostly on the 
Cambodian operation (When the Secretariat started planning the UN operation in 
Cambodia in late 1980s, the potential difficulties were not apparent during the 
planning process; a first intra-secretariat task force was established as early as 
February 1990, and seven more fact-finding missions were dispatched to 
Cambodia from 1989 to 1991).
Since the Paris Agreement: Javan s effort behind the scene 
Before the signing of the Paris Peace Agreement, Japanese Ambassador Imagawa 
was appointed as a Chairman of the 3rd Committee which focused on the issues of 
repatriation and peacebuilding. The appointment of Imagawa was from the desire 
of Prince Sihanouk (and most of the Cambodian parties) for Japan to cooperate in 
the area of the reconstruction of Cambodia after the general election. Hence, the 
appointment of Imagawa as one of the chairmen sent a clear message to Japan42. 
Several members of the Japanese Diet who also visited the Phnom Penh 
government or Sihanouk requested Japan’s support for economic development
42 Ambassador Imagawa’s active role behind the Paris Agreement was well known by the related 
country. Drifte, R. (2000) Japan’s quest for a permanent security council seat: matter of pride or 
justice? Macmillan Press Ltd. P71
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after the transition period. Much of the expectation was for Japan to contribute to 
the rehabilitation phase after the general election. This certainly was an area in 
which Japan already had a lot of experience and it did not violate Japan’s pacifist 
law. However, Japan, at the same time, was trying to involve itself in new areas 
and it experimented to find out what and how it could contribute to UN peace 
operations.
The Cambodian peace process was finally on track and the Japanese government 
provided three agendas items on for the Cambodian peace process (during the 
transitional period):
0  take an active initiative in economical support in the reconstruction 
and rebuilding of the Cambodian economy;
®  persuade the Khmer Rouge to cooperate with the Paris Peace 
Agreement;
(3) dispatch Japanese SDF to the UNTAC operation43.
The environment around the Cambodian peace process improved for the Japanese 
government when two Japanese personnel were appointed to high positions at UN 
organizations during 1991-1992. Mr. Yasuhi Akashi was appointed SRSG of 
UNTAC on 9 January 1992, and Dr. Sadako Ogata became the High 
Commissioner of UNHCR in January 1991. The appointment of Akashi as SRSG 
generated high expectation from the UN and Cambodia on this operation, and as 
for Japan, the government had more reason to take part in this operation since 
Japanese personnel became the head of operation. In addition, the UNHCR was
43 Ikeda. P210
96
leading the repatriation programme of 37 thousand people. With the appointment 
of Ogata, Japan was willing to cooperate in this part of the operation more 
actively as well44. Japan was carefully considering every opportunity they could 
use to show their presence in this operation to gain recognition for their capability, 
and appointment o f two Japanese personnel at this particular time perfectly 
matched the needs of the Japanese government.
As for the Japan’s personnel contribution in UNTAC, Mr Hun Sen visited Tokyo 
on 22 March 1992 to ask for more support on the UNTAC operation. He had a 
series of meetings with Mr. Nakayama (Foreign Minister), Mr. Miyazawa (Prime 
Minister), and several other politicians (including the leaders of the opposition 
parties) about the establishment of the PKO Law. Mr. Hun Sen stated that because 
Cambodia had experienced 90 years of occupation by France, there was distrust 
about Western countries coming into Cambodia. Therefore, in his opinion, if one 
of the Asian countries like Japan could play a central role in UNTAC (on the 
ground), it would enable the operation to run more smoothly45. In addition, Prince 
Sihanouk said that because Japan’s Constitutional Law (Article 9: prohibiting any 
military action), there would be no chance for Japan to become another party 
involved in the conflict. Hence, Japan’s SDF was considered the ideal candidate 
for the operation46. These strong requests from the Cambodian leaders helped the 
Japanese governmental parties to establish the PKO Law and dispatch the SDF to 
the UNTAC operation47. Japan’s most difficult political issue of Article 9 and
44 Ogata, S. (2006) Funsou to Nanmin. Syueisya. P439
45 Dobson. P I09
46 Prince Sihanouk is well known for his favour towards Japan. However, his understanding of 
Japanese politics or the law was sometimes mistaken. This statement is one of his 
misunderstandings of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitutional Law-what he meant was that Japan’s 
SDF was not allowed to participate in a war of aggression .
47 Sources: Interview with MOFA officials. Because of the movement against the establishment of 
the PKO Law and dispatch of SDF troops, strong requests from Cambodia helped MOFA and the
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pacifist constitution helped gain the confidence of the Cambodian leaders. 
External pressure from the US (and other western countries) as well as the request 
from the host country for the peace operation provided enough grounds for 
Japanese politicians to make a drastic change.
Apart from the consideration of the contribution of personnel, the Japanese 
government hosted the Ministerial Conference on the Rehabilitation and 
Reconstruction of Cambodia, which was held in Tokyo on the 22 June 1992 with 
the participation of 23 countries and 13 organizations. It had also hosted a prior 
consultation for this conference on 30-31 March 1992. Japan and UNDP, the hosts 
of this conference, were able to gather 88 million US dollar (Japan’s contribution 
was about 2 million US dollar). This International Conference on the 
Reconstruction of Cambodia (ICORC) was to be held in Tokyo/Paris once a year 
(hosted by the Japanese government)48 -  this was something Japan guaranteed at 
the Third Committee of the Paris conference. For the first time in their history, 
Japan has exerted leadership in this particular area of peace building49. The 
tremendous success of this conference not only provided Cambodia with a 
sufficient amount of financial aid but also provided the opportunity for related 
countries and organizations to have consultation with all Cambodian parties to the 
conflict. Because of this conference, the issue on Cambodia was given the 
spotlight and resulted in much media coverage and international attention. The 
fact that this was hosted in Tokyo gave Japan the attention it so desperately sought 
(details of this conference will be analyzed in Chapter 5).
administration to gain public support on the issue.
48 Japan was the chairman of the ICORC until the 1996. From 1996, Japan has been a host country 
for the Consultative Group Meeting for Cambodia (CG) with the World Bank until now.
49 Maswood, J.S. (2001) Japan and East Asian regionalism. Routledge. PI 13
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In addition to the area of rehabilitation, Japan was also continuously working on 
diplomatic negotiations with the Cambodian parties. Since the summer of 1992, 
Japan and Thailand were the only countries which had “serious talks”50 with the 
Khmer Rouge. The Khmer Rouge and its political party PDK (Party of 
Democratic Kampuchea) became more isolated with the progress of the UN 
operation. Most of the countries involved in the Cambodian peace process 
(including the PRD) decided to keep a distance from the PDK. Most countries 
stated that despite the non-compliance of the PDK, which had initially agreed to 
the Paris Peace Accords (including the disarmament and cantonment phase), the 
peace process should continue even with the exclusion of the Khmer Rouge. 
Nevertheless, both Japan and Thailand put a lot of effort towards consultation 
with the PDK. The aim of the multilateral talks was to disarm the Khmer Rouge 
and establish a common ground with them (it was due to continued violence by 
the PDK which caused the delay and eventual termination of the UNTAC 
operation). The Japanese delegation had several talks with Mr. Akashi on the 
Khmer Rouge’s view; however their demands went far beyond the Paris 
Agreement. Their demands were to strengthen the authority of the SNC, and the 
withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia. The consultation between the 
PDK and Japan/Thailand failed in the end. It became clear that the PDK would no 
longer follow the Paris Accords. The peace process would, however, continue 
without a consensus from the PDK. The efforts by Japan and Thailand were 
appreciated by UNTAC and all related countries including the P5. Japan was 
finally recognised for its role in the UN operation, and it was not because of
50Japan and Thailand had 4 meetings with the Khmer Rouge until the end of 1992.
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personnel contribution51. At the forth consultation, Japan and Thailand were 
recognised (S/RES/783(1992)52) as representatives of the UN Security Council. 
The above three points show the serious changes in Japanese diplomatic skills: 
from passive diplomacy to tactical (constructive) diplomacy. This was yet another 
significant achievement for Japan and was followed by further recognition by the 
international community.
Establishment of the PKO Law 
With all the internal and external expectation and pressure Japan experienced, the 
Japanese Diet finally started to make progress on the peacekeeping cooperation 
law. When the Miyazawa administration decided to establish a new law which 
would enable the government to dispatch the SDF abroad, Japan finally got a 
sufficient base (public support and a request from the host country) to fulfil this 
long time desire. Before the plenary session began, the three government parties 
(the LDP, Komei-party, and Minsyu-party53) agreed on the original PKO bill54. 
When the Paris Peace Agreement was signed, the PKO bill in the Diet was still 
under consideration. The centre of discussion was still on the dilemma between 
Article 9 and active participation in UN peace operations. Moreover, the response 
from neighbouring Asian countries to the PKO bill was a strong refusal as 
expected; when the PKO bill went through the House of Representative, 
demonstrations against the bill were held at several Asian countries.
51 Pitta, R. (1994) UN Forces 1948-84. Oeprey Publishing. Ltd. P28
52 Resolution 783 stated that the Security Council was expressing its gratitude to the governments 
of Thailand and Japan for their effort to find solution to the current problems relating to the 
implementation of the Paris Agreement.
53 Most of the parties in the 1990s have either renamed or were dispersed.
54 The Japanese government tried to establish a new law allowing the dispatch of SDF outside 
Japan in 1990, however, it could not gain a majority in the House of Representative. As a result, 
the government parties took a safety precaution before the bill went for consideration.
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The biggest problem that Japan faced both internally and externally was people’s 
perception and their difficulties in distinguishing UN peace operations from 
“enforcement action” which involved military action55. During the consultation 
process, several member of the Diet asked questions about the reasons behind the 
dispatch of SDF, and its role in peacekeeping operations56. Their biggest concern 
was whether participation in UNTAC and also future UN peacekeeping operations 
would involve military action and thus violate Article 9.
The PKO bill (and future PKO Law) stipulates in detail the roles in which the 
SDF and Japanese civilian personnel can participate during peace operations. 
However, since each operation is unique and different the bill cannot cover every 
single condition or possible situation. Despite its possible shortcomings, 
establishing a new PKO bill was necessary for the Japanese government to 
participate in UN peacekeeping. Firstly, since the end of the World War II, Japan 
has been a pacifist country without an armed force (The SDF is not defined as an 
armed force). Since Japanese Constitutional Law prohibited all kinds of military 
action, Japan’s participation in UNTAC (particularly the SDF contribution) 
caused an allergic reaction in both the Japanese public and members of the Diet 
(The limited understanding of UN peacekeeping led to the perception that the 
“UN force” was equivalent to an “allied force”). On 15 June 1992, the LDP and 
ruling parties managed to push the PKO bill through the Diet, and two months 
later the Law Concerning Cooperation for United Nations Peacekeeping 
Operations and Other Operations (Peacekeeping Law) went into effect. UNTAC
55 Sudo. P83
56 At the Special Committee for the Peace Cooperation Law (1990-1992), the opposition parties 
mainly asked questions on the illegality of sending SDF to the UN peacekeeping operations. The 
ruling alliance emphasized that the UN peacekeeping operation was not a “military force” but a 
“neutral operation” dispatched at the request of the host country.
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had already been on the ground for half a year, and the Japanese government took 
emergency measures to establish the PKO Law. For over a decade the discussion 
of the dispatch of the SDF has continued. However, the Japanese government 
continues to send the SDF and civilian personnel to the UN peacekeeping 
operations.
The establishment of the PKO Law marked the first revision to the law that 
banned the overseas dispatch of SDF. However, new principles of law required 
the reconsideration of some of the difficult conditions for its deployment. 
Examples include the withdrawal of SDF at the first sign of hostilities, and the 
prohibition of SDF personnel to use force except for the purpose of self-defence. 
The Japanese government took the most reliable and safest passage for this first 
time experiment, and it was concluded with the successful return of SDF 
personnel and its withdrawal from UNTAC.
How did the UN cope with issues on the ground?
UNTAC was officially established with the arrival of Mr. Yasushi Akashi, on 15 
March 1992. Soon after its official deployment, UNTAC was thrown into a 
precarious military situation with continued fighting between the PDK and SOC. 
By the end of April, the fighting involving the PDK and SOC was brought under 
control. On 9 April, Mr. Akashi condemned the PDK for not cooperating fully 
with the UN by preventing UNTAC officials from gaining access to territories 
under PDK control. Access was granted on 20 April after UNTAC had opened 
three checkpoints on die border between Cambodia and Vietnam. However, the 
beginning of the UNTAC deployment suffered for several reasons. Not only did 
the continued fighting between the PDK and SOC contribute to this but the delay
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in UNTAC’s deployment was also a serious issue. There were various 
administrative delays, and even by May 1992, most UNTAC departments were 
only beginning to be established. The heads of three of five sections of the 
Administrative Division did not arrive until August, while only 20 percent of the 
staff was in Cambodia by the first three months of UNTAC’s existence57. This 
shows the lack of preparation and planning by the UN Secretariat. Also, the 
broken cease-fire agreement showed the difficulties for UN to get into unsettled 
grounds for the purpose of transition (including holding an election, and taking 
over the administrative function). Unless there is no peace to keep, the UN should 
not go into the country with peacekeepers lives at stake. This certainly was to 
affect Japan’s stance on the dispatch of its SDF.
There had been a long-term internal conflict within Cambodia. There was also the 
mass genocide by the Pol Pot regime in the 1970s when the United Nations 
decided to get involved in Cambodia. In addition, the infrastructure of the country 
was completely destroyed, and there was urgent need for reconstruction of the 
basic infrastructure to facilitate the deployment of UNTAC. Most of UNTAC’s 
schedule was well organized with a full calendar. However, the time required for 
the reconstruction of the infrastructure in the country had to be taken into account 
to make the deployment of UNTAC quick and effective. Apart from these initial 
difficulties, the peace plan set out in the Paris Accords remains the most detailed 
and orderly of any UN peacekeeping operation. It provides a framework and an 
end-point for the missions that order UN operations. The major lesson of 
Cambodia is that intense efforts should be made to reduce the delay between a 
negotiated settlement and the deployment of a peacekeeping force with its
57 Findlay. P35
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associated mechanisms and infrastructure58. There were many reasons for the late 
deployment of UNTAC of which most were caused at the UN headquarters in 
New York. Despite this, the Security Council officially characterized the 
Cambodia mission at its conclusion as “a major achievement for the United 
Nations”59. The organization and conduct of a free and fair election, the refugee 
repatriation programme, and the promotion of human rights were the most 
successful parts of UNTAC.
On 13 June, phase two of the military provisions of the Paris Agreement was 
launched. The second phase involved the demobilization of 70% of the armed 
forces of the 4 Cambodian signatories to the Paris Agreements60 and the 
remaining 30 % were to enter into cantonment. However, the PDK refused to join 
in this process. Their refusal to join in phase two was censured by a unanimous 
resolution of the Security Council on July 21. This resolution requested the 
Secretary General and SRSG to ensure that international assistance would only 
benefit the parties fulfilling their obligations under the Paris Agreements. Also, 
the PDK came under criticism at a ministerial Conference in Tokyo on 22 June. 
The PDK was not mentioned in any official text of the conference records, even in 
the “Tokyo Declaration on the Peace Process”. The UN and other related 
countries started to isolate the PDK from the peace process. Several countries 
attempted to persuade the PDK to rejoin the implementation process of the Paris 
Agreements, and further efforts were made by the PRC during the second half of 
September as well as by Thailand and Japan in October. However, these 
initiatives did not result in the PDK rejoining the implementation process of the
58 Findlay. PI 13
59 UN, Security Council Resolution 880, UN document S/RES/880,4 Nov. 1993.
60 Total number of demobilization was estimated at some 200,000 troops and 250,000 militiamen.
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Paris Agreement. Without cooperation from the PDK, the fighting continued 
leading SOC and other parties to rearm. With the failure of the cantonment and 
disarmament phase of the peace plan and the neutral political environment in 
which UNTAC was supposed to be established, the situation in Cambodia once 
again became unstable.
Series o f violence
During the very first stage, the response of UNTAC to the PDK resembled quiet 
diplomacy and negotiation which has been characterized as a “low-key 
administrative approach”. The Security Council decided not to attempt forced 
compliance, but to continue the peace process without the PDK. There was a 
disagreement between Mr. Akashi (SRSG) and General Sanderson on the issue of 
the reaction to the PDK since the Military Component faced serious security risks. 
It was argued by Findlay in his book “Cambodia: Legacy and Lesson o f  UNTAC  
that UNTAC should have confronted the PDK militarily at an early stage. 
UNTAC’s failure to take action encouraged the PDK to believe that it could get 
away with violence. It gave the PDK an opportunity to strengthen its forces 
politically as well as militarily. However, for UNTAC to play more of a role in 
enforcement action would require a complete change of its mandate under 
Chapter VII. If the mandate had been changed to that of enforcement, some of the 
countries, such as Japan, would have been obliged, constitutionally, to withdraw61. 
This could perhaps have been followed by the Australians thus starting a chain 
reaction that would have decimated the military component and possibly the civil 
police component as well. Therefore, a decision by SRSG Akashi was made not to
61 The Japanese Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) Law (1992) restricts Japanese participation in 
peacekeeping operations to cases where there is an agreement on a cease-fire and the neutrality of 
UN force is maintained. This particular case will be discussed in a later chapter.
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change the mandate under Chapter VII enforcement, and none of the personnel 
were withdrawn from Cambodia. It is also because most of the main participants 
in this peace process had already invested sufficient resources in attempting to 
bring peace to the country, and were not willing to risk war with the PDK.
During March 1993 several attacks were carried out against ethnic Vietnamese in 
Cambodia, which were thought to be an attack by the National Army of 
Democratic Kampuchea (NADK) unit62. Mr. Akashi’s criticism was directed at 
the PDK. However, the criticism resulted in a number of attacks on UNATC 
personnel, finally causing the death of several peacekeepers including a 
Bangladeshi soldier.63 On 8 April, another fatal incident happened to a Japanese 
UN volunteer staff64 acting as a district election supervisor in the province of 
Kompong Thom. This incident resulted in UNTAC withdrawing all the volunteers 
in the ten central and western provinces from the countryside, and they were not 
to travel without armed escort. However, attacks on UNTAC personnel continued 
throughout April into the month of May65. During the operations up to mid-May 
1993, the number of UNTAC casualties as a result of hostile action amounted to 
13 deaths and 52 wounded.
Dispatch of the Japan’s SDF to UNTAC operation
When the PKO Law went into effect, UNTAC had already been on the ground for 
5 months (of the 18 month duration). The Japanese government immediately sent
62 NADK is the armed forces of the PDK.
63 The investigation carried out by UNTAC concluded that NADK was responsible for the killing 
of 4 soldiers and CPAF was involved in a case of a Bangladeshi civilian.
64 The United Nations Volunteers (UNV) programme is the UN organization that supports human 
development globally by promoting volunteerism and by mobilizing volunteers. It is administrated 
by UNDP.
65 According to the statistics data collected by UNTAC, during the first half of May attacks on 
UNTAC personnel caused 2 deaths and 17 wounded.
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two separate advance missions to Cambodia in July-August 199266. On 3 
September, UNTAC made the official request for Japan’s dispatch of personnel: 8 
cease-fire observers, 600 Engineer, and 75 civilian police. As for the cease-fire 
observers, 8 SDF personnel were dispatched in September 1992 for 6 months, and 
replaced by the second contingent in March 1993 for another 6 month period. 
Their mission was to monitor the cease-fire and to supervise encampments storing 
weapons collected from disarmed ex-Cambodian soldiers of all functions. Their 
duties also included monitoring the cease-fire at checkpoints along the border 
along with monitoring any infiltration of other forces and the smuggling of 
weapons and ammunition. The first unit of 600 SDF personnel arrived in 
Cambodia and was stationed in Takeo from September 1992. Their mission was 
to reconstruct roads and bridges on routes 2 and 3 which had been damaged 
during the civil war. With the progress of the reconstruction work, their mission 
was expanded to supply water, fuel, food, medical services, and lodging facilities. 
In answer to the request, the Japanese National Police Agency dispatched 75 
civilian police officers to the Civilian Police Component of UNTAC from 
October 1992 to July 1993 to assist and train the Cambodian police. Because of 
the delayed decision by the Japanese government to send SDF personnel (and 
other civilian officers) to UNTAC operation, their dispatch was immediately after 
the establishment of the PKO Law. However, the SDF had started preparation for 
the dispatch67 to Cambodia much earlier than that and showed their eagerness and 
readiness. In the end, the reputation of Japanese peacekeepers in Cambodia and
66 The First Advance mission was lead by Mr. Arima from the Cabinet Office from 2-7 July 1992. 
The second advance mission was lead by the head of the International Peace Cooperation 
Headquarter from 12-18 August 1992.
67 Japanese MOFA and the Defence Agency gave a course on the Khmer Language and culture to 
the SDF (and civilian officers), (according to the MOFA officials)
107
the public response to their contribution was more than good enough for the 
Japanese government to continue sending SDF to UN peace operations in the 
future.
One aspect both the Japanese government and UN officials were concerned about 
regarding Japanese peacekeepers and civilian police was that the PKO Law 
restricted the “use of force”69. The situation in Cambodia was unstable with the 
violation of the cease-fire and disarmament by the PDK. With the beginning of 
1993, guerrilla warfare by the PDK grew more intense. Two Japanese personnel, 
one a UNV and one a civilian police, were killed during the many guerrilla attacks 
before the election. The news of the two Japanese deaths in Cambodia was a 
shocking incident for both the Japanese government and public. This was the very 
first time since W W II Japanese personnel (SDF) had lost their life in battle.
The safety of Japanese personnel had been a serious concern to the Japanese 
government but it did not realize the potential risks involved in UN peace 
operations, even in areas where there was minimal risk. Therefore, the situation in 
Cambodia was far riskier than anticipated and Japanese contingents were faced 
with a possible battle situation with the PDK70. This was certainly short sighted on 
the part of the Japanese government. It lacked the experience in understanding the 
risks involved and this was another reality Japan faced in understanding the roles 
involved in taking part in UN peace operations.
68 Mr. Akashi of SRSG mentioned the reputation of the Japanese SDF in Cambodia as “polite and 
friendly, and doing an accurate job” in his comment to the Japanese Diet.
69 The fundamental principle of the PKO Law is that the activities Japan carried out “shall not be 
tantamount to the threat or use of force” (Article II, Paragraph 2)
70 As a result, Japanese contingents (SDF personnel) were never confronted with a battle situation.
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On 17 May 1993, Japanese Electoral observers (total of 41 personnel71) arrived in 
Cambodia. During the electoral period (23-28 May), the observers monitored and 
assisted in administrating the election, and from 29 May to 1 June, they monitored 
ballot counting and conducted round-the-clock shifts at the election offices in 
Takeo and Phnom Penh.
In total, Japan sent over 1300 personnel to the UNTAC operation. What the 
Japanese government learned from the experiences in Cambodia was that the 
PKO Law did not cover many of the situations which the SDF personnel faced 
while on the mission. The PKO Law established 5 principles72 that govern 
Japanese involvement in UN peace operations. Those principles ensured that all 
the personnel participating in the UN operation would not violate the constitution. 
During the discussion in the Diet, the biggest concern was the possibility of 
Japanese personnel violating the constitutional law73. The PKO Law limited the 
use of weapons to legitimate self-defence. In Cambodia, two lives of Japanese 
personnel were lost by the violation of the cease-fire. The United Nations ensured 
the safety of the peacekeepers on the ground before the deployment74. However, 
since the peacekeeping operations are required for post conflict situations (after 
the peace negotiations or agreement in most cases) where there is still the 
possibility of instability, there is always the risk of becoming involved in a 
situation of conflict or civil war75. Therefore, the PKO Law enumerates the
71 The Japanese government send 5 national government officers, 13 local government officers, 
and 23 individuals from the private sector to the Electoral Component.
72 Three of the principles are preconditions for Japanese participation, while the other two apply 
during Japanese involvement.
73 Both the Japanese Socialist party and Japanese communist party called the dispatch of the SDF a 
“military campaign” or “remilitarization”.
74 The basic principles of the UN peacekeeping required the all parties to a conflict must agree to, 
and maintain a cease-fire.
75 This point was proven by the operations deployed in the African and European region after 
Cambodia.
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specific tasks that Japanese personnel may carry out within the operation. It is 
well known that Japan’s “oversensitive” protection of its own people on the 
ground caused a few problems for UNTAC: the Japanese government requested 
from UNTAC the removal of Japanese Civilian Police (CIVPOL), and also their 
relocation to a safer place. Japanese CIVPOL stayed on duty but withdrew on 7 
July 1993 (2 months earlier than scheduled76). From the painful incidents in which 
Japanese personnel were killed, the Japanese government and public finally 
understood the risk of participating in UN peacekeeping operations. Nonetheless, 
all Japanese personnel gradually withdrew from Cambodia by September 1993.
Preparation and General Election
The Electoral Component of UNTAC was one of the successful parts of the whole
77operation . The Voter registration was planned for a three month period 
beginning in October 1992, and was extended until 31 January 1993. The 
registration was successfully concluded with 4.6 million Cambodians having 
enrolled by the time voting tolls closed. In particular, thousands registered in 
Khmer Rouge-controlled areas. The electoral law was submitted by UNTAC on 1 
April but was not approved by the SNC until 5 August, because of continuing 
PDK’s objections. It is generally known that the draft electoral law for Cambodia 
was largely based on the Election Proclamation which had governed the conduct 
of the 1989 Namibian election78.
76Japanese National Police Agent strongly requested to UNTAC for the earliest withdrawal of the 
Japanese CIVPOL from their posts. NPA want to withdraw all Japanese CIVPOL soon after the 
killing of their member in May, however, Prime Minister Miyazawa decided that all Japanese 
personnel would remain at their posts as scheduled. (Interview with ex-MOFA official)
7 The repatriation programme was mostly conducted by UNHCR, and UNTAC was in a 
supplementary role.
78 The United Nations experience of the national election in Namibia by Australian (Red Book) 
was used in this case.
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The isolation of the PDK among the four represented in the SNC was becoming 
more and more apparent. This was exemplified on 5 August when the SNC 
adopted an electoral law drafted by UNTAC despite the opposition of the PDK79 
(The primary reason given by the PDK for its opposition to the electoral law was 
that it would allow ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia to vote). Regardless of the 
PDK’s disagreement with the electoral law, preparations for the general elections 
went ahead. As the general election grew closer, the PDK’s continued refusal to 
join in the demobilisation and cantonment process prompted the Security Council 
to take action. In a unanimously adopted resolution on 13 October, the Council 
demanded that the PDK “fulfil immediately its obligations” under the Paris 
Agreements. The cantonment and disarmament process had not been completed 
due to the PDK’s refusal to take part80. The Security Council adopted another 
resolution on November 30 but not unanimously because China abstained from 
the vote. The other 14 members of the Council voted in favour of adoption. The 
resolution confirmed that the election would be held no later than May 1993 and 
called for measures to prevent the supply of petroleum products from reaching 
areas occupied by any party not complying with the military provisions of the 
Paris Agreements. UNTAC started to implement the ban on the export of logs 
referred to in the Security Council Resolution 792 (1992) on 31 December 1992. 
The ban was directed at all Cambodian parties, not only the PDK. As a 
consequence, the PDK’s response was to step up its violence directed at the 
United Nations’ presence in Cambodia. On several occasions, from December
79 The Electoral law enfranchised any 18 years old person bom in Cambodia with a mother or a 
father bom in the country or, in the case of those bom overseas, with a mother or a father bom in 
the country. This constituted a revision of the provisions of the Paris Agreements which stated that 
any 18 years old bom in Cambodia or the child of a person bom in Cambodia would be eligible to 
vote.
80 According to the Secretary General’s report on 15 November 1992, a total of 55,000 troops had 
entered cantonment and handed over their weapons.
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1992 to January 1993, the PDK took UNATC military personnel as hostages and 
held them for one day or a few days before releasing them unharmed.
Finally, at the meeting of the SNC held in Beijing on January 28, the date for a 
general election was set on 23 to 25 May 199381. On 31 January 1993, the voter 
registration period ended and nearly 4.6 million voters had registered along with 
20 political parties that had registered82. The general election was not arranged in 
a “disarmed” and “politically neutral” environment as envisaged at the outset. 
Even so, the election was held as scheduled from 23 -  28 May with the 
participation of 89.56 percent of the registered voters with only a few incidents. 
The outcome of the general elections showed that no single party had obtained a 
majority of the 120 seats on the Constituent Assembly. The largest single party 
was FUNCINPEC with 45.47 percent of the voters followed by the CPP with 
38.23 percent. The rest of the voters were divided among the remaining 18 parties. 
On 15 June, the Security Council endorsed the results of the elections and fully 
supported the newly elected Constituent Assembly. This was a significant 
moment for Cambodia as well as all participating countries. This was also the first 
time Japan had participated in a peace operation. The result of the operation was 
an achievement for Japan in the eyes of the Japanese Government as well as 
opportunity for the Japanese public to see their international contribution in a new 
light.
81 For logistical reasons, three days of voting were added, so that the elections were scheduled to 
run from 23 to 28 May 1993. (The United Nations Cambodia, 1991-1995. P68)
82 20 political parties that had registered to participate in the Cambodian election were: the 
Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) was registered as representative of SNC; FUNCINPEC was 
registered and led by its President Prince Norodom Ranariddh, one of Prince Sihanouk’s sons; the 
KPNLF was not registered to take part in the elections. The political party created by the PDK on 
29 November 1992, the National Unity of Cambodian Party (NUCP) was not among the 20 
registered parties.
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Post Elections phase to withdrawal from UNTAC 
Political stability in the country was further enhanced through power-sharing 
agreements between the four parties represented in the Constituent Assembly. 
They established an Interim Joint Administration (Provisional National 
Government of Cambodia (PNGC)) to rule the country until a new Constituent 
Assembly transformed itself into a legislative assembly. Under the new political 
system, the armed forces of FUNCINPEC, KPNLF and SOC would be brought 
under a central command, and Prince Sihanouk would become the supreme 
commander. On 19 September, the Constituent Assembly concluded its 
deliberations over a new constitution for Cambodia and on 21 September; the 
Assembly passed the new Constitution by 113 votes to 5 which exceeded the 
necessary two-thirds majority requested by the provisions of the Paris Agreements. 
In accordance with the Paris Agreements, the Constituent Assembly was 
transformed into a legislative assembly, and marked the termination of UNTAC’s 
mandate in Cambodia. The new coalition government -  the Royal National 
Government of Cambodia (RNGC) -  was officially brought into office by a 
National Assembly vote on 29 October. King Sihanouk appointed Prince 
Norodom Ranariddh, of FUNCINPEC, as First Prime Minister and Mr. Hun Sen, 
of the CPP, as second Prime Minister. It was the official announcement of a new 
government. The United Nations then announced that UNTAC would be 
gradually withdrawn between early August and mid-November 1993.
As for a withdrawal, the Secretary General proposed83 a United Nations team of 
20 military liaison officers be established in Phnom Penh following the 
withdrawal of UNTAC. This recommendation was requested by Cambodia. The
83 The Security Council dated 7 October 1993.
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withdrawal o f UNTAC from Cambodia over the period August-December 1993 
did not imply that the United Nations had concluded all its activities. The United 
Nations continued to actively assist Cambodia in the field of rehabilitation, mine 
clearance, human rights, protection, and the reintegration of refugees and 
displaced persons84.
The cooperation from member states
The success o f the Cambodian peace process was achieved by the United Nations, 
with cooperation from its member states. Both France and Indonesia, who co­
chaired the Paris Peace Conference, took a lead in the Cambodian peace process, 
as well as Japan, Australia, and others who had a stake in its implementation. 
Without their vital support and participation, the Paris Agreements could never 
have been put into operation. However, there were certain lessons the UN and 
member states learned from this experience. Firstly, the United Nations and its 
member states must ensure the best-qualified and well-disciplined personnel are 
recruited for the peace mission, in order to maintain the credibility of the 
operations. The basic concept of contribution to a UN peace mission is on a 
voluntary basis, and there has been no obligation on contributing countries to 
meet criteria on personnel. It is necessary for the UN to set appropriate guidelines 
on standards and the training of contributed personnel. For example, some units 
suffered from serious language incompatibilities85; there were international 
personnel who is unable to speak either French or English (UNTAC’s two official 
languages), and also, very few officers could speak Khmer86 Cambodia’s common
84 Following the withdrawal of UNTAC, the United Nations presence in Cambodia is manifested 
through the activities of its specialised agencies.
85 Some units in CIVPOL divisions suffered from serious language incompatibilities, with officers 
occasionally unable to speak either French or English.
86 Partially a cause of Cambodia’s long isolation.
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language87. Moreover, there were wide disparities in the training, equipment and 
competence of the various national contingents. According to an article in the 
Washington Post on 30 October, 30% of the Bulgarian battalion were former 
prisoners, and far from what the UN required as “well-trained and equipped” 
troops.88 The minimum requirement of communication skills (troops must speak 
the mission’s official language) is a necessary precondition.
As for the contributors, five East Asian countries dispatched their personnel to 
UNTAC: the PRC, Indonesia, Japan, Philippines, and Thailand. However, 
UNTAC was still operated by a majority of western countries; France, an ex­
suzerain state of Cambodia, and Australia, one of the leading western nations in 
the Asian-Pacific region), were primary states in both diplomacy and personnel 
contributions. In many cases, the suzerain state played a major role in the peace 
process, due to its experience and knowledge of the host country. Nevertheless, 
there was a possibility that its presence would be rejected by local citizens. Prince 
Sihanouk’s preference to the presence of Asian states in the peace process was 
based on this point.
There is no doubt that the peace process, including the UNTAC operation brought 
benefits to Cambodia. It brought an end to the long-standing intemal-conflict and 
international isolation. The peace process resulted in the successful return of more 
than 370,000 Khmer displaced persons and refugees. There were also other 
elements brought into Cambodia such as the introduction of human rights 
principles and practices, and the establishment of basic understanding and
87 Doyle, W. M. and Suntharalingam, N. “The UN in Cambodia: Lessons for Complex 
Peacekeeping”. International Peacekeeping. Voll, No2, Summer 1994, ppl 17-147. PI 13
88 Branigin,W. “Bulgarians put crimp in UN peacekeeping mission”, Washington Post, 30 October 
1993.
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experiences with regard to multi-party democratic practices. The establishment of 
a new government by free and fair election would mark the end of both the 
transition period and the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia. 
Most importantly, the major risk to completing the cease-fire, cantonment and 
demobilization successfully was the lack of cooperation from the PDK in the 
peace process was. Without accomplishing this there was still the possibility of a 
hostile act by the PDK.
What was Japan s experience in Cambodia?
As for Japan’s effort on Cambodia, its attempt to exercise a degree of political 
influence to bring peace had a significant impact on both the region and the 
United Nations. ASEAN nations were mostly supportive of the SDF participation 
in the UNATC operation and encouraged Japan to maintain its presence. The 
Cambodian experience left open greater possibilities for cooperation between 
Japan and the ASEAN nations in terms of regional security issues. This 
relationship continued into the next operation in East Timor in the late 1990s.
The operation in Cambodia was the first time that Japan was involved in a UN 
peace operation. Prior to this, many of the domestic issues were never topics of 
discussion (such as troop contribution) and no determination for supporting any 
action by Japan was in place. Japan had to create new laws from scratch and 
persuade the Diet and public that this was the direction that Japan was to take. 
Much of this study helps us to answer the Research Questions on how and why 
Japan came to deal with the issues of peacekeeping and the process of 
implementation.
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The reason Cambodia was the starting point was that of timing. The mounting 
external and internal expectations as well as the direction Japan wanted to take in 
international politics reached a critical point -  Cambodia gave Japan the impetus 
to take action.
Through trial and error, Japan was able to identify where it could be most 
effective and also effective within the context of its political agenda. Despite 
much deliberation on the issues of sending troops, Japan was able to make other 
significant contributions that far outweighed mere troop contributions. Japan’s 
contribution was its financial support and its effectiveness in hosting conferences 
and gaining the confidence of various parties. With Japan’s initiatives, significant 
headway was gained in many of the processes. In particular, the conferences that 
were held in support of Cambodia continue to be held to this day and make 
consistent and reliable contributions. The significance of this will be elaborated on 
in chapter 5.
The role that Japan took was more of a “behind the scenes” role. As a Middle 
Power Country, this type of role was suitable for what it was capable of and 
discovered that its strengths lay in its political influences as well as its consistent 
and reliable financial contributions. Although the way Japan was only financially 
contributing was a subject of criticism, it became an indispensable asset.
The various events surrounding issues in Cambodia as well as international and 
domestic debates were what helped shaped the way Japan could effectively make 
its contribution within the context of its political agenda. Although troop
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contribution was one of the ways in which Japan attempted to gain recognition, it 
resulted in only a small part as Japan recognized its strengths elsewhere. The 
mounting internal and external pressure for troop contribution allowed for the 
creation of a new law permitting the dispatch of the SDF. This also led to the 
revelation that the quality of SDF personnel in terms of their behaviour, quality of 
work, punctuality as well as the level of trust they gained by the locals was highly 
regarded. The advantage this had in conducting operations on the ground is 
significant and will be discussed in later chapters.
The operation in Cambodia allowed Japan to create, from scratch, its position on 
many issues regarding UN peace operations. It was able to recognize many of its 
abilities as a country and as a responsible member of the international community. 
Many of the strengths discovered were unknown prior to the chain of events 
described. The next chapter will look at Japan’s involvement in the UN peace 
operations in East Timor. The difference this time was that Japan was experienced 
and had the knowledge of how it could more effectively contribute to peace 
operations.
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Chapter 4  -  The UN in East Timor: Javan in the new era
This chapter will focus on Japan’s second opportunity in UN peace operations in 
the East Asian region. Similar to the previous chapter, much of the history of the 
Asian region and of Japan will be referred to in understanding how and why 
Japan’s contribution was developed and implemented. The main difference is that 
this time the expectations of the UN peace mission were based on the 
establishment of a clear mandate and that Japan had knowledge of how and what 
it was capable of contributing. Since its challenge in Cambodia, Japan had sent 
the SDF to several locations outside the Asian region with the biggest contribution 
being to the UNHCR operation in Rwanda. This involved 283 ground unit 
personnel and 188 air transport unit personnel. Although these contributions did 
not receive much attention either domestically or internationally, Japan’s 
involvement continued. In the case of the UN operations in East Timor, Japan’s 
contribution started with the usual discussion of how and when to send the SDF 
unit and whether necessary preconditions were in place, such as a cease-fire on 
ground, in order to satisfy the conditions of the PKO Law and not infringe upon 
Article 9. In fact, the UN action in East Timor started with INTERFET which was 
a militarily involved operation, thus making it constitutionally impossible for 
Japan’s SDF to take part. Nevertheless, Japan made a more significant financial 
contribution by providing financial support to those regional countries willing to 
participate in this operation.
The most significant aspect to note about this time period is the way in which 
Japan had finally begun understanding the kind of role it could play in UN peace 
operations. It is somewhat inconceivable Japan did not take advantage of the fact
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that it had well equipped SDF personnel as well as strong political and economic 
influence in the East Asian region. Japan had several restrictions and limitations 
that kept it from taking action in a way that would seem to be the best course. 
Rather, Japan was able to establish its own way in which it could contribute given 
these restrictions and limitations. Japan received a lot of external pressure from 
the UN and other countries relating to the operation in East Timor as to how Japan 
could best contribute. Much of it was to do with sending SDF personnel as well as 
taking advantage of its political/economic influence and using it as leverage. 
However, Japan was not shaken and this was one of the main reasons why Japan’s 
contribution resulted in something very distinct.
Javan after its experience in Cambodia
In 1993, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) decided to withdraw 
from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and provoked a new crisis in East Asia. 
The US command in Japan requested Japanese backup assistance in the possible 
event of a conflict. However, Japanese officials were unable to respond. Once 
again, Japan’s inability to meet expectations in the new era was made apparent, 
even after its participation in UNTAC. As a result of the continuing events in the 
1990s, Japan agreed to revise its Guideline for US-Japan Defence Cooperation. 
These revised guidelines requested an increased role for Japan in response to 
various events in the region to make the US and Japan a more effective alliance. 
The actions taken by the DPRK confirmed Japan’s dependency on the US as an 
ally clearly to the Japanese people so they recognized the urgency for revising 
Japan’s security policy. Japan has demonstrated an increased willingness and 
capability to take a more active leadership role in multilateral forums such as the 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) group of regional economies, the
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non-govemmental Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) 
and the AFR by the end of the 1990s. The 1996-US-Japan Joint declaration and 
the 1997 Defence Guidelines also demonstrate Japan’s increased willingness, 
within the confines of the US-Japan alliance, to become more equal and active 
security partner1. The new defence cooperation guideline adopted in September 
1997 set up three areas for alliance cooperation: the defence of Japan, regional 
security, and global cooperation. This provided the framework for all subsequent 
cooperation, including the dispatch of SDF personnel. It was revised again in 
2004, allowing the SDF to not only assist UN forces during routine training but 
also to provide ammunition in the event of an armed attack2. This was a change 
that later influenced Japan’s involvement in East Timor -  Japan saw East Timor 
as a regional security issue and decided to take part in the peace process.
In the summer of 1993, the Japanese political structure experienced a drastic 
change; this was a change that brought down the 1955 system. Ichiro Ozawa 
played a central role in this event when he formed his own group, which later 
became a party(Japan Renewal Party), and joined with opposition groups to end 
the LDP’s thirty-eight years of one party-rule. The new generations of 
conservative politicians which emerged in the 1993 elections had strong desire for 
Japan to assume a more prominent political role in the international community, 
and be more outspoken in its foreign policy objectives3.As a result, for the first 
time in Japan’s post war history, the LDP lacked the majority necessary to form a 
government.
1 Tien, H. (2000) The Security Environment in the Asia-Pacific. An East Gate Book. P38
2 Asahi Shinbun 19 December 2004.
3 McCargo, D. (2000) Contemporary Japan. Palgrave PI 18
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Later, joining with the Japan Socialist Party in 1994, the LDP was able to return 
to power. The LDP regained the premiership at the beginning of 1996, though the 
party remained reliant on support from the SDJP and Sakigake. However, due to 
their different political agendas between the parties, Japan lost a clear political 
direction which had been maintained by the Yoshida Doctrine and the 1955 
system. Nevertheless, Japan was gradually moving out of the shadow of post-war 
politics and this made Japan more “normal” as a sovereign nation4 such as what 
Japan can and should and will do to contribute global security through the UN5.
As for its contributions to UN peace operations, in June 1998, three areas of PKO 
Law were revised on the basis of Japan’s experiences in UN operations in 
Cambodia as well as in several other areas. Firstly, Japan’s participation in 
monitoring elections, which was allowed only under UN peace operations, was 
expanded to elections under UN and regional organisations and not only under 
peace operations. Secondly, Japan was able participate in international 
humanitarian relief operations conducted by UNHCR and all related organisations, 
even when the agreement of cease-fire had not yet been reached. Thirdly, the 
decision to use weapons was now made by the superior officer on the ground and 
not under the judgment of each member when his or her life was threatened. An 
opportunity for Japan to take a part in UN peace operations for the second time in 
the region came at the end of the 1990s, but this time Japan was not as 
enthusiastic because of the many complications that were involved.
4 Brezezinski, Z. (1997) The Grand Chessboard, Basic Book. Brezenzinski described Japan as 
“nation under the protection of other country (such as the US)”. It means that Japan dopes not have 
capacity of national security.
5 Cooney. P36
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Japan and East Timor: until the late 1990s
Since its first effort in the Cambodian peace process, Japan participated in several 
UN peace operations6 leading up to its participation in East Timor. However, 
Japan’s position towards the independence of East Timor was somewhat different 
from its stance towards the Cambodian peace process. Despite the mounting acts 
of human rights violation by the Indonesian military and the government in East 
Timor, Japan assumed an air of total indifference until the first time the UN 
Security Council put the issue of East Timor on the table7. Until the 1990s, Japan, 
among many countries, saw the issue of East Timor as an Indonesian “internal 
affair”. Japan and the US voted against all the UN Security Council resolutions on 
East Timor, while most of the European countries abstained from voting on the 
resolution8 in the UN Security Council. Japan’s attitude on the issues of East 
Timor was carefully measured considering its close relationship with Indonesia. 
As is well known, Indonesia is the most successful country in the East Asian 
region in terms of its political effectiveness, and the relationship with Indonesia 
was far more important for Japan to maintain9. Mr. Shimizu, the first Secretary at 
the Japanese Embassy in Jakarta during the East Timor peace process, said “East 
Timor was simply not in Japan’s interest, even though there was a possible chance 
for the Japanese government to play an active role in a peace process”. He added 
that the relationship with Indonesia was far more important to Japan in 
establishing its position in the East Asian region10.
6 See Chapter 2, Japan’s involvement in UN Peacekeeping operations.
7 The first time the United Nations became concerned with the issue of East Timor was in 1960. In 
the 1970s, East Timor began a war of Independence, and the Indonesian government sent the 
military to suppress the insurgency. (See the first section of this Chapter)
8 The UN Security Council adopted a resolution to request the withdrawal of Indonesian troops 
from East Timor.
9 Mori, K. (2007) A New East Asia: toward a regional community. NUS Press. P31
10 Source: Interview with Mr Shimizu.
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On 19 March 1998, interested members of Diet established the “East Timor 
forum” which mainly focused on human rights violation in East Timor. They 
addressed the issues in East Timor in a number of committees and study groups 
on foreign and defence policy on several occasions11. At the Diet’s meeting on 
foreign affairs (gaiko-iinkai) on 8 April 1998, Japan’s timid attitude to UNHCR 
activities in East Timor was criticised by one of the members of the East Timor 
forum. This was due to Japan’s opposition towards a resolution for Indonesia to 
withdraw from the territory of East Timor. A representative from MOFA 
answered that Japan can only approve a resolution by the United Nations with 
consensus from all member states12. At this time, Japan had no intention of taking 
any action without the consensus of all other countries involved in the Indonesia- 
East Timor issue -  this was to avoid any unnecessary conflict with Indonesia. 
Therefore, the Japanese government initiated diplomatic action on issues outside 
the frame of the United Nations. At the APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation)13 and ASEM (Asian Europe Meeting)14 meetings in 1998, the 
Japanese Foreign Minister had discussions with the Indonesian Foreign Minister 
on East Timor. Prime Minister Hashimoto also had a talk with the Portuguese 
Foreign Minister on the issue in Tokyo15. The initiation of diplomatic channels 
was the starting point for Japan in its move towards contributing to the operation 
in East Timor. Japan went about this in a way which was least damaging to its
11 On 19 March 1998, at the budget meeting, a member of the East Timor Forum, Representative 
Takemura, addressed the violations against human rights in East Timor, and Japan’s reaction to this 
issue. Japan’s active campaign on the issues in the East Timor started from this meeting.
12 The Proceedings of the Foreign Affairs Committee on 8 April 1998. A statement was made by 
Foreign Minister Koumura.
13 The APEC meeting was held on November 1998 in Malaysia.
14 The ASEM meeting was held on April 1998 in the UK.
15 In 1998 and 1999, Japan’s Foreign Minister Mr. Takemura visited Portugal, and Portugal’s 
Foreign Minister Mr. Amado visited Japan. On both occasions, Japan and Portugal discussed the 
future of East Timor.
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relationship with Indonesia, yet promoting its commitment to international affairs 
in a visible way.
The UN and East Timor: background knowledge o f  the issues in East Timor 
On 20 May 2002, East Timor became an independent country,16 marking the end 
of a three-year process towards independence under the guidance of the United 
Nations. The United Nations has deployed five different peace operations in East 
Timor since then and UN peacekeepers are still there to this day17. For more than 
four centuries, East Timor had been a colony under Portuguese rule. The first time 
the United Nations General Assembly placed East Timor on the international 
agenda was in 1960 when the territory was added to the list of Non-Self- 
Go veming Territories 18 . In 1974, Portugal required the establishment a 
provisional government and a popular assembly that would determine the status of 
East Timor. This led to the Timorese organizing political parties in preparation for 
self-determination. But as 1975 progressed, hostilities between pro-independence 
and pro-Indonesian parties led to civil war. Unable to control the situation, 
Portugal withdrew. Then, Frente Revolucionarie de Timor-Leste Independente 
(FRETILIN), within a few months, took control of most of the Territory and on 
28 November 1975, FRETILIN declared the independence of East Timor. 
However, the chaotic situation continued when a coalition of pro-Indonesian 
parties, Uniao Democratica Timorese (UDT) and Associacao Popular 
Democratica (APODETI) also proclaimed the independence of the Territory and 
its integration with Indonesia. With these proclamations by Timorese political
16 http://www.un.org/Overview/growth.htm. In the year 2002, two nation-states, Switzerland and 
Timor-Leste, became new members of the UN. Now the total number of member states is 191. 
(Source:“Basic facts about the UN”, DPI, 2000.)
17 U.N. (2003) United Nations and East Timor: Self-determination thorough Popular Consultation. 
UN Press. P5
18 http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/UntaetB.htm. Paragraph 1.
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parties, Indonesia launched an air, land, and naval offensive in East Timor on 7 
December 1975 in support of its allies, and integrated East Timor as its 27th 
province in 1976. However, the United Nations never recognized this integration, 
and both the Security Council and the General Assembly called for Indonesia’s 
withdrawal. On 22 December 1975, the United Nations Security Council passed 
resolution 384 unanimously, in which it recognized the inalienable right of the 
people of East Timor to self-determination and independence. It called upon 
Indonesia to withdraw, without delay, all its force and for Portugal to cooperate 
fully with the UN to enable the people of East Timor to exercise freely their right 
to self-determination. Resolution 384 set the tone for the UN position on East 
Timor for the next 24 years. This was the point at which the issues of East Timor 
gained the attention of the UN.
However, there were mounting problems during these 24 years. With the end of 
the Cold War, the issue of East Timor was brought to the table again. The report 
by UN ECOSOC 1994 highlighted allegations of a high numbers of deaths in East 
Timor. Between 1975 and 1980, an estimated 100,000 Timorese out of a 
population of 700,000 were killed by the Indonesian armed forces19. Also, 
between 1980 and 1984, it was further alleged that another 100,000 were killed or 
died of starvation or disease20. The mounting human rights violations caught the 
attention of the Japanese government and the rest of the world. Two particular 
incidents following this were to become the turning point for the situation in East 
Timor to become known on a global scale.
19 Cary P. (1999) East Timor: Third World Colonialism and the Struggle for National Identity, 
Conflict Studies 293/294. Research Institution for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism. P12
20 Indonesia consistently denied these reports saying the death toll was more in the vicinity of 
30,000.
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The situation in East Timor turned around when Indonesian troops killed a large 
number of unarmed protesters at the Santa Cruz cemetery in the East Timorese 
capital of Dili on 12 November 199121. In addition, when the Nobel Peace Prize 
was awarded to two East Timorese figures in 1996, Bishop Carlos Filipe 
Ximenes Belo, the Apostolic Administrator of Dili, and Jose Ramos Horta, the 
leading exile of the East Timorese resistance, for their work towards a just and 
peaceful solution to the conflict in East Timor22, more than 20 years of isolation 
finally ended. Receiving this most prestigious award made a strong impact, on 
international opinion and a growing number of NGOs and parliamentary groups 
in Western countries began to influence their governments’ policy on the issues 
of East Timor. It was seen as the turning point and turned international opinion in 
favour of self-determination for East Timor.
In May 1998, Indonesian President Suharto stepped down after 32years in office 
and was replaced by his vice-President B.J. Habibie. The new President brought a 
fresh approach to the issue of East Timor23. At first, the Indonesia government 
informed Secretary General Annan and Portugal of its plan to give East Timor 
wide-ranging autonomy with Jakarta, except in the three areas of foreign affairs, 
external defence, and some aspects of monetary and fiscal policies24. This was
21. At the Santa Cruz cemetery, over 271 East Timorese were killed by the Indonesian troops and 
resistance groups that day or in hospitals soon after, http ://www. eta n.org/timor/SntaCRUZ.htm. 
(East Timor Action Network -  which was funded after this massacre to stop the flow of US 
weapons and other military assistance to the Indonesian security forces) 
http://www.zmag.org/zmag/aiticles/dec96timor.htm.
22 http://www.nobel.se/peace/laureates/1996/press.html.
23 At the beginning of his presidency, President Habibie stated his position to be the same as 
President Suharto on the East Timor issue. However, with strong criticism from the international 
community, he started to compromise on administrational policy. Greenless, D. and Garran, R. 
(2002) Deliverance: The Inside Story of East Timor’s Fight for Freedom. Crows nest, Australia: 
Allen & Unwin. P6
24 Morimoto, S. (2003) Ajia Taiheiyou no Takokukanhosyou. JILA. P I88
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unacceptable to the leaders of East Timor, however, talks progressed rapidly 
resulting in a set of agreements25 between Indonesia and Portugal which were 
signed in New York on 5 May 1999. The two governments entrusted the UN to 
organize and conduct a “popular consultation” in order to ascertain whether the 
East Timorese people accepted or rejected a special autonomy within a united 
Indonesia26. In such circumstances, the United Nations accepted responsibility 
for the non-self-governing territory, enabling the process of transition to 
independence. As a beginning, UNAMET (United Nations Mission in East 
Timor) was established and mandated to conduct the ballot under UN Security 
Council Resolution 1246 on 11 June 1999. As for the planning phase, the 
selection and deployment of key personnel, as well as pre-planning and
onpreparation was conducted by the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) . It was 
because the issue on East Timor had been monitored by the DP A, and since 
deployment of the UN mission was urgent, the DPA took the lead on this case. 
The total duration of UNAMET was only about 3months -  the resolution was 
adopted on 11 June 1999, and the popular consultation voting date was set for 20 
August 199928. The 5 May Agreement stipulated that after the vote, UNAMET 
would oversee a transitional period pending implementation of the decision of the 
East Timor people.
25 The document contained three agreements: the constitutional framework for autonomy by 
Indonesia, agreement regarding the modalities for popular consultation, and a broad agreement on 
Security.
26 United Nations Dept..of Public Information. (2000). The United Nations and East Timor: self- 
determination through popular consultation. New York, Department of Public Information United 
Nations. PI 0 Article 12
27 According to Smith, the DPA had an excellent team of political analysts who, under the 
leadership of Under-Secretary General Sir Kieran Pendergast and the director for Asia and the 
Pacific, Francesc Vendrell, had worked closely over a long period with PRSG Jamsheed Market.
28 The UNAMET assessment team was deployed to East Timor from 4 to 15 May 1999, before the 
Security Council adopted Resolution 1246 (1999).
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Javan s first movement on East Timor: what can it do?
When President Habibie announced the new policy on East Timor and the 
cooperation with the UN to hold a public referendum, the Japanese government 
moved quickly to get involved in the East Timor peace process. The approval of 
the UN helped Japan to take this action. At the Diet meeting on security policy on 
9 February 1999, the Japanese government started to discuss the possibility for 
Japan’s SDF to participate in the UN operation in East Timor. Because the 
Japanese government had kept its distance from the issue on East Timor, many 
Diet members criticised Japan’s “week-kneed” diplomacy with Indonesia at 
several committee meetings. As far as many Diet members were concerned, Japan, 
being the number one investor, trade partner and ODA provider for Indonesia, 
should take a stronger approach to Indonesia on the issue of East Timor rather 
than play a “neutral”29 role. Representative Takemura from the opposition party 
also questioned the justification for Japan to provide a large amount of financial 
support to the party or country involved in the conflict or, as in this case, the 
illegal occupation of East Timor. Prime Minister Obuchi (30 July 1998 -  5 April 
2000) responded that Japan’s financial support to Indonesia was a “moral 
responsibility” to a developing country in the East Asian region, and that Japan 
would not take advantage to advance another political agenda. In several 
committees, this point was frequently raised by the opposition party, however, 
neither the cabinet nor MOFA agreed to use Japan’s financial influence on 
Indonesia as points for negotiation. The Japanese government made a clear 
decision not to use its developmental support to Indonesia as an advantage. 
However, Japan was aware of its political influence and was waiting for the best
29 Representatives Takemura and Eda energetically argued this point in the Diet fact-finding 
committee on the International Affairs and Foreign Affairs Committee during 1998-1999.
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opportunity to start diplomatic negotiations with Indonesia. During the East Timor 
crisis in 199-2000, Japan came under international criticism for its less-than- 
vigilant approach to Indonesia .
At the budget meeting on 8 March 1999, the issue regarding the dispatch of the 
SDF was brought to the table31. Nevertheless, the Japanese government could 
make no progress until the UN’s peace mission plan became clear in May. Since 
the East Timor operation was the second peace operation in the East Asian region, 
it was clear that Japan could not miss this chance to prove its ability in the peace 
process, and personnel contribution was a necessary step for Japan to show its 
presence in the UN operations once again32. Before the UN Security Council 
officially established UNAMET in June, MOFA sent a fact finding mission to 
East Timor to find out how Japan could potentially be involved. Also, Foreign 
Minister Koumura announced Japan’s contribution of US$100 million to the UN 
Trust Fund . It was Japan’s intention to demonstrate its interest m East Timor to 
other related countries and the United Nations.
At the end of July 1994, unpaid contributions to the regular budget totalled $835.1 
million for 1994 and $378.7 million for 1993. (The countries with the largest 
arrears in 1993 were: U.S. $232.7 million, South Africa $53.2 million and 
Ukraine $25.9 million)34 In comparison, Japan’s financial contribution is always
30 Schraeder. J.P. (2002) Exporting Democracy: Rhetoric vs. Reality. Lynne Rinner Publisher Inc. 
P99
31 At that moment, the United Nations had not requested Japan to send SDF to the UN 
peacekeeping mission.
32 Green, J. M. (2003) Japan’s reluctant realism: foreign policy challenges in an ear of uncertain 
power. P I86
3 Foreign Minister Koumura made the announcement to the Diet Representatives at the Foreign 
Affairs Committee on 1 June 1999 in answer to the question of the Japan’s contribution to the East 
Timor popular consultation.
34 Kanninen, T. (1995) Leadership and reform: the Secretary General and the UN financial crisis of
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the most reliable in terms of its punctuality. Thus it certainly is Japan’s strength in 
international cooperation. Therefore, by the end of the 1990s, Japan was well 
aware of its influence in the area of financial contribution. Japan was also aware 
that financial contribution was a necessity for the establishment of UN peace 
operations. Personnel contribution alone would not suffice for the deployment of 
an operation. Given its pacifist constitution, one of Japan’s strengths lay in 
financial contributions and in addition, it also had the experience and interest in 
personnel contribution of the SDF.
After the signing of the 5 May agreement, the disorganized situation in East 
Timor35 pushed Japan to the edge. Japan’s PKO law restricted the dispatch of 
Japanese personnel in an act of hostility. However, in response to a request from 
the United Nations, the Japanese government decided to dispatch Mr. Noboru 
Nomura, first secretary of the Embassy of Japan in the Netherlands, to work as a 
political affairs officer for UNAMET36. With the continued fighting in East Timor, 
Japan made a great effort to dispatch more personnel to UNAMET before the 
popular consultation on 30 August. Four days after the announcement of the 
dispatch of Mr. Nomura, Japan decided to send the electoral observers for the 
popular consultation as well as three civilian police officers37 from the beginning 
of July with the dispatch of CIVPOL being announced on 29 June 1999. In 
addition, Japan sent 2,000 radio sets based on the International Peace Cooperation
the late 1980s. P281
35 A Secretary General’s report on 22 June urged that the continuing violence by pro-integration 
militia made impossible for the UN to deploy UNAMET fully. Between the 5 May agreement and 
the popular consolation in August 1999, several attacks were made on the UN and other 
organizations. (See section 1 of this chapter for more details)
36 The announcement was officially made on 21 June 1999.
37 Japanese CIVPOL were stationed at three different locations to carry out their duties including 
giving advice to the Indonesian police on their duties.
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Law38. Since its first experience in the UN peace operation in Cambodia, Japan 
was also able to come up with several alternative contributions that were the result 
of a loophole in the PKO Law. From its decade of experiences in UN operations, 
Japan was finally shaping its own style of contributions .
At the start of the UN operation in Cambodia, the dispatch of the SDF was 
initially seen as one of the ways in which Japan should take part in the UN 
operation in a visible way. There was much expected of Japan after the way it had 
been criticised for its response to the Gulf War Crisis. However, during its 
struggle in the 1990s Japan, as well as the UN and other member states, began to 
realise there were different roles that Japan could play and that Japan could use its 
strengths to its advantage40. As Isezaki noted, it could connect related countries as 
a negotiator or use its bilateral relationships for diplomatic talks. Japan’s 
promising neutrality was verified by its constitution and is its strong point in 
taking this position41.
The SDF dispatch to East Timor initially encountered problems that would not 
allow their dispatch. Two conditions required by Article 3 of the PKO Law were 
not being met. Firstly, Article 3 stipulated that there must be an agreement of 
ceasefire by all parties involved in the conflict42. The article also says that if there 
is no armed conflict, the acceptance by the authorities of the involved country is 
enough. Since the 5 May agreement was signed, there was no cease-fire
38 Press release statement on 29 June 1999itary sphere.
39 Cooney. P48
40 Prime Minister Koizumi argued that Japan established a “different and special “ idea for how to 
contribute UN peace operations, and the international community have to accept Japan’s “one 
country pacifism” concerning the military sphere. Drifte, R. (2000) Japan’s quest for a permanent 
Security Council seat: a matter of pride or justice? Macmillan press. P88
41 K. Isezaki. (2008) Jieitai no kokusaikouken wa kenpokyujyoude. Kamogawa syutupan. P79
42 See next chapter on the Japanese SDF Law.
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agreement between the two parties as required by Article 3, and as a result, Japan 
could not send the SDF. Japan was nonetheless hoping for a request from the East 
Timor government.
Secondly, Article 2 concerns the definition of the type of UN peace operation in 
which Japan can participate. Japan can only participate in UN peace operations 
with strict neutrality and not take sides with any party involved. If Japan considers 
that the disputing parties are “pro-independence” and “pro-integration force”, 
Japan’s participation in the independence of East Timor would be a case of siding 
with a pro-independence force. In either case, the SDF would have to withdraw or 
remain inactive in order to maintain its neutrality once an armed conflict broke 
out. The definition and conditions legislated in the PKO Law became a hindrance 
for Japanese government. The law only covered a few scenarios, and did not 
recognise different types of situations in which the UN might be involved43. At 
this point, the LDP, MOFA, and the Defence Agency were carefully watching for 
the right time to make an amendment to the PKO Law in order to lift some of the 
restrictions on Japan’s participation.
The legislative issue was one issue, but once again the Japanese government was 
faced with the matter of how to convince the opposition party and public opinion 
on personnel contributions. According to a public opinion poll by the Cabinet 
Office in 2000 about SDF participation in UN peace operations,44, 29.9% people 
answered “should participate more than now” and 48.2% people answered
43 Isezaki. P95
44 From the results of a public opinion poll in 2000 (Heisei 12nen) on Japanese foreign policy on 
international cooperation.
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“should participate the same as now” with a total of 77.4% of people supporting 
the participation of the personnel in UN peace operations45.
A result of the public poll showed strong support from younger generations for 
more participation. More than 85% of people aged between 20-39 years old 
answered “more than now (36.8%)” and “same as now (49.8%)”. The overall 
result showed more people are supported personnel contributions to UN 
operations compared the early 1990s. For most of the younger generation, the 
memory of World War II is of the past and they have no difficulties with the idea 
of sending the SDF to UN operations46. The discussion in the Diet on whether or 
not the dispatch of the SDF to UN operations would be a violation of the 
interpretation of Article did not reflect public opinion. Therefore, the opposition 
parties only delayed the process of the dispatch of the SDF.
During the public referendum period in East Timor, major Japanese newspapers47 
expressed the situation in East Timor as “being thrown into confusion”, and 
criticized the reaction by the Japanese government as “taking sides” with 
Indonesia or the pro-integration force. Prime Minister Obuchi’s statement48 on the 
attack on the UN office in Dili on 30 June 1999, made even a stronger impression 
that Japan was taking sides with the Indonesian government49. As a result, strong 
disapproval was given voice by the opposition parties and the media. This moved 
the Japanese public to give more support to the idea of active cooperation for the
45 The Cabinet Office (2000) Public Opinion pull on SDF and its peacekeeping mission. The 
Cabinet Office PR Centre.
46 Cooney. PI45
47 Such as the Asahi, Yomirui, Mainchi, and Nikei Newspapers
48 He stated that the attack on the UN office was not directly offended the UN operation in East 
Timor. It was an “unfortunate incident” made by the minority group of pro-integration force.
49 PM Obuchi’s statement on the incident was the same as the one by Indonesian government.
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international effort to assist the people in East Timor. Both the administration and 
foreign ministry denied taking sides with Indonesia and stated that Japan supports 
the East Timorese. They also stated that the attacks on the UN office was a 
“matter of regret”, and expressed concerns over the situation50.
The opposition parties and interested Diet members pressured the Obuchi 
administration and MOFA even harder to use its influence over the Indonesian 
government. Japan’s ODA contribution towards Indonesia was averaging 840 
million Japanese yen every year, and the bilateral economic relationship between 
the two countries was an essential part of the Indonesian economy.51 Since the 
Japanese government had not taken advantage of this, there were doubts about 
Japan’s neutrality towards East Timor and this spread to the Japanese public very 
quickly.
UN Operations, and Multinational forces: Regional support 
To carry out the consultation, resolution 1246 (1999) of the Security Council 
authorised the establishment of the United Nations Mission in East Timor 
(UNAMET) on 11 June 1999. The mission would set almost 1,000 international 
staff to work together with up to 4,000 locally hired personnel throughout the 
operation.52 The 5 May agreements stated that, after the vote, UNAMET would 
oversee a transitional period pending implementation of the decision of the East 
Timorese people. Despite an extremely tight timetable to prepare for the voting, 
delays were caused by security concerns, while administrative difficulties were
50 At several meetings in the Diet (specially at the Foreign committee meeting in July-August 
1999), MOFA officials and the Prime Minister tried to deny Japan’s position as in Indonesian side.
51 Especially after the monetary crisis in 1997, the Indonesian economy fell, and Japan’s financial 
support meant more than ever to the Indonesian government.
52 United Nations Dept, of Public Information. PI 2. Article 17.
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caused by the heightened levels of tension. However, even with the problems of 
an underdeveloped infrastructure, UNAMET successfully registered 451,792 
potential voters among the population of 800,000 in East Timor and abroad. On 
voting day, 30 August 1999, some 98% of registered voters went to the polls and 
rejected the proposed autonomy by a margin of 344,580 (78.5%) to 94,388 
(21.5%). This was the beginning of the process of transition towards 
independence53. Following the announcement of the result, pro-integration 
militias with the support of the Indonesian security forces, launched a campaign 
of violence with looting and arson throughout the entire territory. The exact 
number of deaths and other human rights violations remains uncertain, but the 
estimated number of deaths was around 1,000. As a result, the entire population 
was displaced, and more than 250,000 people left the territory, in some cases 
transported under Indonesian and militia control to West Timor.54 Most of 
UNAMET personnel were evacuated to Darwin, Australia, but a small team of 
UNAMET staff remained in the UN Headquarters in Dili. The Secretary General 
and the Security Council undertook strenuous diplomatic efforts to halt the 
violence, pressuring Indonesia to meet its responsibility to maintain security and 
order in the territory.
In response to this emergency situation, the United Nations began to coordinate 
large-scale emergency humanitarian assistance. When a UN mission sent by the 
Security Council visited Jakarta and Dili on 12 September 1999, the Indonesian 
government agreed to accept the offer of assistance from the United Nations and
53 http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/lJnta etB .htrn
54 Dunn, J. Crimes against humanity in East Timor, January to October 1999: Their nature and 
causes. McDonald, H. (ed) (2002) Master of Terror: Indonesia’s Military and Violence in East 
Timor in 1999. Australian National University. P66
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its member states. Immediately, the Security Council passed resolution 1264 on 
15 September acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and authorized the 
establishment of a multinational-force empowered to use all necessary measures 
to restore peace and security in East Timor. Then, the Security Council 
authorized the multinational force (INTERFET), under a unified command 
structure headed by Australia, to protect and support UNAMET in carrying out 
its tasks and, within force capabilities, to facilitate humanitarian assistance 
operations.
Rapid deployment o f a multinational force 
In the East Timor operations, the military component and INTERFET were the 
largest and costliest and the most effective and successful. Both INTERFET and 
UNTAET were mandated to use force to maintain security under Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter. Deployment of a peacekeeping force (PKF) was stipulated in the 
5th May agreement to replace the TNI (Indonesian National Army) in an orderly 
transition. However, post-ballot violence and destruction required the rapid 
deployment of the PKF unit. However, it was impossible for the UN to deploy 
such large numbers of troops at short notice. Thus, as an alternative, the UN 
Security Council Resolution 126455 authorised “the States participating in the 
multinational force to take all necessary measures” to restore security in the crisis- 
ravaged territory of East Timor. The Australian government agreed to lead the 
multinational force for East Timor-INTERFE56 and Resolution 1264 authorised 
INTERFET to undertake the following mission:
55 S/RRS/1264 (1999) 15 September 1999.
56 Following the Indonesian government’s announcement that it would permit INTERFET in East 
Timor, PM Howard announced on 15 September 1999 that Australia would be involved in the 
multinational force.
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®  to restore peace and security in East Timor
(2) to protect and support UNAMET in carrying out its tasks within 
force capabilities
(3) to facilitate humanitarian assistance operations
It is generally known that deployment of any kind of peace operation, especially 
PKF, takes more than a few months. “Rapid deployment” is almost impossible 
except in a multinational force of the “coalition of the willing”. The UN’s desire 
to improve its capability to deploy PKF speedily when it was required was far 
from the reality. However, INTERFET proved to be a possibility in deploying a 
multinational force for an emergency base.
In general, contributors of troops are not comfortable with handing over 
operational control, however, in the case of INTERFET, Australia took all control 
under the usual command arrangements for its own operations. The decision was 
based on resolution 1264 (1999) which authorized the establishment of a 
multinational force under a “unified command structure”57. The UN mandate 
ensured that the “leading nation” concept of command would prevail. Australian 
command adopted a strong lead nation’s approach and made this operation stand 
out. Most of the UN peace missions follow a more bureaucratic and collegiate 
model of command, where national representation often has priority over 
operational effectiveness. In East Timor, the INTERFET/UNTAET military 
model worked out, but it is likely to require modification for future operation in 
more hostile environments.
57 Paragraph 3 of the resolution 1264.
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The United Nations was unable to deploy the PKF quickly enough to restore 
security in East Timor. However, the regional will to gather a voluntary base of 
multinational forces with reliable financial contributors was certainly a success. 
Australia proved its ability to manage and control such a large force. Financial 
contribution was the only action that Japan could take given its circumstances. 
However, it is too vague to see INTERFET as a model case for a generic solution 
to regional peacekeeping in East Asian region58.
Javan s contribution: domestic dilemma and international requirement 
With the chaos in East Timor and the establishment of INTERFET in September 
1999 put the Japanese government in a more difficult position. INTERFET was 
established under Chapter VII o f the UN Charter, however, Article 9 and the PKO 
Law both prohibited any kind of military activity. This meant that Japan could not 
send personnel to the East Timor operation until peace was re-established. 
Contrary to the response Japan received the previous time it was unable to 
contribute troops, Japan did not receive any criticism from other regional states. 
Since Australia was willing to play a leading role in this area, shared 
responsibility in the East Asian states was perfectly possible between the two 
countries59.
Japanese government was taking alternative action to fulfil its responsibility from 
a non-military perspective. As for the beginning contributions, Foreign Minister
58 Francis. J.D. (2005) Dangers of co-deployment: UN-cooperative peacekeeping in Africa. 
Ashgate Publishing inc. P71
59 Cotton, J. (2004) East Timor, Australia and regional order: intervention and its aftermath in 
Southeast Asia. Routledge Curzon. P83
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Koumura gave Japan’s financial contribution of US$1 million to INTERFET, and 
another US$ 200 million to the UNHCR and WFP operations in East Timor at the 
Diet budget meeting on 30 September60. The Diet session was extended to discuss 
Japan’s possible personnel contribution to the operation not limited only to 
INTERFET, but also to missions with a more humanitarian purpose, and unfreeze 
the participation to the Chapter VII operation. At this point, the Japanese 
government had strongly supported the 5 principles of the PKO Law since 1992, 
and sought to play a role in “backup support” for the humanitarian mission of the 
East Timor so as not to violate its non-involvement principles. The SDF Law 
Article 100 does state that SDF can participate in humanitarian relief operation.61 
Therefore, MOFA and the Defence Agency were looking for a possibility in the 
UNHCR refugee relief operation in West Timor.
This was a compromise for the Japanese government given the PKO Law. Finally 
in November 1999, in response to a request from UNHCR, the Japanese 
government was able to provide airlift services by SDF transport planes between 
Surabaya (Java Island) and Kupang (West Timor) for UNHCR’s humanitarian 
relief items that were to be used for East Timorese people displaced in West 
Timor.62 The scale of the corps was as followed: Air SDF unit (150 personnel), 
Liaison officers (6 personnel), Aircraft (4 transport planes of C-130H), and 1 
multi-purpose assistance plane (U-4).
60 It was an answer to the Representative Kawabata, a member of the East Timor association. 
MOFA announced Japan’s financial support to INTERFET to the public on 21 September 1999 by 
the Press Secretary.
61 Article III of the PKO Law defines “humanitarian international relief operations” in which Japan 
may participate. The requirements for participation in humanitarian relief operations are less 
stringent than those for PKO.
62 MOFA announcement on 19 November 1999.
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Compared with the beginning of the 1990s, the Japanese government was able to 
manage personnel contribution even under the pacifist constitution with few 
amendments to the PKO Law. The Japanese government, MOFA and MOD found 
an alternative interpretation of Article 9 of the Constitution -  to deploy SDF in 
humanitarian intervention under the UN or related organisation -  which will allow 
them to send SDF personnel.
By the beginning of new century, not only the Japanese public but also several 
Asian countries showed their respect towards Japan’s active involvement in UN 
peace operations especially in Cambodia. There was still a concern from 
particular neighbouring states such as the PRC, DPRK and Republic of Korea on 
Japan’s “remilitarisation” by sending SDF to UN PKOs63. Despite some of the 
arguments inside and outside of Japan (this point will discussed in the next 
Chapter), the debate in the Diet was moving towards allowing the SDF to 
participate in military aspects of the peace operations include monitoring a cease­
fire, disarmament, and cantonment etc.. The basic argument by the LDP was that 
if the 5 principles of the PKO Law were maintained, permitting PKF activity 
would not violate Article 9 of the Constitutional Law which prohibited any kind 
of military action64. The reason why the PKO Law was initially established in this 
way in 1992 was that the government carefully took into consideration the 
sensitivity of neighbouring countries as well as trying to stay true to its own 
pacifist constitution65.
63 Some Asian countries (particularly those three countries mentioned above) expressed their 
concern about Japan’s SDF participation in the UN PKO even in the non-military part of the 
operation. Japan’s
Foreign Minister Kono’s (Oct 1999-Apr 2001) answer to Representative Sato of the Komei 
Party at the Committee of the Security on 11 November 1999.
65 Willibald, S. (2004) Japan’s (UN)certain future? Permanent membership on the United Nations 
Security Council -  A Delphi Study. GRIN Verlag. P36
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Due to the restrictions, the Japanese government tried to show its presence by 
providing financial support. On 4 October 1999, Foreign Minister Koumura 
announced66 the decision to contribute around US$100 million to the UN Trust 
Fund for the multinational force (INTERFET). He also announced that Japan 
would provide a substantial financial contribution to INTERFET by providing 
financial support for those developing countries willing to participate in the force. 
The contribution by Japan was welcomed by the Australian government which 
lead the operation. It said that “Japan’s contribution will be decisive in 
encouraging strong regional participation”67. Fourteen countries from the East 
Asian region, including Thailand, the Philippines, Singapore and Malaysia had 
already announced their participation in INTERFET at the beginning of October 
1999. Japan’s contribution to INTERFET and additional support for the
/■O
developing countries was significant and set things in motion . Moreover, the UN 
Secretary General, Annan visited Japan in November 1999 to discuss several 
matters with Japanese governmental officials in Tokyo. Before his visit to Tokyo, 
Annan had appointed Mr. Akira Takahashi who was Special Advisor to the 
President of the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA69) as Deputy 
Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) for Humanitarian 
Assistance and Emergency Rehabilitation70 of the UNTAET. Mr. Takahashi
66 On 4 October 1999, Foreign Minister Koumura made an announcement to the public. Before the 
announcement, the Cabinet approved the financial contribution to the UN Trust Fund, and support 
for the developing countries to participate in INTERFET.
67 Speech by Mr. Alexander Downer (Foreign Minister of Australia) 6 October 1999.
68 This speech made by the Australian Foreign Ministry on the Japan’s financial contribution to the 
INTERFET on 6 October 1999.
69 JICA was founded in 1974 as an agency to implement technical assistance, focusing on 
institution building, strengthening organizations and human resources development that would 
enable developing countries to pursue their own sustainable socioeconomic development.
70 This position was one of the two deputies of SRSG of the UNTAET, and would take charge of 
the coordination and provision of humanitarian, rehabilitation and development assistance.
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already had experience in humanitarian assistance and the development 
programme in JICA which administrated most of Japan’s ODA. This gesture was 
received as UN high expectation for Japan to play an important role in its area of 
greatest experienced. The official visit by the UN Secretary General in this timing 
highlights Japan’s importance in the East Asian region, and also the necessity of 
Japan’s financial contribution71. Because of INTERFET’s nature as a “coalition of 
the willing” which was established under a resolution of the UN Security Council, 
the cost of this multinational force was not covered by the UN budget and Japan’s 
financial contribution was crucial.
During the deployment of INTERFET, the Japanese government was still 
searching for a way to contribute its personnel to non-military posts72. As for the 
diplomatic effort, MOFA and the Foreign Minister continued their discussion with 
the Indonesian government. During the years 1999-2001, Indonesian President 
Wahid visited Tokyo twice (November 1999 and April 2000), and President 
Megawati (September 2001) once, while Japanese officials visited Jakarta 6 
times73 to discuss and exchange views on East Timor. This was an indication of 
Japan’s willingness to lead in the area of diplomacy, however, none of the 
meetings were able to bring about any solutions to the issues.
71 The UN Secretary General Kofi Annan visited Japan every year since his appointment as the UN 
Secretary General. His visits made clear that Japan’ role in the United Nations and the East Asian 
region.
72 The Secretary General Kofi Annan suggests that Japan’s participation in the UN operation in 
East Timor does not have to be a personnel contribution. (Press Release on 17 November 1999
73 Official visits by Japanese government officials, including the Foreign Minister of Japan, to the 
Indonesian Government were frequently repeated during the transitional period of East Timor.
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UNTAET: UN to sovem  a country
With the delay of the deployment of UNTAET, the United Nations decided to 
extend the mandate of UNAMET until 30 November 1999 -  until the deployment 
of UNTAET. Several UN officials and MOFA diplomats witnessed that the 
United Nations did not plan to establish a transitional administration between the 
5 May agreement and the popular consultation74. UN Secretariats were given an 
impossibly short time, and did not have time to consider a briefing report from 
any fact-finding missions75. The Secretariat gathered available personnel and 
equipment within a short period of time, however, the scale of the operation 
needed to govern a nation was impossible to picture without experience and the 
operation found difficulties from the planning stage.
On 25 October 1999, the Security Council authorised the establishment of the 
United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) under
Resolution 1272,76 and the Secretary General appointed the highly regarded
Sergio Vieira de Mello from Brazil as SRSG. Resolution 1272 mandated 
UNTAET to provide security and maintain law and order throughout the territory 
of East Timor. Its mandates were as follows:
®  establish an effective administration;
©  assist in the development of civil and social services;
(3) ensure the coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance,
(D rehabilitation and development assistance;
74 Source: Interview with MOFA officials posted in Dili during the transitional period, and UNV 
personnel engaged in the East Timor peace process. Smith, M. (2003) Peacekeeping in East Timor. 
Lynne Rienner. P60
75Speech by Breen B. at the Tokyo Conference 2002.
76 It should be noted that the Security Council authorised UNTAET under Chapter VII of the 
Charter.
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©  support capacity-building for self-government;
®  assist in the establishment of conditions for sustainable 
development.77
This was not the first occasion in which the UN had acted in a transitional 
capacity, however, UNTAET was to be the de jure  government of a ruined 
country.78 What UN did in Cambodia or Namibia was re-building a society in 
countries with established Ministries and Agencies, a Judiciary system, Economy, 
and Education. In East Timor, on the other hand, the UN took the responsibility 
to establish the basic structure of a nation-state from scratch. In addition, due to 
the uncertain security situation, the infrastructure was almost completely 
destroyed and the population dislocated. To all intents and purposes, UNTAET 
assumed responsibility from UNAMET in November 1999, inheriting a small 
number of experienced UNAMET personnel and what remained of its equipment.
UNTAET’s experience was distinct from other operations exercising transitional 
administration, since this was the first time sovereignty had been passed on to the 
UN despite competing authorities79. Therefore, during the planning phase of 
UNTAET, the question of sovereignty was carefully avoided to minimize and 
attempt to steer clear of any resistance or objection. However, resolution 1272 
became the instrument for giving sovereignty over East Timor to the United 
Nations, even though it did not use those words. As Time magazine noted on 20 
March 2000, “the UN is legally the holder of East Timor’s sovereignty, and it is
77 http://wwrw.un.org/peace/etimorAJntaetM.htm.
78 Smith, M. G and M. Dee (2003). Peacekeeping in East Timor: the path to independence. 
Boulder, Colorado, Lynne Rienner Publishers.
P59
79 In both Eastern Slavonia in 1996-98 and Kosovo since 1999, Croatia and Serbia respectively 
constituted the recognised sovereign states.
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the first time in its history the world body had played such a role”80. This new 
experiment by the UN was watched carefully. UNTAET was deployed under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter which is entitled “Action with Respect to Threats 
to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression.” Therefore, 
UNTAET consisted of essentially the same capabilities as the former INTERFET 
-  the forces were modem, well equipped, well trained and well led.
The Secretariats: the Brahimi recommendations 
The scale and responsibility of UNTAET was enormous and the importance of 
mission preparation and planning was highlighted in the mandates of UNTAET. 
However, the Secretariats could not fulfil such a requirement and advance 
planning was only managed in two particular areas: the Peacekeeping Force 
(PKF) and the Electoral Division (for the UNAMET ballot -  popular 
consultation -  and later for the Constituent Assembly elections81). Nevertheless, 
UNTAET had to replace all pre-existing authorities in the territory during the 
operation -  this was something the UN had never experienced in its peace 
operation history.
The UN inter-departmental hand-over process caused unnecessary confusion and 
delay for the deployment of UNTAET82. UNAMET had been conducted by the 
DPA, while the UN authorisation of the deployment of INTERFET, whose 
strength ultimately reached 11,500 troops, entailed the transfer of responsibilities 
to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). However, as a
80 Terry McCarthy, “Rising From the Ashes” Time, 20 March 2000. PI4
81 Much of the credit for the electoral success went to the excellent preparatory work done by the 
DPA’s Electoral Assistance Division, under the capable direction of Carina Perelli from Uruguay.
82 Breen, B. (2002) UNTAET: Debriefing and Lesson. Tokyo Conference. JILA
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consequence, there was a significant loss of continuity in planning and leadership, 
in communication between New York and Dili, and in the transmission of in­
theatre knowledge and experience from UNAMET to UNTAET83. With the 
exception of some delays and disorganisation caused by the UN Secretariat, the 
overall time schedule for the UNAMET and UNTAET operations went smoothly. 
The difficulties experienced in the transition of roles between the departments at 
the UN headquarters served as another lesson for future missions.
After several years of experience in peace operations in the 1990s, many of the 
difficulties which most of the operations encountered related directly to inchoate 
planning and preparation within the Secretariats in New York. The Brahimi report 
indicated that the Secretariat was understaffed and lacked integrated planning. 
Also, bureaucratic difficulties were compounded by the parlous state of DPKO 
staffing levels.
As for the planning of UNTAET, only infrequent communication had been made 
between the departments and the UN agencies in the planning process. Therefore, 
when the UN personnel were deployed into East Timor, this brought in many 
different organizational paradigms. Those difficulties in addressing day-to-day 
problems also obstructed UNTAET ability to conduct a sufficient mission. Since 
the 1990s, most of the UN peace operations were deployed at short notice, and 
there had always been a need for Secretariats to improve the planning process so 
that it was organised and ran more quickly. There was sufficient time for the 
Secretariat to plan and prepare details of UNTAET, during the UNAMET 
deployment. However, the post ballot situation was more than anyone could
83 Jarat Chopra. (2000) The UN’s Kingdom o f  East Timor. Survival Vol 42. No3. Autumn 2000. 
P27-39
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imagine, and most of the advance planning which was predicted for 5 May 
Agreements did not suit the actual situation84.
The planning process of UNTAET took place in the context of a fierce 
bureaucratic power struggle between the DP A and the DPKO. Before the 
referendum and violence, the DP A85 had been the principal unit in the Secretariat 
to handle the situation in East Timor,86 however, the entry of INTERFET radically 
changed the nature of the mission. UNAMET was organized by the DPA and its 
mandate further gave the DPA a role in the initial transitional period regardless of 
the outcome of the ballot. The DPKO had been in control of the deployment of 
international troops in a peacemaking /peacekeeping capacity. Therefore, the 
control and management of the East Timor mission naturally moved from the 
jurisdiction of the DPA to that of the DPKO. However, from the very beginning 
of its transition, the DPKO did not respond to proposals from the DPA’s Under 
Secretary General for a joint planning mission. This inter-departmental rivalry 
over institutional mandate caused some distractions for the planning of UNAMET. 
In mid-September, a decision by the Secretary General’s office settled the matter. 
While the planning team drew its staff from both departments and was assisted by
on
several UN family organizations, it was clear that the DPKO had to be in charge .
84 Article 7 of the agreement stipulated that if the result of the ballot rejected the autonomy 
proposal, authority in East Timor would be transferred to the UN, which would initiate a process 
of transition towards independence.
85 The Department of Political Affairs provides advice and support on all political matters to the 
Secretary-General in the exercise of his global responsibilities under the United Nations Charter 
relating to the maintenance of peace and security. The Department carries out activities related to 
the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts, peace-building, electoral assistance, 
substantive support and secretariat services to the Security Council, the Committee on the Exercise 
of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, and the Special Committee on the Situation 
with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial 
Countries and Peoples. The Secretary-General, through his special representatives and envoys, is 
actively engaged in implementing political mandates in a number of countries.
86Suhrke, A. (2000) Peacekeeping as Nation-builders: Dilemmas o f the UN in East Timor. 
International Peacekeeping. Vol 8. no4. 2000 Pl-20
87 Suhrke. P6
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The conflicts between departments inside the UN had to be avoided, because 
cooperation between internal sectors was one of the important elements for the 
success of peace operations.
The fundamental interests between the DPA and the DPKO are different, however, 
both departments are the heart of United Nations planning and conducting peace 
operations. Therefore, stronger cooperation and joint planning or a joint mission 
seemed necessary. As the DPA had been the principal unit in handling East Timor 
since the 1970s, the DPKO had little knowledge of East Timor, and moreover, had 
only limited experience in “governance missions.” Institutional location also 
influenced the choice of a “model” for planning purposes -  another important 
element in the mission’s genesis88. The DPKO chose its operations in Kosovo as 
the model for East Timor. A comprehensive “peacebuilding” and “governance” 
mission had been established in Kosovo in June 199989. The duties and tasks by 
UNMIK (United Nations Mission in Kosovo) were shared with UNHCR, OSCE, 
and EU, while NATO leading KFOR was deployed to ensure their security. 
However, UNTAET was taking full responsibility as a governmental authority, 
and also had the power to enforce peace under Chapter VII of UN Charter. The 
ability of UNTAET to conduct institution building had limitations since the 
missions only consisted of three departments. Because of UNTAET lacking 
capacity, a large part of the reconstruction work was taken over by the World 
Bank, the donors and the UNDP.
88 Suhrke. P7.
89 The Kosovo mission itself reflected a broader doctrinal evolution that incorporated experiences 
from Namibia to Eastern Slavonia, and UNAMET was not a complete structural replica of 
UNMIK.
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In addition, East Timor lacked all necessary resources to rebuild the 
administration. If there was “nearly nothing” in East Timor for the UN to build on, 
as Sergio de Mello (SRSG) later said, then everything had to be brought in90. 
Since each operation has a unique character and background, complications for 
“peace-building” and “governance” missions were unrecognised in the UN 
Secretariats until the East Timor operation. Some improvements made on the 
UNTAET were institutional changes in the UN Secretariats in the planning area. 
There was tremendous political pressure to demonstrate that the UN could act 
quickly and effectively. Ideally, the United Nations needed six months to prepare 
a multi-purpose mission like UNTAET.
As noted in the Brahimi report, “effective, dynamic leadership can make the 
difference between a cohesive mission with high morale and effectiveness despite 
adverse circumstances, and one that struggles to maintain any of those 
attributes... the tenor of an entire mission can be heavily influenced by the 
character and ability of those who lead it.”91 Ian Martin (SRSG of UNAMET), 
Major General Peter Cosgrove, Head of INTERFET, and Sergio Vieira de Mello 
all demonstrated leadership qualities under difficult circumstances. There is no 
doubt that the sustained personal commitment of Sergio Vieira de Mello as SRSG 
was one of the key factors in the overall success of the UNTAET operation. He 
was the UN Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs and head of 
OCHA (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) at that time, and had 
an extensive record of service with UN missions and agencies stretching over 30 
years.
90 Statement to the Security Council. UN doc. SC/6799/3. February 2000
91 Brahimi report. Para 92, P I6.
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De Mello arrived in mid-November 1999 with great expectations. The DPKO had 
delegated him wide powers of discretion, and his mandate from the Security 
Council was sweeping92. As soon as he arrived in East Timor, he immediately 
opened a direct dialogue with Gusmao and he relied on this personal relationship 
almost exclusively to guide the mission. During the operation, although East 
Timorese leaders were sometimes critical of the UN and UNTAET, they all 
recognized and solidly supported the efforts and commitment of the SRSG. To 
accomplish the mission’s objectives, the SRSG is required to engage in constant 
negotiation with a wide range of actors, including the key persons from the host 
country. Therefore, the SRSG must provide leadership and be able to 
communicate effectively with the diverse international and local staff, as well as 
the rotating national contingents of peacekeepers, to keep them working toward 
the same objectives and to maintain morale93. In the case of UNTAET, SRSG - 
De Mello did not have a problem with language -  Portuguese was his native 
tongue. Moreover, he was a Director of Repatriation for the UNTAC -  the only 
peace operation in the East Asian region before UNTAET. The cultural and 
linguistic background along with his experience with the UNTAC operation made 
Sergio De Mello extremely effective in the negotiation process with East 
Timorese leaders. This seemed to negate to the idea that the people in the host 
country experienced resistance to the “white man”.
92 Chopra. P32
93 Malone, D. (2004) The UN Security Council: from the Cold War to the 21st Century. Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, Inc. P324
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Japan s first movement: cooperation with related countries 
The Prime Ministership of Junichiro Koizumi (2001-2006) was the turning point 
for Japanese foreign policy, and domestic institutions. What was most significant 
about the Koizumi administration was that he took anti-mainstream ideals to the 
mainstream, which had been impossible in Japanese politics for more than a half 
of century. The first change was seen when terrorist attacked the US on 11 
September. Unlike previous prime ministers, Koizumi took necessary measures 
within a few hours. He established an inter-ministerial task force under his 
supervision, and issued six initiatives by the following morning including the 
dispatch of SDF if necessary. Prime Minister Hashimoto (1996-1998) formed the 
Administrative Reform Council, one of its major goals was to reinforce the 
authority of the cabinet and the prime minister, provide them with more staff 
support and give firmer control in emergencies. The administrative reform related 
bills passed in July 1999. It resulted in significant institutional changes that 
strengthened the power and function of cabinet secretariat94.
Koizumi’s understanding of interpretation of Article 9 was no different from 
previous administrations, however, he added that “there is room for 
consideration95” for an amendment or variation on the interpretation. After 
consulting with MOFA and the Defence Agency, Koizumi decided to dispatch 
SDF ships to refuelling mission to the “Coalition of the Willing” in Afghanistan, 
which was a breakthrough for Japan’s foreign and security policy. This action was 
seen by the White House as a major step forward by Japan towards collective self- 
defence and taking on a role in global security.
94 Shinoda. P I94
95 Kyodo-tsushin, 21 April 2001, and the Asahi Shinbun, 6 November 2001.
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Koizumi’s effective policy-making leadership was never seen in Japanese post­
war political history, and he was willing to exercise his power on the SDF 
dispatch to operations in East Timor.
As for a breakthrough, Foreign Minister Kono visited East Timor on 30 April 
2000 to meet with Sergio de Mello, and Xanana Gusmao. During his visit, Mr. 
Kono and the East Timor representatives exchanged views on the issue of East 
Timor, while Mr. Kono promised further support by the Japanese government. He 
also explained Japan's policy on support for reconstruction and development, 
including an early implementation of tangible aid and assistance for human 
resources development which was support through JSPP21 for East Timorese 
students in Indonesia. Foreign Minister Kono also expressed his intention to raise 
the issue of East Timor in some form at the Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the 
G8 Kyushu-Okinawa Summit. This first time attempt at raising the issue of East 
Timor also contained indirect messages96 towards the government of Indonesia. 
This was Japan’s way of applying pressure in a non-direct way, given its political 
relationship with Indonesia, by showing Japan’s support for East Timor. This was 
the point when Japan finally used its strong influence on Indonesia even though 
indirectly.
Foreign Minister Kono also visited Singapore ahead of Indonesia and East Timor, 
and re-visited Singapore again. With regards to the regional situations, Foreign 
Minister Kono explained the reasons for his visits to Indonesia and East Timor 
and exchanged views with the Singaporean leaders. Specifically, he reached an
96 Sources: Interviews with Mr. Matsuura in NYC December 2005, and with Mr. Shimizu in Tokyo 
March 2006.
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agreement in principle with Foreign Minister Jayakumar on assistance to human 
resources development in East Timor under the framework of the Japan-Singapore 
Partnership Program for the 21st Century (JSPP21). Japan’s diplomatic efforts for 
East Timor continued through its own channel during the UNTAET operation. 
Japan used the visits by F.M. Kono to promote its own commitment to East Timor, 
and also asked other regional states to cooperate with Japan in playing a leading 
role in the rehabilitation and reconstruction phase.
Finally, with the hand-over for the responsibility of the security of East Timor 
from INTERFET to UNTAET on 23 February 2000, the Japanese Diet started 
preparing for the dispatch of SDF units to UNTAET. However, because of the 
legislative system, it took more than a year to get SDF troops on the ground. In 
the Japanese legislative process, if  a bill cannot be passed by the end of the 
session, those bills will be abandoned for the current session and be reconsidered 
in the next session.
Therefore, to fill the time gap between the dispatch of SDF on East Timor soil, 
Japanese government first held a Donor’s Meeting for East Timor in Tokyo in 
December 1999, and pledged around US$130 million in assistance over three
Q7years - the largest package to be provided by a donor country . Subsequently, 
MOFA dispatched an economic cooperation study team to East Timor to examine 
the reconstruction and development needs in January 2000. Japan was able to 
contribute financially and in addition, took the time to examine the ways in which
97 Approximately US$100 million was for reconstruction and development assistance, and 
approximately US$30 million for humanitarian assistance.
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it could help rebuild East Timor. The delay in the contribution of troops was 
inevitable, however, troops were finally dispatched in November 2001.
The Independence o f East Timor 
During the post-ballot violence, more than 75% of the population was displaced 
while more than 70% of East Timor’s private housing, public building and 
utilities were destroyed. Some 200,000 persons fled or were deported to West 
Timor and other areas of Indonesia98. There was an urgent need for reconstruction 
of the infrastructure and a stable society in which Japan could take a lead with 
expectations from leaders in East Timor already being high for Japan (details of 
Japan’s projects on rehabilitation and reconstruction will follow in Chapter 5). 
The crisis in East Timor needed a great deal of external support if it was to move 
towards a solution.
Following the deployment of INTERFET in October 1999, displaced refugees 
began to return home. From October to December 1999, close to 85,000 refugees 
were initially repatriated from camps under the auspices of the UNHCR, and a 
further 42,500 refugees were repatriated later. However, thousands of refugees 
that remained in West Timor were continually intimidated and misinformed of the 
situation in East Timor by pro-Indonesian militia99. This led to confusion on the 
part of the refugees. As a result, UNTAET took a more active role in facilitating 
the return of more refugees, especially in the difficult cases involving militia and
98 All the data are from “Global Report 1999” by UNHCR available at UNHCR hope page. 
http://www.unhcr.org.
99 Indonesia failed to disarm and curtail the power of the militias that were effectively preventing 
repatriation to East Timor. The distractions by the Indonesian military become serious when three 
UNHCR international staff members were killed by militia elements in Atamuba in West Timor on 
7 September 2000. Following this tragic incident, the UNHCR was less able to assist in the 
repatriation of refugees due to consideration for the protection of its own personnel.
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pro-autonomy supporters. Between the Atamuba killing in September 2000 and 
May 2002, only some 29,000 more refugees returned from West Timor, with 
support from UNTAET.
Japan contributed its SDF units to UNHCR’s refugee relief operation. From 
November 1999 to February 2000, Air SDF transport units totalling 113 personnel 
airlifted relief supplies from Surabaya, Java, to Kupang, West Timor, using C- 
130H transport planes 100 . The UNHCR expressed appreciation for this 
contribution, which made it possible to deliver relief supplies to some 120,000 
East Timorese displaced persons in West Timor. This was another noteworthy 
accomplishment by the Japanese government. Humanitarian relief operations such 
as these are the kinds of operations that are allowed under the new PKO Law. 
UNHCR operations are those that have no military aspect to the duties and this 
was particularly consistent with the way Japan was willing and able to contribute 
and further defined Japan’s role in UN peace operations.
During the early deployment period, the United Nations paid more attention to the 
situation in East Timor and less to that in West Timor. More senior UN presence 
in West Timor might have helped the UN to better succeed in the repatriation 
programme101. By the Security Council Resolution 1319 (2000) on 8 September, 
security in West Timor had sufficiently improved and gave good reason for a 
return of UN personnel102. From then, the UNHCR in partnership with UNTAET 
helped 188,646 refugees return to East Timor, but an estimated 60,000 to 80,000
100 Data from the Japan Peace Cooperation Headquarters.
101 Kings College report. P246, Para 150.
102 The resolution called on the Indonesian government to take immediate steps to disarm and 
disband any militia, and restore law and order in the affected areas in West Timor to ensure safety 
and security in the refugee camps.
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still remained in Indonesia103. The number of those returning increased after the 
successful election on 30 August 2001. In summary, the efforts to repatriate the 
refugees and resettle the displaced population were successful.
The election of the Constituent Assembly, scheduled for 30 August 2001, the 
second anniversary of the balloting, was promulgated on 16 March 2001. On the 
same day, civil registration of all residents began, and by 23 June, 737,811 
people had successfully registered. Finally, the date for East Timor’s 
independence was set for 20 May 2002. On 30 August 2001, two years after the 
Popular Consultation, more than 91% of East Timor’s eligible voters went to the 
polls. An 88-member Constituent Assembly and a new East Timorese 
Government which would govern East Timor during the remainder of the 
transitional period before its independence was chosen by the Timorese people. 
Then, East Timor’s Constituent Assembly signed the Territory’s first 
Constitution on 22 March 2002 and following presidential elections on 14 April, 
Xanana Gusmao was appointed president of East Timor. With both these 
preconditions for a hand-over of power, the Constituent Assembly transformed 
itself into the country’s parliament on 20 May 2002104.
State building: new areas for UN peace operation?
What the United Nations tried in East Timor was distinct from all other peace 
operations. For the first time in its history, the UN exercised sovereignty over a 
territory. For example, UNTAET held effective treaty making powers105, and
103 S/2001/983, Para 36, P5.
104 http://www.iin.org/DeDts/dpko/missions/iinmiset/background.html. UNTAET home page.
105 Full legislative and executive powers were concentrated in the hands of one individual, SRSG 
and Transitional Administrator Sergio Vieira de Mello.
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entered into a treaty with the World Bank’s IDA negotiating on behalf of East 
Timor106. Since the transitional administration had all power, it raised questions 
about whether the United Nations was involved in “state-building” and, if it was, 
how? An Agenda fo r Peace regarded Peacebuilding as “reforming or 
strengthening governmental institutions”, and Supplement to An Agenda fo r  Peace 
(1995) described an essential goal as “the creation of structure for the 
institutionalising peace”. Clearly, what the UN did in East Timor overextended 
this concept of peacebuilding, and raised questions of the capacity of the UN in 
peace operations. The most fundamental task of a transitional administration was 
to govern effectively, and prepare for a smooth transition to a sustainable 
government. Until East Timor, the UN had limited experiences in governmental 
administration. Added to the limited experiences of the UN, the existing 
difficulties of planning and conducting peace operations certainly did not help the 
situation and it was one of the most frustrating times for the UN.
That UNTAET was again ill prepared made it no different from other peace 
operations. Especially with the unique responsibility the UN took in East Timor to 
activate itself as a governmental administration, the UN Secretariat needed to give 
full support to prior planning and preparation and to the provision of a start-up 
package at the inception of the operation107. While planning for UNTAET was 
brief, the planning for UNMISET began early, allowing the transitional authority 
to develop a detailed and comprehensive plan for the follow-up mission. As for 
the logistics and financial support, the UN had no difficulties in getting 
cooperation from regional states. This reduced the amount of pressure that the
106 Kreijen, G. (2004) State failure, sovereignty and effectiveness. Koninklijke Brill NV. P321
107 Guttieri, K. (2007) Interim Governments: Institutional Bridges to peace and democracy?. 
United States Institution of Peace. P234
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Secretariat normally gets in planning peace operations. However, the UN 
Secretariat needed more than regional support to prepare peace missions, and 
what it needed was a sufficiently prepared unit (for emergency cases) that could 
quickly adapt to different kinds of worst case scenarios in conflict zones. Since 
regional cooperation and interest are the most fundamental needs in deploying 
peace operations, it was possible to quickly deploy operations in the East Asian 
region in emergency situations.
As in the pre-deployment phases at UN headquarters, UNTAET experienced 
difficulties co-existing with local powers in sharing responsibilities. After several 
months of UNTAET’s deployment, the East Timorese people became suspicious 
of the UN’s sovereignty, and doubting whether the UN had any inclination for 
sharing power during the transition. For the planning process, the DPKO had not 
tried to cooperate with East Timorese representatives until the establishment of 
the NCC. According to UN representatives, because most of the political leaders 
had been exiled or escaped from East Timor soil, most of the leaders knew little 
about the reality of civilian life in East Timor108. In addition, due to the dramatic 
changes daily in circumstances, it was hard to devise an actual plan that would 
work or be adapted to the situation the next day. At the end. UNTAET was 
intrinsically involved in mediating the access of local parties and politicians to 
key positions of authority in the period before the elections109. UNTAET was an 
ideal case study for the skills required by an interim administration to perform the 
duties of a government until replaced by local authorities. UNTAET’s 
performance was often perceived to be inefficient and ineffective. However, given
108 Interview with Matsuura.
109 Tansey, O. (2009) Regime-building: Democratization and international administration. Oxford 
University Press. P74
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the responsibility it took to build a new country in the short period that was given, 
the operation accomplished a relatively exceptional job.
Participants -  regional aspects and support from the host country 
One o f the significant factors o f the UN operations in East Timor was the strong 
support from regional states. All UN operations in East Timor had been successful 
coalitional operations with a significant regional component. The commanders o f  
the military component o f  INTERFET and UNTAET were both from the 
Philippines. One o f the significant regional developments was made by the PRC, 
which contributed 60 civilian police officers to UNTAET. The majority o f  
personnel contributed to UNTAET were mainly from neighbouring countries. 
This included members from following countries: Bangladesh, Japan, Malaysia, 
Nepal, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, South Korea, Singapore and 
Thailand, as well as others beyond the Asia-Pacific. However the major 
contribution in the entire operation were the Australian leading military and police 
components.
UNTAET personnel contri bution (December 2001)
Troops CIVPOL Observers
Australia 1,407 78 14
Bangladesh 539 35
China 60
Fiji 194
Jordan 777 200 4
Nepal 159 47 3
New Zealand 667 9 5
Pakistan 821 44 15
Philippines 58 105 8
Portugal 931 149
Republic of Korea 439
Thailand 736 24
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(in bold are the East Asian 
regional countries)110______
Table 4. 1
As Lt.-Gen. Sanderson (former Commander o f the military component o f  
UNTAC) said, Australia proved to be the only country in the East Asian region 
which was capable o f building a “coalition with strong regional representation” 
for both peace enforcement and peacekeeping missions”111. This was because of 
the geographic circumstances that shaped the performance o f the operation that 
affected the role Australia played in the operation. East Timor is located only 
500km from the city o f Darwin in Australia’s Northern Territory. One o f the 
conditions for success o f UN peace operations is the degree o f acceptance and 
support provided by the host country. In East Timor, the U N ’s involvement was 
highly supported by the majority o f the population. Despite differences o f opinion 
on certain issues, Timorese political leaders were committed to working with the 
UN. All the East Timorese domestic factions requested the U N ’s continuous 
support for its country following its independence, they did not want the UN to 
withdraw too quickly. This was because the Timorese understood the difficulties 
they would be facing in the post-independence environment and recognized the 
need for continued international assistance112.
UNTAET personnel contribution (December 2002)
Troops CIVPOL Observers
Australia 840 55 15
China 69
Fiji 185
Japan 650
Pakistan 102 9 13
Philippines 55 72 7
Portugal 639 30 1
Republic of Korea 436
110 Source: Contributors to UN peacekeeping operations. Monthly Summary of Contributions on 
Military Observers, Civilian Police and Troops. From 2001 - 2003.
111 Ryan, A. (2002) The Strong Lead-nation Model in an ad hoc Coalition of the Willing: Operation 
Stability in East Timor. P23-44. International Peacekeeping. Vol9. nol. P25
112 Smith. PI01
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Singapore 228 25
Thailand 502 36 6
(in bold are the East 
Asian regional countries)
Table 4. 2
Although INTERFET was an Australian lead exercise, many East Asian countries, 
including ASEAN member states, contributed decisively in a discrete but 
effective manner in persuading Indonesia to accept international intervention in 
East Timor (the PRC, Japan, Philippines, Singapore and the Republic of Korea 
worked closely with Australia). Indonesia was highly sensitive to the role of 
Australia in this particular issue on East Timor. Although it was clear from the 
beginning that Australia would provide the core of the force, Indonesia wanted as 
much Asian participation as possible and a force commander from ASEAN113. In 
the end, INTERFET consisted of contingents from all major Asian countries, and 
was less “western-led”. Below is a brief summary of Asian participation:
•  Thailand agreed to provide the deputy force commander along with its
contingent;
•  Japan provided its SDF troops mainly for construction work;
•  The Philippines and the Republic of Korea confirmed their commitments;
•  Singapore agreed to send a medical component114.
The United Nations continued to maintain its presence in East Timor throughout 
the post-independence period to ensure the security and stability of the nascent 
State. A successor mission, known as the United Nations Mission for Support in 
East Timor (UNMISET), was set up by resolution 1410 (2002) adopted
113 Martin, I. (2001). Self-determination in East Timor: the United Nations, the ballot, and 
international intervention. Boulder, Co., Lynne Rienner Publishers. PI 12.
114 All the information of ASEAN participation was based on the record of APEC leaders meeting 
in Auckland, New Zealand September 1999.
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unanimously by the Security Council on 17 M ay115. The Security Council 
authorised the extension of UNMISET’s mandate until 20 May 2004 by 
Resolution 1480 of 19 May 2003. There were 4,694 troops and 114 military 
observers present in May 2002.
The latest personnel contribution to the UNTAET operation shows that the main 
contributors are mostly from the East Asian region. The exception was Portugal, 
an ex-Suzerain state of East Timor. The East Timor operation proved that strong 
regional support in East Asia was one of the factors that enabled the UN to fulfil 
the needs of the host country. This also helped the UN Secretariat to plan and 
conduct the peace operation on short notice. As argued in the previous section, the 
mission in East Timor was not well prepared and the Secretariats experienced 
difficulties, however the mission resulted in the creation of a newly independent 
country with much regional support. If there is a future opportunity for the UN to 
deploy peace operations, there will be a promising commitment from regional 
countries, and the Secretariats can take into consideration these offers at the 
planning stage. In East Asia, there are countries that can play distinctive roles in 
UN operations. Japan is a country that can provide finance, diplomatic channels, 
and experienced rehabilitation and development support. There is Australia which 
willing to contribute trained troops to the military aspect of the operation. Also, 
ASEAN nations are willing to take any role available for them to participate. The 
UN Secretariats certainly lacked the knowledge of the availability of regional 
support. Although the mission had many positive outcomes, there were many 
issues that could have been avoided if regional contributions were considered in 
the planning stages by the Secretariats.
115 This mission was established for an initial period of 12 months, starting on 20 May 2002.
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UNTAET personnel contribution (December 2003)
Troops CIVPOL Observers
Australia 301 20 7
China 16
Fiji 197
Japan 376
Pakistan 74 10 3
Philippines 147 16 3
Portugal 517 20 1
Republic of Korea 9
Singapore 4
Thailand 49 8 6
(in bold are the East Asian 
regional countries)
Table 4. 3
Continuous support by the UN: for the future
UNMISET was established by Security Council Resolution 1412 (2002) o f 17 
May for an initial period o f  12 months, starting on 20 May 2002. The United 
Nations’ involvement in East Timor went beyond traditional peacekeeping and, 
maybe different from second or third generation peace operations. This is a 
completely new challenge for the United Nations. The role o f peace operations 
has now expanded to a much more complex and multinational 
peacekeeping/peace support operations including a much greater non-military 
component to undertake the tasks o f governance, humanitarian assistance, 
electoral supervision, police tasks, and nation building116. The building o f the 
new State o f Timor Leste by the UN transitional administration had not been the 
building o f an ideal State as imagined by international experts. However the 
achievement o f self-determination for East Timor did great credit to the United 
Nations as an institution: without the UN, and without the principled persistence 
o f committed individuals within, the fundamental human rights o f  the East 
Timorese might never have been realised. Despite the criticism o f the U N ’s slow 
movement on the decision-making and deployment processes, UNTAET and all
116 Smith P23.
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other UN operations achieved a great deal within the minimum duration of its 
deployment.
There is no doubt that UNAMET and UNTAET achieved the set mandates and 
built a new democratic country in East Timor. The UN successfully established a 
newly elected government with the basic structure for a democratic government 
with infrastructure improvement including healthcare, and educational system117. 
Until the independence of East Timor, the Timorese people’s journey to freedom 
had been long, arduous, and painful, with considerable loss of life. However, 
within a few years of the UN operations, the recovery o f East Timor was starting 
to take shape. Efforts to resettle the displaced population and resolve the refugee 
problem were extremely successful. Most importantly, East Timor had declared 
independence, marking an official end to 450 years of foreign rule over the
1 1 Q
territory . East Timor is still one of the poorest countries and the people are 
amongst the most illiterate. It is a heterogeneous population in language and 
culture where unemployment is high, and major reforms in agriculture and fishery 
are long overdue. Thus, the United Nations and related organizations will 
continue their support to assist East Timor in the long run. Also, a good 
relationship will need to be maintained with Indonesia, Australia, Japan, 
ASEAN/ARF, and all other Asian nations. ASEAN is important for the future of 
East Timor -  not so much as an economic cooperation, but as a means to achieve 
security. The UN intervention in East Timor provides an example of the positive 
contribution that can be made to peace and security, to the establishment and 
survival of a new state. Also, the active participation by Asian countries was more
117 According to da Costa, over 700 primary schools, 100 junior high schools, and 10 technical 
colleges were established during UN operations.
118 BBC News online. Sunday 19 May 2002.
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than the United Nations had estimated. The coordinated support of key member 
states such as Japan and Australia in this case was crucial to the success of UN 
operations, and functioned particularly well in the case of East Timor.
Javan s participation in UNTAET
As for personnel contribution, 11 Japanese personnel served as senior staff and 
civil officials in UNTAET from the end of December 2000. Japan’s gradual 
personnel contribution is due to its enormous efforts to make its presence known 
in UN operations. In the case of UNTAET, however, the initial numbers turned 
out to be extremely small and barely recognized. There had been a freeze, pending 
amendment of the PKO Law so SDF and other units could participate in certain 
duties of UN peace operations, including monitoring the disarming of combatants, 
stationing personnel in and patrolling of buffer zones, and the collection and 
disposal of abandoned weapons.
Finally, on 7 December 2001, the PKO Law was amended119 to remove the freeze 
on participation in the above-mentioned duties. With the amended PKO Law, the 
process of the dispatch of the SDF to East Timor was accelerated120. With this, the 
UN officially requested Japan’s participation in UNTAET/UNAMET in 
November 2001. The direct official request from the UN silenced critics and 
opposition parties opposed to the dispatch of SDF personnel. Both government 
and opposition parties agreed that Japan needed to be recognised and respected in 
the international arena and all the available chances under the flag of the UN
119 The new PKO Law was approved by the three parties of the coalition government, the Japanese 
Security Council and the cabinet on November 20, and submitted to the House of Representative 
shortly after this. Source: Asia Times. 29 November 2001.
120 Hoadley, S. (2006) Asian Security reassessed. ISEAS Publications. P73
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must be taken. The Communist party and Socialist party did not agree on this 
point. In addition, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Mr. 
Marie Guehenno visited Mr. Nakatani, the Defence Agency Director General, and 
formally requested Japanese personnel contribution. This request, at last, 
confirmed that the Japanese contribution was required, and silenced opposition 
attacks once and for all. Mr. Guehenno expressed his high expectations of Japan’s 
SDF’s techniques and machinery material to be use in peacebuilding works, and 
counted on their participation.
The official announcement of the dispatch of SDF units to UNTAET/UNANET 
was made on 6 November 2001. On 14 Feb 2002, in his policy speech opening the 
159th session of the Diet, Prime Minister Koizumi incorporated the plan to send 
SDF units to East Timor from March 2002 as a replacement for a unit of 
Pakistan121. They were to engage in logistic support of UNTAETAJNMISET 
operations, including the maintenance and repair of roads and bridges, the 
management and maintenance of water supply points, and civil military affairs. 
On 25 February 2002, both Houses approved the dispatch of 690 Ground Self- 
Defence Force personnel, consisting of an Engineer Unit and 10 UNTAET 
Headquarters staff, in succession from February to April122.
Since Prime Minister Koizumi came to power, most of the administrative process 
was accelerated, and Japan’s foreign policy became much more active in terms of 
international cooperation. Koizumi was head strong on political reform and took 
considerable action on many fronts. He was able to speed up many administrative
121 Prime Minister Juinchiro Koizumi’s Policy Speech at the opening of 159 Diet Session on 4 
February 2002. http://www.kantei.go.ip/ip/koizumispeecli/2004/01/19sisei.html
122 Foreign Minister Press Release on 15 February 2002.
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processes which allowed Japan to make decisions and act upon them in a timely 
manner. Koizumi was able to reach out to the public and restore some of the faith 
in Japanese politics that had been long lost123. One of the highlights of his term at 
office was the way he visited the Yasukuni War Memorial shrine and paid his 
respects. This had been particularly controversial as there was much pressure from 
China and other Asian countries against the Japanese Prime Minister paying 
tribute to those who were internationally considered war criminals during World 
War II. However, this was among some of the actions that he took that opened up 
talks about the implications of World War II that Japan had been keeping a lid on 
for so long. There was much public debate which raised the awareness of the 
public to issues that had been almost taboo about Japan’s historical background. 
Koizumi was able to unite a divided Japan and was gain the support he needed to 
pursue the political reform he had been advocating for so long. Koizumi’s time in 
office was certainly a turning point for Japanese politics124.
There was a symbolic moment on 29 April 2002, when Prime Minister Koizumi 
visited East Timor. He had meetings with President-elect Xanana Gusymao and 
SRSG Sergio Vieira de Mello. Prime Minster Koizumi announced that Japan was 
steadily implementing the US$130 million project in reconstruction, development 
and humanitarian assistance that had been approved at the Donors Meeting for 
East Timor in 1999. He also visited the camps of the SDF units and offered his 
direct encouragement125. Until June 2004, a total number of 2300126 SDF
123 Shinoda, T. (2007) Koizumi Diplomacy. University of Washington Press. P80
124 The Numerous changes in structures and policies, some put in place by his administration, 
(others in place before he took office), have provided Koizumi with a reconfigured policy making 
process , enabling him and his supporters to push through changes in economic policy that will 
force substantial structure reforms and an end to many old patterns. Katzenstein, J.P. and Shiraishi, 
T. (2006) Beyond Japan: the dynamic of East Asian regionalism. Cornell University. P54
125 Prime Minister Koizumi became the first serving Prime Minister to visit the camp of an SDF 
unit serving in a UN PKO.
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personnel served in the UN peace operations in East Timor. The Japanese 
government continued implementing assistance that focused on three areas: 
human resources development; agriculture and infrastructure building, and 
facilitating nation-building towards a self-dependent nation. It is clear that 
Japanese diplomacy was most successful where there were Japanese personnel on 
the ground: the presence of peacekeepers enhanced Japanese credibility in both
1 7 7Cambodia and East Timor .
At the Open Meeting of the Security Council on the Situation in East Timor on 26 
April 2002, Mr Yukio Sato, the permanent Representative of Japan, explained the 
purpose for this visit as “conveying directly to the leaders and people of East 
Timor the Japanese people's message of congratulation and their determination to 
assist East Timor” 128. Koizumi’s visits to East Timor sent several messages 
domestically and internationally. Most of all, the Japanese Prime Minister’s 
presence on East Timor soil acted as pressure on Indonesia for active cooperation. 
As for the domestic impact, his visit to East Timor gave the Japanese people a 
strong impression that their government is committed to the UN peace operation 
and that it supports regional countries in need.
Japan was not able to use many of the experiences it had gained in Cambodia. 
However, because of these difficulties, Japan was able to discover more of its 
hidden talents in a way that was to be recognized internationally. Since Japan was 
the number one ODA provider in the East Asian region, most of the leaders of
126 The first and second units included 680 personnel, the third unit included 522 personnel, and 
the fourth unit was 405 personnel. The duration for the each unit was 6-8months. Source: SDF’s 
international cooperation. Defence Agency.
127 Green. P191
128 From Mr. Sato’s speech at the meeting of the Security Council on the situation in East Timor on 
26 April 2002.
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neighbouring countries are influenced by what Japan might suggest in the 
rehabilitation and reconstruction phase of an operation129. It was able to gather 
support for the case in East Timor and this resulted in neighbouring countries 
pressuring the Indonesian government without Japan having to do it.
Moreover, Japan was able to use its expertise and knowledge in the area of 
developmental support in the post deployment phase of the operation. This is 
certainly one of the areas in which Japan can play a leading role in the East Asian 
region and is now considered one of the components of Japan’s contribution to 
Human Security. Furthermore, Japan is now one of the greatest financial 
contributors to the UN despite being criticised for its apparent chequebook style 
of diplomacy in the early 90s. Japan’s financial support130 to the developing 
countries and its participation in INTERFET made a strong impression on Japan’s 
support for regional states. One of the focuses of Japan is to look for more 
meaningful, effective, immediate and noticeable ways of contributing financially. 
Lastly, much effort has been put into the amendment of the PKO Law and with 
the impact of the Koizumi administration, the PKO has now become more flexible 
in the contribution of the SDF.
There have been significant findings in this chapter and the next chapter will 
focus on the details of the ways in which Japan has begun to find its role as well 
as possible future areas in which it can contribute to UN peace operations.
129 The Japanese government believed through the financial assistance, it also provides political 
and security value to the international community. It has accepted that through economic 
development, societies can cultivate democratic values and institutions and that the best instrument 
Japan has for promoting democracy and human rights. Schraeder. P I05-106
130 As mentioned previously, the Japanese government focuses its assistance in 3 areas in which 
Japan can contribute the most.
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Chapter 5  -  Javan’s experiences in Cambodia and East Timor:
distinctive contributions?
This chapter will review the main arguments of this thesis and also elaborate in 
more detail some of the findings from previous chapters. It will also identify key 
features for Japan’s role in the future.
The focus of this study has been to identify key points surrounding Japan’s 
involvement in UN peace operations. The case studies in Cambodia and East 
Timor have been used to highlight many of the discoveries and insights made 
through this process as well as pose new questions for the future role of Japan. In 
order to guide this inquiry, the two research questions devised were:
3. How and why were Japan’s contributions to the UN peace operations developed and 
implemented in Cambodia and East Timor? What were the distinctive characteristic 
contributions made by Japan?
4. What did Japan learn from its experiences in the Cambodian and East Timorese cases, 
and what is its future role in the area o f UN peace operations?
The following summarises findings from previous chapters:
Much of the question of “how” and “why” Japan’s contribution was developed 
and implemented has been answered through the various processes that Japan has 
endured since the end of World War II. Also, the experiences of the UN in its 
mission and changing role have provided the “bigger picture” on Japan’s position 
in relation to the UN in further assisting this inquiry. The US assisted creation of
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the new Japanese Constitution and its restrictive nature; changing global 
expectation of the role of Japan in peace operations; public opinion; balance of 
economic/political power; and diplomacy are only some of the factors that have 
shaped the development of the Japanese contribution. Many of the distinctive 
characteristic contributions by Japan have been new discoveries, as Japan had 
never been involved in the practical aspects of peace operations before. Japan’s 
unique position as an economic super power; devoted financial contributor to 
reconstruction projects; a country having succeeded in the recovery from war 
have led to many areas of expertise in peacebuilding. Despite the regional stigma, 
many of the neighbouring countries look up to the accomplishments of Japan as a 
country that has been revived from defeat. Because of this unique position, it has 
been able to gain the trust of political leaders; gain international attention; assist 
rehabilitation work; and provide further financial aid to the region in a continuous 
manner.
The experiences in Cambodia and East Timor provided Japan with many learning 
opportunities. It has given Japan the drive to make the necessary changes in 
responding to international crises. The reinterpretation of the Japanese 
constitution; the establishment of the PKO Law with revisions; and the dispatch of 
personnel and SDF personnel were only the starting points for many new 
discoveries which Japan had make through its experiences since the end of the 
Cold War. In fact, Japan was able to learn that its major strengths lay elsewhere in 
the realm of UN peace operations. The role of Japan has certainly been made 
clearer by the UN’s realization that peace keeping/building could be more 
effectively developed and maintained through the emphasis on Human Security.
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This realization characterizes the gap that Japan is able to fill, and has been filling, 
which provides it with a new future role as a leading country in this area1.
Bearing in mind these findings, the concept of Human Security will be explained 
in this chapter as one of the key roles that Japan can play, and will be further 
expanded in the final chapter.
Japan s contribution to Cambodia and East Timor
Prior to Japan’s involvement in Cambodia and East Timor, Japan’s contributions 
were never recognized by the United Nations or its member states2. Japan had 
made several contributions through the ODA and bilateral financial support to the 
East Asian region since the end of World War II as post-war compensation. Its 
effectiveness has gained recognition during the 1990s: Japan’s ODA mostly 
concentrated on society building and establishment of infrastructure which are 
fundamental factors of peacebuilding.
While financial contribution is one significant area, as argued in previous chapter 
3 and 4, Japan was able to contribute in many other areas including diplomacy, 
personnel, hosting conferences as well as various other humanitarian projects in 
the East Asian region. The following are further elaborations on the findings as 
well as some of the background for understanding the significance of Japanese 
contributions. This will build up to the concept of Human Security and how Japan 
will be able to take a leading role in this area.
'Kohama, H, (2003) External Factors for Asian Development. Institute of International Affairs and 
ASEAN Foundation. P237
2 Interview with Mr. Shimizu from the North-American Division but who also served in East 
Timor as UNV.
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Contribution focused on civilian lives with a financial base 
Japan is the second largest contributor to the United Nations’ after the US. Japan 
provided an estimated US$ 280 million (19.5%) of the UN general budget of year 
2004, and gave about US$530 million for UN operations3.
Much of the Japan’s financial contribution focused at both the level of individual 
as well as the national level. The nature of the contribution was of continuous 
support over a long period of time as opposed to one-off donations and much of 
the work was based on the experience Japan had as a nation that successfully 
rebuilt itself from the ruins of war. There have been discussions on the need for 
long term support for peace building after UN peace operations withdrawal. As 
Manning argued, “establishing legitimate state institutions at the central level is 
just the tip of the ice-berg. It is at the local level where a peace settlement has the 
most immediate and far reaching consequence for ordinary citizens4. Japan’s 
financial support is exactly targeting the ground level of peacebuilding. Prior to 
the peace operations in Cambodia, Japan already had a history of experience in 
developmental support in the East Asian region and among through the ODA. 
However, Japan’s financial contribution on UN peace operations was usually 
highlighted by its operational support and donations at conferences on 
rehabilitation.
3 Yomiuri Shinbun.8 July 2005.
4 Manning, C. (2003) Local Level Challenges to Post-conflict peacebuilding” International 
Peacekeeping, Vol. 10, No3, P36
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Japan’s bilateral assistance to Cambodia had been suspended between fiscal years 
1974 to 1991 but was resumed in 19925. Since then, the Japanese government has 
been the biggest contributor to Cambodia’s rehabilitation and reconstruction. The 
first grant aid was made by Japan at the ICORC which was hosted by the Japanese 
government in Paris on 8-9 September 1993. This was the very first direct support 
by the Japanese government to UNTAC in addition to its active cooperation. 
Between 1992-1997, Japan provided US$1,306 million, which included US$182 
million for a bilateral loan, in financial assistance under Japan’s ODA bilateral 
grant aid for the peace process, and rehabilitation and development of Cambodia6. 
Japan’s support was mainly in the following areas: reconstruction of the road 
system, rehabilitation of the infrastructure, and economic and social development. 
Japan also established JSA (Japanese Government Team for Safeguarding
Angkor) in 1994 and has contributed, until now, an estimated US$2,500 million to 
protect Angkor Watt and all other National Heritages in Cambodia7.
During the years 1992-1993, Japan’s ODA contribution was mainly used for the 
reconstruction of the road system that consisted of the following:
0  A project for the rehabilitation of Chroy Changwar Bridge
(Cambodia-Japan friendship bridge): US$ 23.2million 
(D A project for the rehabilitation of National Route 6A (Japan
Friendship Sangkum Restr Niyum Highway): US$ 29.94 million 
(3) A project for improvement of the Road construction centre:
US$ 20.16 million
5 Japan-Cambodia relationship. MOFA Diplomatic Blue Book. 2006
6 Japan’s ODA support to the Kingdom of Cambodia. Source: Embassy of Japan in Cambodia. PI
7 Source: JSA home page. http:/Avww.angkor-isa.org/
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In addition to road reconstruction, even after the withdrawal of UNTAC from 
Cambodia, Japan has continued its bilateral support in a variety of areas. Later, in 
1993 -1994, Japan was also involved in restoring and upgrading electricity and 
water supply facilities in Phnom Penh. Moreover, Japan made grant aid, of 
approximately US$29,148 million, for increasing food production (1992-1996).
There has been much involvement in developmental support in Cambodia, and 
through the cooperation of JICA, Japan has developed policies stipulating that 
contribution to Cambodia would focus on the following areas:
®  Good governance
®  Improvement of conditions for economic growth 
(3) Improvement of the social and economic infrastructure 
®  Health sector development 
©  Education sector development 
©  Agricultural and rural development 
©  Demining and support for people with disabilities 
®  Environment resource management8
This has helped to shape the consistent ways in which Japan can make a long term 
commitment by focusing on particular areas of development. It is clear that this 
does not conflict with any of the issues regarding restrictions resulting from the 
constitution and it focuses more non-controversial aspects of development.
8 A report on Japan and Cambodia by JICA office in Phnom Penh. 2004. P3-4.
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In addition, through the key support o f JICA, Japan has been running an aid 
scheme called the “grass-roots projects (Kusanone)”9 in Cambodia since 1991. 
The Kusanone project was established in 1989 and is known as the GGP (Grant 
Assistance for Grassroots Human Security Projects). This provides flexible and 
timely support to small-scale development projects, which aim to improve the 
social well-being o f the people at the grassroots level. This project that was 
launched globally and for 2001 - 2004, JPY 3,022,340,OOO10 was given as aid to 
428 cases around the world. Japan’s assistance to Cambodia through this project 
from 1991 - 2007 has been a total o f US$ 39,377,782n . Most o f these projects 
helped to fund the education and health sectors by building schools, hospitals and 
training centres, and to supply equipment for those facilities, assistance that 
continues to this day.
Japan has been involved in many initiatives in Cambodia and in the year 2003, 
Cambodia was one o f the top ten largest recipient countries o f Japan’s ODA. 
Figure 5.1 shows that Cambodia received 2.7% (JPY 3,755,236,000) o f the ODA 
budget in the year 2003, ranking 6th overall. This is indicative o f the way that
support for Cambodia has been continuous.
10 Largest Recipient Countries in FY 2003 
(Technical Cooperation by JICA)
No. Country Budget (in 
thousand/JPY)
Portion (%)
1 Indonesia 9,101,046 6.4
2 Philippines 6,717,791 4.7
3 China 6,179,713 4.4
4 Vietnam 5,577,065 3.9
5 Thailand 4,296,291 3.0
6 Cambodia 3,755,236 2.7
9 As a part of the ODA, the Japanese government offers a programme to support NGOs and 
community based organizations (CBOs) working specifically in social development.
10 Source: Kaikeikensain 2005. ODA ni kansuru kaikeikensano kekka
11 Source: Japan’s assistance for Cambodia. Amount of Grant Assistance for Grass-Roots/Human 
Security Projects
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7 Laos 2,982,858 2.1
8 Kenya 2,831,458 2.0
9 Malaysia 2,730,904 1.9
10 Afghanistan 2,644,794 1.9
Table 5 .112
The contribution to East Timor took a somewhat different form than that of 
Cambodia. There was no bilateral relationship through which aid could be made 
and many of the contributions were made through UN family organizations such 
as UNICEF and UNDP.
On 16 December 1999, the Japanese government announced US$100 million in 
financial assistance to East Timor for the cost of rehabilitation and economic 
development over the next three years13. The category of assistance for the 
rehabilitation and development of East Timor was built into Japan’s 
supplementary budget for the year 2000. This included US$9 million for the 
UNTAET Trust Fund for providing basic administrative services and US$3 
million for rehabilitation requirements14. Japan also contributed US$100 million 
to the UN Trust Fund to facilitate participation by developing countries to 
INTERFET, and another US$30 million for the purpose of humanitarian 
assistance. As for the deployment of UNTAET, Japan’s total amount of 
contribution was US$52 million. On 14 July 2000, the Japanese government 
announced the details of its emergency aid to East Timor for the year 2000. The 
total amount was $28,710,000 to the UNDP and UNICEF to assist nation building. 
The assistance focused on seven particular projects of UNDP and UNICEF:
12 Source: Japan’s ODA White Book 2003.
13 An announcement was made on 16 December 1999 by MOFA. Source: The Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of Japan, http://www.mofa. go.ip/annouce/annouce/1999/1216.htm
14 Issues relating to Japan’s contribution of assistance to East Timor by MOFA on 17 December 
1999.
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®  Rehabilitation and Improvement of the Dili water supply system: 
$11,280,000 (UNDP)
(2) Urgent rehabilitation of the Dili-Ainaro Road: $4,700,000 (UNDP)
(3) Urgent Rehabilitation and Restoration of Navigation Aids and 
Fender System at the Port of Dili: $2,650,000 (UNDP)
®  Rehabilitation and Maintenance of the Output Capacity of Komoro 
Power Station: $3,100,000 (UNDP)
©  Urgent Rehabilitation of Small Power Stations in Rural Areas: 
$2,390,000 (UNDP)
©  Emergency Irrigation Rehabilitation: $3,360,000 (UNDP)
©  Rehabilitation of School Building in East Timor: $1,230,000 
(UNICEF)15
Japan’s support for nation-building and rehabilitation was focused on improving 
the living conditions of the people in East Timor and building the foundation of a 
future independent nation. Therefore, assistance concentrated mainly on re­
building the infrastructure, which included improvement of roads, water supply 
systems, and power supply systems, and building educational facilities as well as 
improving or re-building school buildings. In addition, because most of die 
projects were related to construction work, it contributed to job opportunities for 
the local population. The unemployment rate was extremely high in East Timor -  
in Dili, the estimate was more than 80 % of the population -  so the provision of 
job opportunities was essential in establishing a stable community. In 2001, Japan
15 An announcement by MOFA on Emergency Aid to East Timor for Rehabilitation and 
Development. 14 July 2000.
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extended US$19,270,000 in assistance to the UNDP which also focused on 
civilian lives. In the second year of the project, Japan concentrated on educating 
the younger generation for the future of East Timor. There were shortages of 
professionals, such as teachers, and properly equipped and trained professionals 
were required to further accelerate the process of the restoration and development 
of the country. Thus, the following two areas were added to the list of projects in 
the year 2001:
®  Establishment of the Timor Loro Sae Scholarship, funded by the 
government of Japan for East Timor students: $707,000 
©  Urgent Rehabilitation of Faculty of Engineering East Timor National 
University: $4, 670,00016
What Japanese government and MOFA learned from its experiences in the 1990s 
was how to maximise its strength in development support by financing 
rehabilitation projects. Since it was the biggest ODA contributor in the 1990s, 
Japan’s long time experiences in development support are definitely valuable in 
the phase of peacebuilding. In East Timor, Japan made most of the donations 
through UN organisations such as UNDP and UNICEF and also UN Trust Funds. 
It was due to the unique situation in the case of East Timor, where there was no 
government to represent the territory except UNTAET, that the Japanese 
government took alternative measures, rather than bilateral grant aid, to make its 
contribution. Japan’s support for the development of East Timor focused on the
16 MOFA Press Conference on Emergency Aid to East Timor for Rehabilitation and Development
on
18 December 2001. Source: http//www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2001/12/1219.html
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following three areas: improving the infrastructure system, human resources 
development, and local community development17.
Estimated Donor Contributions to East Timor October 1999 -  May 2002
No Donor UNTAET Trust 
Fund/CFET
TFET Humanitarian
Assistance
Development
Assistance
Total 99-02
Budgetary
Support
0 2-05
Project
Support
02-05
Total 02-05 Grand Total Ratio
1 Japan 9.31 27.90 34.26 75.00 146.47 000 60.00 60.00 206.47 21%
2 Portugal 6.00 50.00 10.30 51.10 117.40 9.00 60.00 69.00 186.40 19%
3 Australia 9.00 12.43 34.17 43.20 98.80 13.20 29.00 42.20 141.00 14%
4 EC 9.07 41.79 41.85 2.90 9561 6.00 27.00 33.00 128.61 13%
5 USA 8.50 0.50 36.20 50.00 95.20 12.00 19.00 31.00 126.20 13%
6 UK 5.09 10.16 9.50 3.45 28.20 18.00 0.00 18.00 46.20 5%
7 Norway 3.04 2.40 9.07 1.44 15.95 9.00 9.00 18.00 33.95 3%
8 Sweden 5.97 5.00 0.09 11.06 0.00 12.00 12.00 23.06 2%
9 Canada 0.37 0.90 11.84 13.11 0.00 9.00 9.00 22.11 2%
10 World Bank 10.40 10.40 5.00 000 5.00 15.40 2%
Notes:
Development assistance includes funds committed by donors in 2000, 2001 and 2002 according to  their respective financial years 
Portugal disbursed US$30 million by May 2002 and provided promissory notes o f  US$20 million in accordance with its pledge o f US$50 million 
According to the World Bank, another US$43 million (including Technical Assistance) was unofficially pledged in addition to  the US$320 million 
Hence, the  total pledge amounts to US$360 million
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Figure 5.2 shows the Estimated Donor Contributions to East Timor between 
October 1999 and May 2002. The top three donor states put weight in different 
areas o f development through different channels. Since Portugal was an ex­
suzerain state, it was one o f the active western countries in the East Timor peace 
process. Its main area o f contribution was in education with almost 50 % o f the 
financial support being focused on areas related to education. The Portuguese 
government announced a US$900 million financial aid for the next three years 
and also US$ 6,billion for development assistance in May 2002. On the other 
hand, the third biggest contributor, Australia, took a different role in its support 
for East Timor. Its aid primarily concentrated on personnel training and the 
construction o f structures for the administrative system in East Timor through 
SAPET (Staff Assistance Programme in East Timor), and CAPET (Capacity
17 JICA report 2002. P56
18 A report on East Timor’s reconstruction and rehabilitation. JICA May 2002. P44
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Assistance Programme in East Timor). Not only did the Australian government 
make financial contributions, but it also sent professional advisers to support die 
following areas: training public officials, election support, and judicial and 
taxation etc. The Australian government also announced the continuous financial 
support for East Timor of US$8.billion for five years from the year 200019. This 
shows the interests of different countries in various areas of the peace operations. 
The location and relationship with East Timor definitely played a role in the way 
each country contributed. Nevertheless, whereas other countries tend to focus on 
particular areas of contribution, comparatively Japan supports a much wider field 
in multiple areas.
Even after the UN operations withdrew from both Cambodia and East Timor, 
Japan has continued its financial support to both countries for rehabilitation and 
development. Since Japan is the only super economic power in the East Asian 
region, most of the countries in the region accept Japan’s ODA or bilateral grant 
aid. For the Japanese government, these development support initiatives have two 
different elements -  diplomatic and financial. In terms of financial contributions, 
Japan’s purpose was to improve civilian lives and help to build a stable 
independent society. Therefore, Japan’s support is in both hard (building schools, 
hospitals, and port etc.) and soft (personnel training, support organizing 
administrative structures in local government, support local businesses) 
infrastructure20. On the other hand, Japan sees development support as its way of 
“diplomacy” since Japan has been reinforcing its bilateral relationships with some 
of the developing countries through its support. Active support for the developing
19 Australian Aid programme. Aid activities in East Timor. 
Source: http://www.ausaid.gov.au/,coiintrv/comitrv.cfm?CountrvID:=911 &Region=:EastAsia
20 Watanabe, T. and Miura, Y. (2003) ODANihonni nanigadekiruka. Cyukoushinsyo. P I54
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countries in the region can strengthen Japan’s economic relationships, and build 
pro-Japanese feelings. This is something Japan needs in order to improve 
confidence in East Asia. In addition, the Japanese government reviews its 
development support every year with JICA, JBIC (Japan Bank for International 
Cooperation), and MOFA to analyse the effectiveness of its contributions for 
future operations.
However, there have been cynical views on Japan’s financial support in the 
peacebuilding phase. There are questions about the validity of some of the 
projects that are not in urgent need and how some of the initiatives are about 
Japan “showing their face” on the ground21. Japan is particularly keen on 
local/international recognition and projects like this, no doubt, contribute to 
Japan’s objectives. Nonetheless, much of the focus of Japan has been on the 
improvements in the quality of the daily lives of the local people.
Many of the abovementioned financial contributions in peacebuilding 
concentrated on human security, and this is perhaps the most distinctive 
contributions of all. Specific projects for the local community/individuals are 
where significant amounts of financial support are being directed. The amount 
being contributed is enormous and it is something that has an immediate impact 
on civilian lives. This was certainly the intent of Japan in building its reputation as 
a visible contributor to the operations. Japan fully understands the importance and 
effect of full and consistent support; it was one of the biggest recipients of low 
interest loans from the World Bank after its defeat in World War II. Furthermore,
21 In some cases, big projects (roads, bridges, hospitals, and schools are the typical cases) are 
named
after the country providing financial assistance.
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it would not have been able to make the rapid economic development it did 
without the Government Appropriation for Relief in Occupied Area Fund 
(GARIOA) from the US22. This is why Japan is highly experienced in this area of 
targeted financial support and values long term committed support for sustainable 
development. This also helps us to understand why East Asian countries such as 
Cambodia and East Timor requested Japanese support: it could be seen as a 
country that had already been able to achieve the outcome desired.
Hosting international conferences: a leading country in the peacebuilding phase 
The Japanese government was the host country for international conferences on 
the rehabilitation of both Cambodia and East Timor. The conferences allowed the 
warring parties the rare opportunity to open and hold talks in a neutral 
environment. Much progress was made in the peace talks and in addition, this 
initiative gradually caught the attention of the international community, 
particularly regarding the situation in East Timor. Not only did this accelerate the 
process of international support, but also gave Japan the recognition of taking an 
active role in peace keeping initiatives. By holding international conferences, 
Japan was able to achieve one of the aims of showing its strong political 
influences and its passion for both peace processes .
For the operation in Cambodia, Japan hosted the Ministerial conference on the 
rehabilitation and reconstruction of Cambodia in March 1992, and was able to 
successfully gather US$8,000 million. In addition, Japan and related countries 
established the ICORC (International Committee on the Reconstruction of
22 Chronological History o f the GAIROA programme in Japan.
23 Interview with Mr. Furuta.
Cambodia) in which Japan took a leading role as a chair country. ICORC 
meetings were held three times (September 1993, March 1994, March 1995). This 
was later renamed the Consultative Group Meeting for Cambodia (CG)24 in 1996 
and successfully held its 8th meeting in 200625. Japan served as a chair country 
three times for the CG meetings. As for East Timor, the Japanese government 
held its first Donor Meeting for East Timor in Tokyo in December 1999. By 
holding a donor meeting, the Japanese government officially announced its 
support for the independence of East Timor. Although interest on the issue of East 
Timor had been very limited, and almost ignored by the international society, this 
meeting was able to effectively catch the attention of rest o f the world26.
These types of international conferences were extremely important for the 
progress they were able to make. They are rare opportunities for related countries 
and organizations, particularly those coming from different factions, to discuss the 
progress of the peace process. During the deployment of peace operations, 
occasions like this are quite limited. Thus, in many cases, conferences such as 
these become the only chance for negotiation or discussion. In the case of 
Cambodia, even the Khmer Rouge, who had been rejecting any kind of 
negotiations, showed up at the Tokyo conference, and at least sat on the 
negotiation table27. Japan provided the Tokyo conference and all other meetings 
related to the issue as “frank talk” opportunities for the four Cambodian parties 
and international organizations. Not only was this an opportunity to publically
24 Co-chaired by the Royal Government of Cambodia and the World Bank, the CG is a group of 
donors who meet annually with the Government to discuss issues of development, growth and 
poverty reduction, and reform.
World bank Report on the Eight Meeting of the Consultative Group meeting for Cambodia 2006. 
Source: World Bank Home Page.
26 Interview with Mr. Matsuura.
27 Miyoshi, N. (1994) Kanbojia PKO. Akishobo. P84
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discuss various issues but also provided the platform for many of the talks that 
were conducted behind closed doors. Many off-the-record discussions occurred 
during this time which would not have been possible otherwise28. On occasions, 
this resulted in substantial progresses being made on the peace talks. As for East 
Timor, the Tokyo conference was the very first opportunity for related countries 
to gather and discuss the future independence of East Timor. Because of the lack 
of interest by rest of the world29 until the independence movement in 1999, the 
opportunity of the Tokyo conference was the first time in which significant 
financial support was gathered. It was also the time when the world tuned into 
East Timor amid the various global crises that were present at the time.
Japan’s initiative of hosting a platform for discussions has played a significant 
role. Many of these forums continue to this day and this is indicative of Japan’s 
constant support for neighbouring countries. From a political point of view, the 
fact that the conference is held in Japan and is referred to as the “Tokyo” 
conference is significant for Japan in gaining recognition for the role it plays as 
facilitator30. Regardless, as the only regional country in East Asia that can 
facilitate financial and diplomatic support, Japan has certainly been able to attract 
much attention to the region as well as add value to its status by expanding its role 
as an ever more active player in supporting the initiatives of peace operations. 
This is only possible because of the economic power and political influence Japan 
has both globally and in the East Asian region. This is yet another role that Japan 
will continue to play in the future.
28 Comments made by Amb. Owada, Sato and Kitaoka (successive UN ambassadors) on numerous 
occasions
29 Many MOFA officials and UN Secretariats admitted that the issue of East Timor was not getting 
enough attention from any of the western countries or even from the international organizations 
until the 1990s. Source: from several interviews the author conducted.
30 Interview with Mr Matsuura and Mr Furuta
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Diplomatic initiative: Japan’s role in peace process 
The kind of role Japan can play during the peace process under the United Nations 
authority has become much clearer from its experiences since the end of the Cold 
War. As discussed in previous chapters, Japan is well aware of its advantages and 
disadvantage in this area. Japan’s diplomatic influence it has had in the East Asian 
region stems from Japan’s unique position. It is the only country with a pacifist 
constitution; it experienced complete destruction from World War II and managed 
full recovery to become the second most powerful economy in the world; it has 
had a policy of active wow-involvement in any conflicts in the region since the US 
occupation; and it has had strong bilateral relations with many of the world’s 
leading countries.
Japan’s involvement in development support in the East Asian region started as 
early as 1954. Japan’s wartime atrocities were in need of repair and Japan took the 
initiative of reconstructing friendly relationships with the Asian countries, and it 
offered compensation for wartime damages. For more than 50 years, Japan's ODA 
has supported as part of its diplomatic policy the self-help efforts of developing 
countries, especially in East Asia. In Cambodia and East Timor, Japan’s long time 
experiences in development support in the region was based on Japan’s mid to 
long term support policy in both countries.
When the issue was raised about how Japan was willing to provide for the future 
operations, which did not require military involvement or judicial amendment, in 
the East Asian region following the crisis in Cambodia, taking diplomatic 
initiatives behind the scene became a point for discussion. Mr. Hiroshi Matsuura,
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former Japanese Representative in East Timor during the transitional period of 
October 2000 - April 2002 said there were four areas the Japanese government 
focused on in relation to diplomatic efforts:
®  Establish cooperative relationship with UNTAET to support 
East Timor’s independence
(2) Build a relationship with the newly independent government of 
Timor-Leste
(3) Make diplomatic efforts at UN headquarters to focus more 
attention on the issues in East Timor
®  Become a mediator between Indonesia and East Timor to re­
build their relationship31
Much of the role that Japan was willing to play related to behind the scenes work 
linked to major breakthroughs. This was a long, hard process of talks and 
negotiations in which progress was made at an incremental rate. Japan’s 
persistence in diplomatic relations certainly made, over the years, an impact in the 
cases of Cambodia and East Timor. These kinds of roles are consistent with the 
type of role Japan can play as a Middle Power country as opposed to a Super 
Power. Japan, with its background, was in the perfect position to take on this kind 
of role.
Japan particularly used its diplomatic skills on the relationship between Indonesia 
and East Timor at the beginning of the process for independence. When the Santa 
Cruz massacre occurred, Ambassador Kawakami of the Japanese Embassy to
31 Source: A series of interview with Mr. Matsuura in NYC and Tokyo.
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Indonesia (1997-2001) had direct talks with President Suharto on the issue of East 
Timor to accept the popular consultation by the United Nations. Kawakami made 
a landmark achievement as the first diplomat ever to successfully negotiate the 
resignation of President Suharto to facilitate an easier transition to independence. 
Amb. Kawakami also established a personal relationship with the new President 
Habibie and the Minister of Defence for Indonesia. They were the two key 
persons for the independence of East Timor and the establishment of this 
relationship was vital for the influence that the Japanese government was to have 
on the two countries32.
One of the distinctive skills of Japanese diplomats is their ability to develop 
personal relationships with top politicians in host countries. Amb. Kawakami’s 
personal connection with President Suharto and Habibie was based upon the 
strong relationship between Indonesia and Japan. However, the confidence from 
both Presidents was gained through friendship and trust33. Amb. Kawakami was 
not the only diplomat who was able to form this kind of relationship. In Cambodia, 
Ambassadors Imai and Ikeda both established personal relationships with Prince 
Shianouk, Prince Ranariddh, Hun Sen, and even with Khieu Samphan -  the four 
key persons in the peace process. The success of diplomatic efforts certainly 
assisted the progress of peace talks. In particular, Akashi Yasushi refers to the 
success as follows: Japan as a country has no complicated relationships in either 
conflict, the key persons have nothing but trust for Japanese diplomats who are 
willing to support a road for peace and independence34.
32 Interview with Mr. Matsuura and Mr. Shimizu who both worked under Amb. Kawakami in 
Indonesia was First Secretary during the transition period in Indonesia.
33 Comment from Mr Shimizu
34 Akashi’s comment at the International Symposium on the role of Japan in the 21st century IN: 
what are the world’s expectations? Held on 10 June 2001. Tokyo, Japan.
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One of Japan’s advantages in diplomatic initiative in both cases, but especially in 
Cambodia, is its pacifist law,. Because of Article 9 of its constitution, the leaders 
of host countries saw Japan as the best country for a negotiating and mediating 
role between the disputing parties, related countries, and the organizations. Japan 
did not involve itself in the Cambodian conflicts since most of the neighbouring 
countries and major powers of the UN were taking sides with at least one of the 
battling parties. Thus, when the peace process came to a deadlock, Japan was able 
play the role of negotiator smoothly as a neutral party. All of the parties, even the 
PDK, accepted talks with Japanese diplomats, and agreed to take a seat in the 
discussions. In the case of East Timor, Japan was seen as taking the side of 
Indonesia because of their tight economic and political relationship. However, 
Japan’s continued neutrality since the end of World War II was well known by 
leaders of East Timor and so did not affect the talks with East Timor.
Although Article 9 of the constitution had been seen as a restriction on Japanese 
participation to UN peace operations, the pacifist nature of Japan worked to gain 
the trust of the Cambodian leaders during the Cambodian peace process. This was 
the first time the constitution was seen as an advantage in the area of diplomacy.
One of the factors which aided this success was Japan’s neutrality in the East 
Asian region since the end of the World War II. For the UNTAC deployment, 
Japan did not have any connections with any one of the parties in the conflict
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before the Paris Agreement: all four parties saw Japan as the only neutral country 
in the peace process35.
Another factor which contributed to Japan’s diplomatic success was its reputation 
as a reliable financial contributor and development supporter. This was something 
with which most Asian countries had continued long term experience. In the case 
of East Timor, since Japan is the biggest development support country with its 
ODA support and bilateral loans and grants36, it already had a strong relationship 
with the Indonesian government. Japan had never shown interest in taking part in 
the movement for independence by East Timor in 1999, however, according to 
MOFA diplomats, Japan’s changing policy on East Timor made a strong impact 
on the Indonesian government and President Suharto37. Japan had a significant 
effect on Indonesia to accept the public referendum.
Much of Japan’s contribution to UN peace operations, particularly in the East 
Asian region, is a direct continuation of its development support and diplomatic 
effort to build a stable Asian region from past decades38. As Mr. Kiya mentioned 
in his speech, the Japanese themselves experienced the hard process of 
rehabilitation and reconstruction from the painful defeat of World War II. 
Compared to other Western countries, the Japanese people know the importance 
of peace, and building new democratic society39. Therefore, Japan’s development
35 According to Amb. Ikeda, Vietnam, the PRC, Thailand, US, USSR, France, and Indonesia were 
the seven countries militarily involved in the Cambodian conflicts. Especially the first five 
countries had seriously committed themselves to one of the fighting parties. Ikeda. P211
36 Bilateral Financial contributions from Japan to Indonesia during FY1996-2005 are as follows: 
Loans: US$16.3 billion, Grants: US$1.7 billion, Technical cooperation: US$28.8 billion. Source: 
Japan-Indonesia relationship. MOFA Japan’s ODA White paper.2006.
37 Source: A Series of Interviews with MOFA diplomats who were stationed in Indonesia during 
the transitional period of East Timor (1999-2004).
38 Source: Interview with Ms. Yuge (former Head of UNDP Office in Tokyo).
39 Mr. Masahiko Kiya’s speech on Peacebuilding and Global Governance. UNU Global Seminar
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support is comprehensive and wide-ranging including construction work, medical 
and educational support, administrative support, judicial support, community 
building in local villages, etc., which was a result of their own experiences. It also 
had the flexibility to exercise alternative ideas and adapt to different situations on 
the ground.
As mentioned in previous chapters, Japan’s diplomatic ability to open discussions 
and negotiations with key countries has been indispensable in the case of 
Cambodia and East Timor40 .Japan’s diplomatic role in smoothing the peace 
process during the UN operations was vital to its success. It is rather unfortunate 
that Japan does not receive the international and domestic recognition that is 
fitting its diplomatic efforts. Although one of Japan’s primary objectives has been 
to seek recognition, many of the efforts occur behind the scenes and behind closed 
doors where only the outcome is measureable while the intense process and 
quality of negotiation skills takes a back seat. MOFA officials believe that its 
long-term process of nurturing a relationship of trust is what results from its 
diplomatic success where other parties have been unsuccessful41. It is the slow 
and incremental steps that are taken that achieve further success. This is exactly 
what Japan has accomplished in the cases of Cambodia and East Timor, yet, this 
is a process that is never truly recognized internationally. It is certainly is ironic in 
that it is a strength that cannot be fully measured in a way that would achieve a 
level of recognition. Perhaps this is the dilemma that faces a Middle Power 
country.
2006 in Kobe. 6 September 2006.
40 Interview with Matsuura.
41 Consistent comments from all interviews by MOFA personnel
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From a cultural perspective in the East Asian region, there are certain “Asian 
values” involved in handling crises: the importance of harmony; being reserved 
and modest; and most importantly respecting the opponent42; are some but to 
name a few. One of the issues regarding UN peace operations are the difficulties 
in integrating western values into the local culture, and yet at the same time 
respecting local culture and tradition. In Cambodia and East Timor, Japan took 
great care in its diplomatic efforts that were based on Asian tradition and culture. 
Ambassadors. Ikeda and Imai, for example, paid respect to Prince Sihanouk by 
visiting him regularly wherever he was staying, whether in Beijing, Phnom Penh, 
or Bangkok, during the Cambodian peace process. It is well known that many 
developed countries, especially ex-colony states, have an apprehensive attitude 
towards Western culture and the white race. Respect and understanding for the 
local culture and tradition most certainly played an integral role in Japan’s 
diplomatic efforts. This is another aspect that is very difficult to qualify and 
quantify, however, is regarded as an integral part of the diplomatic process.
There were many factors that contributed to the diplomatic success of Japan as an 
effective negotiator/mediator in the cases of Cambodia and East Timor. The 
consistent developmental support for the region added to the successful self- 
reconstruction of Japan as well as its flexibility in meeting new challenges has 
certainly earned the respect of the region and has certainly played a significant 
role in its diplomatic efforts. The neutral status of Japan and its pacifist 
constitution as well as its unwavering efforts to continue talks, while respecting 
the cultural norms, has earned the trust of key persons. While Japan maintains its 
success in diplomacy, it still continues to seek more recognition from the
42 Mr. Matsuura and most of the MOFA diplomats strongly indicated Japan’s diplomatic principles.
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international community. Nevertheless, the diplomatic support that Japan has 
provided in Cambodia and East Timor is one of the keys to the success of the UN 
peace operations. Japan is one of the members of the G8, and its bilateral 
relationship with other western powers (the US, UK, France, and Russia) is firmer 
than with all other East Asian nations. Since the PRC as a member of the P5 is not 
in a position to play a leading role, a country like Japan is expecting to play a 
more active and visible role as a regional power in future peace operations. Japan 
has much to offer in diplomatic terms when coming to represent the interests of 
the region as well as representing external interests to the region. It can act as a 
diplomatic portal to peace within Asia.
Personnel contribution to UN operations 
Japan received much disapproval for what appeared to be its lack of effort in 
contributing personnel to UN peace operations. There was a lack of sympathy for 
Japan’s internally controversial status regarding its constitution. Its passive 
approach to international crises was dismissed and was criticized as “chequebook 
diplomacy”; this was a shock for the Japanese government which had made 
substantial contributions in many other areas of developmental support. However, 
the creation of a new law followed by further amendments has allowed Japan to 
contribute personnel even with some restrictions.
An interesting point to make is the difference in perception in how different 
countries regard troop contributions. One of the SDF personnel serving in East 
Timor commented that “sending troops is a very big deal for both the government 
and public of Japan. However, for other participating countries, it is part of their
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duties and nothing special which was a big shock for me”43. There is a big gap 
between Japan and the other UN member states, especially with those who send 
their troops to peace operations, in the way troop contributions to UN peace 
operations are regarded. The existence of a military in many countries is 
commonplace and the contribution of troops is an extension of their duties. 
However, for Japan, the existence of a military itself is under question let alone 
sending troops abroad. This is only one aspect of Japan’s inability to respond 
rapidly, or respond at all, to requests for troop contribution.
The biggest issue of personnel contribution was the restrictions that were placed 
in Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution. There was much initial debate regarding 
the dispatch of troops to Cambodia which led to the establishment of the PKO 
Law in 1992. There were more debates at the time of East Timor where 
amendments to the PKO Law were necessary to satisfy conditions for the dispatch. 
Japan decided to dispatch personnel to UN operations and other humanitarian 
relief operations, pending approval, yet there were always discussions of whether 
the dispatch of SDF units was unconstitutional or not, and whether the five 
principles of the PKO law were being fulfilled. In principle, Japan only sends 
SDF unit to engineer groups of the operation, and not to the military component44, 
since SDF in not a military force. Japan’s personnel dispatch was mainly from its 
SDF unit which engaged in reconstruction work of the operations. Nonetheless, 
Japan has dispatched more than 5,000 personnel to UN peace related missions
43 Interview with SDF personnel who served in the 6th Unit at UNMISET.
44 In the UNTAC operation, 16 Japanese personnel worked in military observer units (Sep 1992- 
Sep 1993).
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since 199245 including 1,332 persons to UNTAC and 3,110 persons46 to the 
operations in East Timor.
As a country, Japan strongly values its Constitution. There is a widespread belief, 
particularly in the older generation, that faith in the constitution is what helped 
develop the country to its current status from its destruction in World War II. 
However, many polls have shown that the public is becoming less resistant to the 
idea of sending troops abroad, that there has been the gradual acceptance of a 
responsibility to be fulfilled in this area. The public view of troop contributions 
has run parallel with government debates and the establishment of the PKO law 
was a milestone achievement for the Japanese government. Since then, Japan has 
contributed SDF unit to several UN missions, and the understanding of Japan’s 
complicated judicial system and restriction on the SDF by the five principles of 
the PKO Law are now well known to other participating countries to UN 
missions47.
Despite some difficulties, the disciplined and well-organised behaviour of the 
SDF units impressed not only the local people but other participants and UN 
commanders.
Considering the serious misbehaviour48 caused by peacekeepers from some other 
participants during peace operations, Japan’s SDF units are regarded as model
45 Record of Japan’s international peace cooperation activities based on the International Peace 
Cooperation Law. (as of March 2005) Source: MOFA web-site. 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/UN/pko/pamph2005-2.pdf
46 The numbers included personnel contributions to UNAMET, UNTAET, and UNMISET 
operations. Personnel to International humanitarian relief operations by UNHCR (Nov 1999-Feb 
2000) are also included.
47 Seki, H. Ochiai, S. Suginoo,Y. (2004) PKO no Shinjitu. Keizaikai. P98
48 See Chapter 3 for a details.
196
cases in various locations. The misbehaviour of peacekeepers can easily 
jeopardise the reputation and the future of an entire mission, and unfortunately 
Cambodia is a good example of this49. Moreover, Japan’s SDF is one of the best 
trained and militarily equipped in the world, even though they do not engage in 
any military action. One of the SDF personnel deployed in East Timor 
(UNMISET) said that most of SDF personnel were willing to participate in UN 
missions, and were proud to make use of their ability and technique for the people 
of East Timor50. Due to the unusual situation surrounding the SDF existence in 
Japan, the SDF play an active part only in the domestic restoration of devastated 
areas, and spend most of their time on practicing and training. Therefore, the 
SDF’s participation in UN missions and other humanitarian relief operations 
abroad was the first time for most SDF personnel to practice what they had been 
training to do -  rescue people in situations of disaster. The SDF’s work has 
always had a good reputation, especially with their flawless jobs and hard work, 
and has received the admiration of local communities and leading organizations.
One of the major issues with the dispatch of SDF personnel was the gap between 
the reality on the ground and the idealistic restrictions. The personal safety of SDF 
personnel always took a back seat given the initial PKO Law. This lead to the 
amendment of the PKO Law which took into consideration the safety of Japanese 
personnel on the ground. The freeze was lifted in December 2001 as a result of a 
revision of the PKO legislation that relaxed the rules for weapons use by SDF 
personnel. Japan’s view on the safety of its own personnel was salvation by faith:
49 Utley, E.R. (2006) Major Powers and Peacekeeping: perspectives, Priorities and the Challenges 
of Military Intervention. Ashgate Publishing Ltd. P131
50 Interview with several SDF personnel from the Fourth Engineer group (405 personnel) engaged 
in UNMISET operations from October 2003-June 2004. Their main tasks were: maintain and 
repair roads and bridges necessary for peacekeeping activities, and maintain reservoirs used by 
units of other national and local rehabilitants in Dili and surrounding locations.
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in a report on Japan’s perspective on UN peace operation in January 1997, the 
Japanese government stated as followed:
the responsibility for the safety of the dispatched personnel rests mainly 
with host countries and the United Nations. However, in case where 
neither the host countries nor the UN can take effective measures, troop- 
contributing countries should be authorised to take appropriate measures 
to ensure the safety of their personnel 51
Several SDF personnel, engaged in Cambodia and East Timor, as well as other 
locations such the Golan Heights, and Mozambique, expressed their “fear” of 
threat to life because of the restriction on the use of force52. Since most of the 
discussion on SDF participation concentrated on its justification, the issue of the 
reality and practicality on the ground were always put aside. However, there is 
still a need for the Japanese government to consider self-defence measures and 
emergency countermeasures for life-threatening situations.
Japan’s SDF dispatch to UN operations has been favourably received both 
domestically and internationally. In a Foreign Ministry poll conducted in 2002 in 
six Southeast Asian nations, “maintenance of peace” topped the list of 
contributions expected of Japan, followed by “economic and technical 
cooperation” and “promotion of trade and private investment”53. At the same time, 
in a poll taken by the Cabinet office 76% of the respondents said cooperation in
51 Current issues surrounding UN peace-keeping operations and Japanese perspective. MOFA 
January 1997, Safety of personnel.
52 Seki. P I59
53 The Japan Times, 15 February 2005.
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UN peace operations should be provided at current levels or in more active ways. 
Both results show promising support around Japan’s personnel contributions, 
which it did not have at the beginning of the 1990s. As the environment around 
Japan’s personnel contribution begins to settle, the United Nations Secretariats 
can count on Japan in personnel contributions for non-military related roles with 
the engineer unit being the most suitable role).
The experience in Cambodia and East Timor as well as international expectations 
have aided the formulation of the current PKO Law and the definition of what 
Japan is and is not allowed to do in regards to troop contribution. Despite the 
many visible restrictions, it is with these restrictions that Japan was able to define 
its role in a unique way. There is still much work to be done regarding legislation, 
however the public and government have supported many of the changes as Japan 
continues to make contributions. Much of the foundation has been laid for further 
changes to be made but more importantly, Japan can be relied upon to make 
valuable contributions with its experience and expertise.
The significance o f regional support
The perception of Japan in the eyes of the East Asian region changed dramatically 
during the 1990s. It has gained the support and trust of the region through the 
contributions it has made to the operations in Cambodia and East Timor as well as 
many of the other countries. Speculation of Japanese military advancement that 
was once an obstacle for Japan to contribute troops is no longer an issue. Gaining 
regional support for Japan’s active participation (by sending SDF personnel) has 
been vital for Japan in achieving international recognition as an active player in
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the area of peace operations. The following summarizes the processes in which 
regional support was gradually attained.
Since World War II, Japan was a country which had remained uninvolved in East 
Asian politics, security, or economic relationships. It had only been interested in 
active aid programmes, and official pronouncements. This was the result of 
Japan’s US-focused relationship that was the foundation of Japanese foreign 
policy. The importance and endurance of this bilateral relationship was supported 
by the US - Japan Security Treaty and economic links54.
However, there was a shift in policy with the newly appointed Prime Minister 
Takeo Fukuda; he came to office with Japan’s new Southeast Asian policy known 
as the Fukuda Doctrine of 1977. This is the doctrine that has formed the axis of 
the Japan-ASEAN relationships to this day with its special emphasis on 
ASEAN55. Japan’s diplomatic efforts to consolidate its relationship with ASEAN 
continued and were able to make significant headway after the end of the Cold 
War. In the post-Cold War period, the first official attempt was made by Prime 
Minister Toshiki Kaifu (1989-1991) when he visited the ASEAN countries in 
1991 and made a policy speech in Singapore. Kaifu underscored the importance 
of the Japan-ASEAN partnership. He stressed the important political role that 
Japan could play in the region, and stated that Japan was ready to host an 
international conference on the reconstruction of Cambodia when peace was
54 Maswood, S.J. (2001) Japan and East Asian Regionalism. London, Routledge. P6
55 Prime Minister Fukuda set out his vision for Japan’s relationship with ASEAN. The three 
principles he put forward: that Japan would never become a military power, that Japan would build 
up a “heart to heart” relationship of mutual confidence and trust with Southeast Asian countries, 
and that Japan would cooperate positively with ASEAN and its member countries in their own 
efforts, as a partner “ - would become known as the Fukuda Doctrine.
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restored to the war-torn country56. The promulgation of the Fukuda Doctrine in 
1977 served as a catalyst in strengthening Japan-ASEAN relations.
The appointment of Yasushi Akashi as the SRSG of UNTAC was extremely 
important for the development of Japanese involvement in Cambodia. Japan had 
already been contributing as a key financer, apart from contributing personnel 
which included SDF units, but the appointment of Akashi was an indication by the 
UN to ensure continued Japanese support for the mission in Cambodia, and future 
UN missions in the East Asian region. The UN request for Japanese involvement 
was what Japan was seeking given the stigma attached to Japanese involvement in 
the region. In addition, in April 1990, the Japanese government decided to hold an 
international meeting to resolve the Cambodian conflict by inviting concerned
cn
parties to Tokyo . This meeting was Japan’s first effort at “peacemaking 
diplomacy” since the end of World War II. Since then, Japan has embarked on a 
more active political role in Southeast Asia.
One of the main problems that Japan had been carrying was how it was perceived 
in the East Asian region. Because Japanese foreign policy operated within the 
framework of the US-Japan alliance and the Western camp of capitalism and 
liberal democracy, some East Asian states, those such as the PRC, DPRK, and 
Republic of Korea who were always against Japan’s active involvement in 
peacekeeping or any military activities, were unlikely to view Japan as a neutral 
state58. In addition, the wartime atrocities committed by the Japanese in the region
56 Source: US Congress HP. Japan -Asia-pacific countries, http://countrvstudies.us/iapan/134.htm
57 Sudo,S. (2001). The international relations of Japan and South East Asia: forging a new 
regionalism. London, Routledge. P84
58 Maswood. P I30
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resulted in a significant level of distrust by those in the region and they feared 
Japanese involvement, specifically any type of military involvement. Added to the 
Yoshida strategy, this was one of the primary reasons why Japan remained 
relatively uninvolved in East Asian political, security and economic relations59.
The operations in Cambodia and East Timor gave Japan the opportunity to 
demonstrate what Japan was able to offer and cast aside any doubt on the 
intention of Japan in the region. Japan had also made continuing contributions to 
peace operations outside East Asia having made contributions to operations in 
Mozambique, Zaire, Golan Heights, and Afghanistan. Such involvement in East 
Asia, Africa, and the Middle East were probably unthinkable to both Japanese and 
its neighbours a decade ago. However, Japan has gradually been building on its 
reputation as a country with much to offer in the East Asian region and 
internationally.
Japan is potentially a highly significant security actor both within and beyond the 
East Asian region. The Japanese SDF is indeed amongst the largest and best 
equipped military with advanced technology and adequate logistical support, 
trailing only those of the US and PRC. SDF involvement had been regarded as a 
sensitive issue in the region but the regional response to Japan’s active 
involvement in security issues, especially the visible presence in UN activities, 
has become much more moderate. Japan has been maintaining its pacifist position 
for the past 60 years and playing a leading political and economic role in the 
region. It has taken almost 15 years since the early 1990s for the East Asian
59 Yamada,T. (2003) Kokurenniyoru funsou yobou to nihon no yakuwari. JIIA kenkyu 9. 
Morimoto,T. (ed) Asiataiheiyou no takokukananzenhosyou. JIIA. P I73
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region to re-consider the impact of a Japanese contribution of SDF personnel and 
this has been a major accomplishment for Japan.
The UN has provided Japan with the framework in which it could make 
contributions. The initiatives in Cambodia and East Timor are good examples of 
this, and Japan has been very careful and selective about how to make its mark in 
the area of security threats to various regions. It has also proceeded cautiously in 
developing its security contacts with East Asia. Japan was involved from the 
outset in the Asian Regional Forum (ARF), and while this forum has a rather 
doubtful potential as an active regional peace support agency, its value as a 
confidence building mechanism as a security extension of the ASEAN way may 
be very considerable60. This is Japan’s attempt to work outside of the structure of 
the UN and focus more on cooperation within the region.
Many of the issues regarding international and regional security have been 
discussed, however, there is still much progress to be made. The possibility for 
Japan to participate in UN security activities beyond peace operations in full 
capacity is not possible without the amendment or changing the interpretation of 
its constitutional law. In addition, there needs to be further consideration for 
contributions outside the framework of the UN. This is particularly important in 
making provisions for regional considerations such as in the ARF (as mentioned 
above). There is a need for Japan to reconsider the narrow interpretation of Article 
9 and the right to collective security, which is protected by the UN Charter for a 
sovereign nation.
60 McCoubrey. P I76
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Nonetheless, Japan has proved its ability to support rehabilitation and 
development in peacebuilding. This was a proposal in which Japan’s commitment 
in this area was welcomed by both the UN and host countries. Japan no longer 
receives the criticism that it was accustomed to since the beginning of the 1990s 
because of the frequent presence in international crises as well as its positive 
reputation. Although Japan has experienced many difficulties, its continued 
persistence, with much caution and care, has resulted in a region where its 
contribution is highly regarded on many fronts. This process has certainly defined 
Japan’s role in the region and also lays the foundation for many of the future 
opportunities that lie ahead.
Internal struggle for Javan: why its problematic?
Japan’s participation in UN peace operations has always been problematic in 
many ways. The biggest difficulty is the militaristic past which has invited many 
regional concerns, resulting in the slow transition in the area of personnel 
contributions. Some Asian states are sceptical that the deployment of SDF 
personnel overseas will eventually lead to more troops being sent overseas and in 
turn, revive Japanese militarism. These kinds of misunderstandings have 
gradually diminished with the continued deployment o f the SDF during the 
1990’s, however, the PRC and North Korea are still expressing their resistance 
towards Japan’s active cooperation in UN peace operations. These negative 
responses from neighbouring countries have influenced the opinion of the 
Japanese public, and have sometimes influenced the decision-making processes in 
the Diet. They have also been used by the opposition parties, especially the 
Socialist Party and the Communist Party, to denounce the SDF dispatch to UN 
operations.
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Through the 1990s, Japan dispatched personnel to several UN operations, and 
public knowledge about UN peace operations improved greatly. The Prime 
Minister’s Office polls demonstrated a steady increase of public opinion in 
support of Japan’s contributions to peace operations in the past decade. However, 
the Japanese media sent mixed messages of both the positive and negative 
aspects: for example, the Yomiuri-Newspaper, the largest newspaper in Japan, 
stated that “Japan should prepare to participate in the multinational force (PKF)”; 
and the Sankei Newspaper also addressed the necessity of the Japanese 
government to act flexibly in different situations such as sending SDF to rescue 
refugees and providing assistance for the multinational forces acceptable under 
current law. On the other hand, the Mainichi Newspaper expressed doubts about 
the hasty conclusion to lift the freeze on the dispatch of SDF personnel by stating 
“the government must present reasonable justification to be able to persuade the 
nation in order to send the SDF” 61. These mixed messages demonstrated the 
difficulties and confusion in Japan to participate in UN operations, however the 
public polls prove that the Japanese public accept their responsibility as one of the 
leading countries to play an active role in the areas of peace and security.
With Japan’s successful participation in UNTAC, the United Nations unofficially 
requested its participation in UNDOF in June 1994. However, the Japanese 
government declined the offer since it was already sending SDF troops to 
ONUMOZ. The Golan Heights had first been mentioned as a possible future 
dispatch for SDF personnel in May 1994 as the five conditions for Japanese
61 All the newspaper articles appeared in September 2001, before the International Peace 
Cooperation Law was amended.
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participation were clearly met, and the Middle East would prove to be a new 
regional experience for Japanese peacekeepers62. Dispatch of an SDF unit armed 
with light machine guns despite the initial emphasis on pistols only started in 
February 1996.
Even after the successful participation in UNTAC, both the Japanese government 
and MOFA were sensitive about taking the next step to sending more SDF troops 
to UN operations63. This was triggered by a Japanese UN volunteer worker and a 
CIVPOL officer being murdered during the UNTAC operation. This led to the 
Japanese public becoming sceptical about the active involvement in UN 
operations. The Japanese people was not used to the idea of their own personnel 
participating in UN missions in possible areas of combat, and the loss of Japanese 
lives made them realise the difficulties and serious responsibility they were about 
to take. When these events took place, the Japanese government quickly 
expressed its regret to the public as a measure of damage control, but also stressed 
its firm commitment to UN operations. Contrary to the concern of the government, 
public opinion polls demonstrated a positive change in people’s attitudes to 
Japan’s contribution to the UN peace operations. A Nihon Hoso Kyokai (NHK) 
poll carried out in May 1993 saw a total majority of 64.8% holding a positive 
view of participation in UN peace operations64. This revealed that the Japanese 
public was not as sensitive as politicians or bureaucrats, and the opposition party 
could no longer argue SDF participation in UN operation as being “against public 
will”.
62 Yomiuri Newspaper, 1 June 1994.
63 Mr. Shimizu and Mr. Matsuura both expressed difficulties MOFA has experienced during the 
gast decade to being involved in UN peace operations. Source: Interviews by Author.
Yanai, S. Law concerning cooperation for UN peace operations and other operations-Japanese 
PKO experiences. Japan Annual of International Law 36. pp33-75
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This kind of public opinion supported the government and MOFA in taking the 
next necessary steps for active engagement in UN operations. In his speech to the 
126th regular Diet session, Foreign Minister Watanabe called for “greater 
flexibility” and “further participation in UN peacekeeping efforts world-wide65. 
Further encouragement came from the United Nations when Boutros-Ghali 
encouraged more participation in UN peacekeeping within the framework of the 
Japanese Constitution during his visit to Tokyo in February 1993. Ogata Sadako, 
the high commissioner for UNHCR, also called on the Japanese government to 
dispatch SDF personnel even when the five principles of Japan’s participation 
were not fully met. Japan’s policy on UN peace operations became clearer after 
engaging in several UN peace operations and related humanitarian intervention.
By the end of the 1990s, the Japanese government was forced to face key issues to 
expand SDF’s role in peace operations: the revision and amendment of the Peace 
Cooperation Law and the possible use of force by SDF troops. The review of the 
PKO Law began in 1995, under the Peace Cooperation Department of the Prime 
Minister’s Office. Prime Minister Hashimoto, who believed that the use of force 
should be allowed, suggested that they should avoid conflict with the Constitution 
by either establishing a new body or by clearing up the Law66. A debate on the use 
of force by the SDF had been on the table ever since Japanese lives were lost 
during the SDF participation in the operation in Cambodia. For a more secure and 
safe environment for future participation, an amendment proposal was made by 
IPCHQ in August 1996 which sought to revise the PKO Law to allow use of
65 The Japan Times, 23 January 1993
66 Asahi Newspaper, 6 September 1996.
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weapons in line with UN standard practice. During the discussion, MOFA and 
MOD officials explained to MPs that SDF personnel were only allowed to use 
weapons by individual judgement, when required for personal self-defence. 
However, the “organised” use of weapons would still be intended only for the 
personal safety of individual member67. Finally, in March 1999, the Cabinet 
agreed to revise the PKO Law to allow SDF commanders to order the use of 
weapons.
One of the problems in Japanese politics was that discussion of UN peace 
operations at the Diet sessions changes in to discussions about Article 9 and 
Japan’s pacifist position. Many MOD, SDF personnel and MOFA diplomats 
claimed that the slow process in Diet sessions does not reflect the urgent needs 
required in conflict zones. The Japanese government could not reply quickly 
enough in order to send personnel by the official deployment date of the operation. 
The reasons for the delays are due to discussions in the Diet that lose focus as well 
as the time constraints of Diet sessions. A regular session of Diet starts in January 
and concludes in June (normally 150 days), and mainly discusses the budget for 
the next fiscal year68. For an unexpected issue like participation in a UN operation, 
there is not enough time to reach a conclusion. In addition, bills which did not 
pass during the regular session, and if no extra-ordinary session is approved to 
consider them, they will be tabled at the end of the year69. Japan’s legislative 
organs have not changed for over 60 years, and it has not been able to adapt to
67 Ku, C. and Jacobson, K.H. ed (2002) Democratic Accountability and Use of Force in 
International Law. Cambridge University Press. P231
68 In a normal Diet session, approval of the budget for the next fiscal year continues until the 
middle of March, and all the other issues put on the table are started after the budget meeting.
69 Hayes, D.L.(2005) Introduction to Japanese Politics. M.E. Shape. Inc. P51
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international movement70 and this has made it extremely difficult for Japan to 
make the necessary rapid changes.
However, the emergence of Prime Minister Koizumi contributed to significant 
institutional changes and led to a revision of the role of the prime minister at the 
beginning of the new century. Koizumi’s capacity to provide leadership in foreign 
policy was a key strength. As mentioned in Chapter 4, he took a more assertive 
and proactive role in crisis management, formulated a strategic vision, and most 
of all, he responded rapidly to the demands for international security. During his 
term, Koizumi established a much stronger cabinet with executive leadership by 
the prime minister. This drastic change was possible due to the strong public 
support Koizumi had. The Japanese public welcomed the new changes to the 
political structure and this allowed Japan to become more active globally in this 
new century. Koizumi’s popularity was cemented in the general elections in2005 
when the Liberal Democratic Party marked an historic landslide victory, with the 
party winning 296 seats, the largest share in post-war politics71.
Human Security: the new challen2e bv Javanese 2Qvemment in peacebuilding 
Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a lot of confusion about the role of 
the UN in peace operations. Although it initially began with simple observer 
missions with minimal use of force, UN peace operations have developed into an 
entity much more involved that it was originally intended. There was much 
emphasis and recognition on the contribution of troops to many of the 
complicated missions including those that involved UN missions playing the role
70 Interview with Matsuura.
71 In addition, the turnout for the elections was 67.5%, the largest in the history of Japan
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of government. With the increase in numbers of operations and the shortage of 
personnel, Japan was under severe pressure to make troop contributions.
During the 1990s, the UN and Western countries mainly concentrated their efforts 
on how to restore peace in conflict situations, and the urgent need for a 
peacebuilding phase after the conflict was not recognised until recently. These 
conflicts mostly occurred in poor countries involving small arms and light 
weapons between weak government forces and ill-trained rebels. Until the mid- 
1970s, most battle deaths were in East Asia and in the 1980s, in the Middle East, 
Central and Southeast Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. However, since the end of the 
Cold War, more conflicts have taken place in the African region than in the rest of 
the world. This was mostly caused by pervasive poverty, reduced aid, poor 
infrastructure, weak administration, external intervention, and spread of cheap 
weapons among the public72. Therefore, there has to be shift from national 
centralised development support to individual human development support. 
Threats to human security are varied -  political and military, but also social, 
economic and environmental73. The reformulation of national security into the 
concept of human security is simple, yet needs profound policy changes for 
development support. This is precisely where Japan can play a more active role.
In addition, not only the United Nations, but all the international agencies, 
regional organizations, and donor countries for development support should have 
utilised non-military intervention measures to the new security threats. What has 
changed the most during the 1990s is how to conclude conflicts. It is no longer
72 Thakur, R. From national security to human security. The Japan Times 13 October, 2005.
73 Keynote Speech by Dr. Ogata at the Ministerial Meeting on Human Security Issues of the 
“Lysoen Process” Group of Governments, Bergen, Norway, 19 May 1999.
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enough to deploy peace operations and prevent conflicts and monitor the 
development of a governing body. The missing link is the gap between the 
emergency bases of assistance, before and during the peace operations), and mid - 
long term development and rehabilitation support74. Once the emergency support 
of UN operations is able to establish a “safe and stable society”, there has to be a 
continuous process of “rehabilitation, reconstruction and development” to build an 
independent country with an economy and industry.
Human Security can provide the strategic perspective of a link between 
humanitarian aid and peacebuilding. In recent years, lack of human security is 
recognised as a hotbed of armed conflicts. The ultimate goals for both 
peacebuilding and human security are the same: to establish a durable peace and 
the improvement of humanitarian needs. Most of the works related to the 
protection of human security is conducted by UN family organizations such as 
UNICEF, UNDP, and WFP, or international aid organizations such as the Red 
Cross, OXFAM, and other NGOs. There is a clear gap between the UN peace 
operations and the establishment of a stable society during the transitional period, 
and the promotion of human security can be a solution for that issue. The report 
“Human Security Now” identified a number of gaps in post conflict strategies by 
the UN in four areas: security, governance, international response, and resources . 
Since the existing UN peace operations were aiming to provide and maintain 
security in the target areas, the fundamental functions of UN peace operations did 
not contain the protection of human security. Because of this, the changing nature 
of both conflict and the UN peace operations during the 1990s required the UN to
74 Inada, T. (2007) Post PKO to mid-long term development support. JIIA report. Chapter 1. P5
75 Human Security Now. P59
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protect individual civilian lives rather than national security, something the UN 
never experienced before. Moreover, the new demands are the key elements to 
promote the reintegration and establishment of a divided society.
This was the role that Japan was seeking and it is what was considered missing 
from peace operations during the 1990s. It mirrors the experience that Japan had 
had in the way that it had to rebuild itself from the defeat of war. Any work that 
Japan would be involved in would be a continuation of what it is already doing 
through its work with organizations such as the ODA and JICA.
Japan’s mid-long term support in both Cambodia and East Timor was mainly 
made through ODA and activities by JICA. Promoting the welfare of developing 
countries and contributing to the stability and development of the countries 
through ODA is an important means of making international contributions 
suitable for the basic doctrine of the Constitution of Japan76. Between the year 
1991 and 2000 Japan became the largest provider of ODA assistance in the world.
76 Japan ODA White Paper 2006. Section 1. P6
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Trends in Japan’s ODA bv Sector (Commitment Basis)
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Figure 5.1 shows the distribution o f Japanese contributions to the ODA. The 
general trend is to more focus on social infrastructure and services; transportation 
and storage; energy, and the production sector. Japan’s ODA normally focused on 
the necessity o f individual life. With its advanced technology and developmental 
experiences, Japan focused on building the infrastructure and transportation that is 
essential for development and rehabilitation o f  the developed countries in the 
restoration process. Since the main focus o f UN peace operations is on “making 
peace” and not on “building a society”, Japan’s ability and experiences in 
peacebuilding can fill a gap between two different mission purposes. Since the 
concept o f human security appears to be more o f an underlying principle to 
formulate foreign policies in terms o f development support and peacebuilding, it 
had not been explicitly expressed as part o f Japanese foreign policy. However, 
many o f the principles concerning Human Security have been consistent with 
what Japan has been practicing through the years.
77 White book 2006
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The concept of Human Security is not new: it means to protect human “life” and 
“existence” from distress and is profoundly related to human rights and human
no
development . It became highlighted when Prime Minister Obuchi used the word 
“Human Security” in his speech at a conference in Hanoi 1998. Since then, Japan 
has been promoting this new concept for development support and has started to 
apply this new concept to ODA and all other development support functions.
The concept of Human Security was initially established by Canadian Foreign 
Minister Lloyd Axworthy in his speech to the UN General Assembly in 1996. He 
set out a broad view of human security which included the following areas: child 
labour, environmental issues and economic development. Axworthy linked human 
security to the practice of UN peace operation activities79, however, the concepts 
were narrow and weighted towards the Western view of human rights80. This 
approach seeks to promote freedom from fear alone and emphasises civil political 
rights in particular.
Japan’s approach to Human Security, however, emphasises the creation and 
maintenance of a stable society and economic environment as a means of 
achieving human security, and seeks to promote freedom from fear and also 
freedom from want. This approach also focuses on economic, social, and cultural 
rights, which is profound in the concept of human rights.
78 Sen, A. (2000) Ningen no Anzenhosyou. Syueisya. P24
79 Axworthy, L. (1997) Canada and Human Security: the need for leadership. Intenational Jounal, 
52.P183-196.P190
80 The Canadian approach was criticised in the UNDP Human Development Report as it focused 
too heavily on threats associated with underdevelopment at the expense of human insecurity that 
stems from violent conflicts.
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In the East Asian region, most o f the nations generally favour Japan’s approach 
because o f the central policy o f “promoting citizen’s welfare”. Japan established 
human security as a policy framework to connect different concerns, based on the 
report by the Commission on Human Security in 2003, and also supported the 
conclusion o f the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change and the 
Supported Responsibility to Protect at the 2005 HSN ministerial. The 
Commission o f Human Security states: poverty continues to be a major challenge 
for the UN and developed countries, and is one o f the causes o f violent conflicts 
around the world especially in the African region81. The approach and philosophy 
Japan has developed, based on its knowledge and advanced technology which, in 
turn, is based on its own history and experiences, are favored by most o f the 
developing countries. This is helping countries in need to establish 
democratization and a stable society82.
81 MOFA Report: The UN in the 21st century: Time to Address New Challenges.
82 Which none of the Western Societies have experienced in their history.
83 MOFA Report. The UN in the 21st Century: Time to Address New Challenges. Meeting the 
MDGs
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Japan particularly emphasises the areas of education, health care, especially in 
infectious disease control, environment, and water and sanitation as ways to 
provide human security. In accordance with the Basic Education for Growth 
Initiative (BEGIN) undertaken in June 2002, Japan is strengthening its support for 
basic education in developing countries where the key areas of focus include 
elimination of gender discrimination, promotion of adult literacy and 
improvement of educational quality and administration.
Also, for Japan’s Grant Assistance for Grass-roots Human Security, more than 
50% of the projects concentrate on Educational research84. Another area which 
Japan concentrates its development support is water and sanitation which includes 
the establishment of a JPY16 billion programme of grant aid for water resources 
world-wide, and the introduction of a low-interest loan programme for sewer
85construction .
84 MOFA ODA White Paper 2007.
85 Japan has been the largest donor for water and sanitation since the 1990s. Japan's ODA related 
to water and sanitation between 2000 and 2004 was $4.6 billion, constituting 41% of the bilateral 
donors' total. Under WASABI, Japan will strengthen its contribution on water and sanitation to 
contribute toward achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).
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For the Japanese government, promoting the concept o f human security is another 
way to strengthen its foreign policy on UN peace activities. Since it has already 
experienced difficulties contributing Japanese personnel including SDF to UN 
operations, it is willing to play a more active role in the area, and this new concept 
is the key for its future role in the 21st century.
The biggest initiative by Japan is the establishment o f the UN Trust Fund for 
Human Security. This fund was established in March 1999 in response to Prime 
Minister Mori’s statement at the UN Millennium Summit. Japan contributed 
US$ 4.2 million at the beginning, and committed a total amount o f US$200 
million by August 2003, which made the trust fund for the largest project in the 
UN history87. The purpose o f this fund was to translate the concept o f human 
security into projects88 which addressed threats to human security. The most
86 ODA White Paper 2007
87 MOFA Diplomatic Blue Book 2003. PI85
88 Categories of the projects supported by the trust fund are: poverty eradication projects such as 
community reconstruction, vocational training, food production and the protection of children,
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unique part of this fund is its decision making process: projects for the fund was 
planned by UN agencies, and proposed to the Japanese government. If the 
Japanese government approved of the project proposal, they passed the proposal 
to UN headquarters for further approval. In this way, the Japanese government 
can be in control of the projects, and this would also commit Japan to promoting 
the concept and projects. However, further efforts should be made by both the UN 
and the Japanese government to promote this concept in the phase of 
peacebuilding, if they are willing to take this project to the next step. Firstly, in 
order to make this concept into the general UN project after the UN 
peacekeeping/enforcement operations for the peace-building phase, both the UN 
and the Japanese government need to invite and encourage other countries 
financial support89. Secondly, because of the wide scope and cross-characteristic 
nature of human security, there is not only the need for financial assistance but 
also a need to increase coherence and coordination among the various 
organizations. This is a relatively new initiative and requires a lot of cooperation 
from different countries and organizations for the expansion of this project..
As for the Grass roots human security project in Cambodia, JICA began a 
technical cooperation project to assist legal and judicial reform. Japanese experts 
supported the revision of the Civil Code and Code of Civil Procedure with careful 
consideration for Cambodian culture and customs so that it would be easy to gain 
the support of the Cambodian people. In the process of drafting these legal codes, 
the group also worked to develop legal personnel so that the new legal system
medical and health care such as reproductive health, control of inflectiousl diseases (HIV/AIDS), 
refugees and internally displaced persons assistance, and conflict related areas such as social 
reintegration for ex-troops through vocational training
89 Japan is the only financial contributor to this fund.
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could firmly take root in Cambodian society. In addition, the focus turned to 
assisting the training and capacity-building of judges, prosecutors, lawyers, 
Justice Ministry officials, and other legal professionals who will be responsible 
for understanding and implementing the new laws90. By developing Cambodia's 
legal system and then linking it to the people through the training of legal 
professionals, this project helps to empower individuals to fully utilize the law to 
defend their rights, a contribution that reflects a strong commitment to the human 
security perspective. In East Timor (Timor-Leste), since 2000, the Japanese 
government has been giving support, through JICA, in accordance with the 
National Development Plan (NDP) to ensure sustainable development for building 
a self-reliant nation by focusing on four areas of priority: Agriculture and Rural 
Development, Maintenance and improvement of infrastructure, Human resources 
development and institution building, and Consolidation of peace. Japan’s 
continuing support to both countries, especially after the UN peacekeeping 
mission are appreciated by the local people, and has contributed to building a new 
society.
The effect of focusing efforts on Human Security is two-fold. Firstly, these 
projects work towards completing what the UN began with peace operations on 
the ground. After establishing a stable environment, projects such as these help to 
build and sustain a peaceful society. Secondly, following the withdrawal of UN 
troops from the ground, these projects help to maintain a stable environment, thus, 
preventing any future conflicts from occurring in the area. There have been many 
cases in which a stable society was not achieved, leading to conflicts reoccurring. 
Many of these cases have occurred in the absence of an economy, an education
90 JICA - Cooperation to Cambodia. December 2006. P8
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and many of the basic needs for human life. Therefore, Human Security also 
serves as a preventive measure for future conflict situations.
Although the concept of Human Security covers many aspects of developmental 
support, its core focus is on the improvement of individual lives. Where poverty, 
disease, and hunger have stricken, outbreaks of fighting become much more 
probable. Developmental support at the individual level helps to reduce such 
conditions. Also, factors such as education, the development of the infrastructure 
and judicial systems, etc., help to build a self-sustainable society. The cases in 
Cambodia and East Timor demonstrate the value of such endeavors and have also 
shown that regional countries such as Japan can take an active role in this area.
What can Javan do?- Javan in UN peace operation in the future 
Japan has taken tremendous strides to involve itself in a role in UN peace 
operations. There were clearly many issues, particularly to do with the 
interpretation of Article 9 of the Constitution. However, Japan has taken measures 
to move beyond the restrictions of Article 9 in order to become a more active 
player in this field. The allowance of troop contributions has been a significant 
change, particularly in the eyes of the Japanese public as this was previously 
inconceivable given the interpretation of the constitution at that time.
The initial debate after the Gulf War Crisis focused on how Japan could send the 
SDF abroad to places of need. However, this study has shown that the areas in 
which Japan would make the most impact is clearly not in the contribution of 
personnel. Despite the changes made in the interpretation of the Constitution and
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the establishment of the new PKO Law, Japanese troop contribution still has 
many restrictions.
What Japan was able to learn with regards to troop contribution during the 1990s 
was that the SDF were able contribute in very specific ways. Japanese SDF have 
upheld high standards in many ways. They have advanced technological skills, the 
ability to meet deadlines, are accurate and faultless in their work and have 
exemplary moral behaviour. In contrast to troops from other contributing 
countries, the Japanese SDF particularly is well regarded and it has had great 
reviews by both the local organizations and people and the UN for the troops 
moral behaviour and faultless jobs91.
However, this is only a minor portion o f what Japan can contribute. The 
contribution of troops was, to some extent, a symbolic representation of Japanese 
commitment in the eyes of the rest of the world. There is still much expectation 
for a Japanese contribution, however, the true strength of Japan was to be found 
elsewhere.
The criticism that Japan was subjected to for what appeared as chequebook 
diplomacy after the Gulf War Crisis was perhaps one that was premature. The 
financial contribution of Japan to the UN and UN operations takes on a significant 
purpose. Without this contribution, the UN Secretariat would suffer a great deal as 
it would be unable to deploy operations to fulfil its mandate. It is a vital ingredient 
to the activities of the UN. In particular, Japan’s reliability in terms of its long 
term and continuing contribution to operations led to significant progress in the
91 Suginoo,Y. (2004) PKO no shinjitsu. Keizaikai. P226
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development and rehabilitation phase in both Cambodia and East Timor. Japan is 
still the second largest contributor to the UN, is the largest contributor to East 
Timor and has been one of the top ten contributors for Cambodia for more than a 
decade.
Because Japan’s financial contribution to all the operations in Cambodia and East 
Timor was the biggest, with bilateral financial support and technical development 
support for both countries still continuing, it is even now making significant 
results. In addition, Japan has some degree of political influence on East Asian 
nations, and faith in Japan as a leading state in the region is strongly felt . It is 
partly because the pacifist constitution made Japan a safe neutral country, and also 
because of its 60 years of effort to support development in most of the regional 
countries. If there will be a future operation in East Asian region, Japan will play 
a similar role as financial contributor and shadow negotiator again. Those parts 
are indispensable for the UN to plan and conduct peace operation. Sometimes 
Japan’s development support is called “ODA gaiko (ODA diplomacy)” because 
the side effects of this development support include the strong bilateral 
relationship with the recipients93. Japanese ODA has been reduced by 35 % in 
past nine years94 due to Japan’s financial depression, but at the same time Japan 
continues its contribution to many projects in the region.
There were many facets of Japan’s contributions that surfaced during the 
operations in Cambodia and East Timor. Japan learned many of the difficulties 
and limitations in its abilities as well as many of the advantages it possessed by
92 KItaoka, S. (2006) Kokuren no seijirikigaku. P264 Cyukou shinsyo.
93 Tanaka,Y. (1994) Enjyo toiu gaikousenryaku. Ashahi shinbun.
94 It is an amount of more than 400 billion JPY. Source: MOFA Blue Book 2006.
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virtue of its nature and historical background. However, one of the main areas of 
interest in this study is Japan’s future role in the areas of UN peace operations. 
This has been considered in reference to the concept of Human Security. It is not 
so much that Japan has found an area in which it can play a leading role in Human 
Security but rather, the role that Japan has been playing for many years in the area 
of developmental support has finally been recognized as an area of urgent need. 
This is an area that Japan has been promoting for the past decade. It is an area 
regarded as something “very difficult to put into practice”95. However, in recent 
years, human security focuses more on post-conflict peace building and this is 
something in which Japan has much expertise and where there are no internal 
judicial restrictions. The areas of financial contribution, political influence, 
diplomacy, developmental and regional support all factor into strengthening 
Japan’s position as a leading country in Human Security, particularly in the East 
Asian region. Despite being given the nature of its constitution and many of its 
internal struggles, Japan has reached a position where it can now contribute in 
many different ways, including the dispatch of SDF troops, although there still are 
many restrictions with this. In particular, the area of Human Security is the area in 
which Japan can take a leading role in the future.
95 Dr. Ogata’s speech at the International Symposium on Human Security. 50th Anniversary of 
Japan’s Admission to the United Nations. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, Japan. 6 December 
2006.
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Chapter 6: Javan’s future: choices and challenges
Having utilized the research questions as a guide for the details of specific 
contributions made by Japan involved in UN peace operations, this chapter will 
put into perspective how Japan’s role has evolved given many of the external and 
internal forces. It will also look into the recent developments in UN peace 
operations and many of the roles the UN and Japan has begun to foster and 
continues to take. Much of these developments will be related to the findings from 
the research and will help to show many of the positive changes that have 
occurred.
What was found from this study
This study highlights some of the political processes that underpinned the 
reconstruction of Japan that formed the basis for some of the difficulties Japan 
faces in contributing to UN peace operations. This also analyzes the ways in 
which various events and conditions have led to Japan’s participation in UN 
operations in Cambodia and East Timor. It talks about many of the slow changes 
Japan has undergone to facilitate the changing nature and expectations of 
contributions to UN operations and identifies many of the limitations. Finally, 
areas of strength are identified in which Japan can make effective contributions 
that have a major impact - this is an area that coincides with the urgent needs 
realized by the UN and is a gap that can be filled by the efforts and expertise of 
Japan. Although Japanese contributions to UN operations were never highly 
regarded, Japan has worked hard to make meaningful and visible contributions 
within its given frameworkQ It has, in effect, turned what was considered a 
liability in to its greatest asset.
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It has been demonstrated that what appeared to be hindering Japanese personnel 
contributions was Article 9 of the Japanese constitution. However, it was the US 
occupation of Japan that devised the creation of such a constitution. This has had 
a limiting effect on the way Japanese SDF were dispatched, and there was a lack 
of recognition for any other contribution made by Japan. The assumption that 
Japan should take part in much wider areas, including personnel contribution to 
military operations, was the basis for the criticism that it received as taking a 
passive role. For some of the countries, especially the US, Japan’s role as simply a 
financial contributor was not seen as a proportionate share of the responsibility 
given Japan’s status as an economic power. Japan’s pacifist position was very 
clear during the post-World War II era, and Japan being in this position was the 
result of the US government and rest of the alliance. The constitution created by 
the US after World War II was the very reason Japan was initially unable to 
contribute personnel.
However, the existence of Article 9 was seen as a symbol of Japan’s neutrality. 
There are even at some countries that do not know the existence of Article 9, but 
recognize Japan’s neutrality. This pacifist position actually became an advantage 
for Japan when it was involved in the peace process. Japan’s neutrality was easier 
to accept by the disputing parties and/or host countries because of this distinction. 
Japanese diplomats used this advantage, and have built strong relationships. The 
perception of Japan as the second largest economy with political power which 
does not involve itself in any kind of military operations is the biggest advantage 
of Japanese diplomacy. Mr. Isezaki, who has served in several UN peace 
operations as one of the high ranking officials including the operation in East
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Timor, made some interesting comments on this point. From his experiences, he 
said Japan is recognised as a neutral country which does not involve itself in any 
kind of military actions as many other western powerful countries do, and makes 
Japan a distinctively unique country1. If Japan maintains this pacifist position in 
the future, this trust in Japan will help it to gain more opportunities. However, 
since the September 11th terrorist attack, Japan started to send SDF to logistic 
support missions for the war against terrorism. This could affect the perception of 
Japan’s neutrality in some of the locations such as Afghanistan or Iraq.
What Japan learned the most from its experiences in Cambodia, East Timor and 
other UN operations is that its role can be extended to non-military dimensions by 
using its experiences in support of development. Personnel contributions were 
seen as a benchmark of Japan’s commitment; however, it could not make a huge 
impression to UN, operations, or even on other member states. Japan’s personnel 
contribution was too small in numbers and was dispatched in the middle of the 
UNTAC operational phase with restrictions on SDF activities causing confusion 
for the mission. Sending personnel was a vital first step to taking part in UN 
operations, and Japan proved itself on that point in UNTAC. However, Japan 
discovered that what it could provide for UN peace operations was not the well 
equipped and well trained troops for military operations; it was able to provide 
more the fundamental needs to build a stable society in developing countries, 
needs that can prevent future conflicts. Human Security is the area in which Japan 
can take effective action without confronting the controversy of its constitution. 
Japan has accomplished much through financial contribution, diplomacy, hosting 
international conferences and has realized much of its potential through personnel
1 Isezaki, K Jieitaino Kokusaikoukenwa Kenpoukyujyoude. Kamogawasyutsupan. P68
226
and other regional contributions. Many of these areas directly relate to the 
rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts of development support and this is exactly 
what needs urgent backing in managing and preventing regional crises. Much of 
the assistance that Japan has provided requires a lot more recognition in order to 
promote the concept of Human Security. Many super power countries do not 
focus on these aspects of development while Japan, as both a middle power 
country and an economic super power, can be an ideal fit for this role.
What is more, the arguments for the need to recognize Japanese contributions 
stem from the lack of attention paid towards many of the urgent necessities finally 
recognized by the UN. Promotion of Human Security is certainly one of these 
areas. In order to do so, much more focus should be placed upon what Japan can 
do as opposed to its limitations. US criticism of Japan’s limitations regarding 
personnel contributions does not help to reinforce the weight of Japan’s voice.
In addition, Japan needs to express the impact of its financial contribution to UN 
operations and related activities in a much stronger way at UN related 
opportunities. Despite the fact that Japan’s donation was necessary for the 
deployment of the entire operation, Japan’s financial contribution to the Persian 
Gulf War came under strong criticism. That was not the only time Japan was 
subject to condemnation. Japan’s financing was always vital, and the money was 
effectively used in the operations. While financial contribution cannot be counted 
as equal to human lives on the ground, financial contributions have to receive 
more credit. The Japanese government and MOFA diplomats must represent the 
necessity and effectiveness of Japan’s financial contribution more clearly and 
without hesitation. Also, in the future, Japan needs to express its opinion more
227
openly on the use of its money. With careful consideration by the government and 
MOFA of their financial commitment to the international community, Japan needs 
to take more action to promote its characteristic financial contributions so it 
receives the recognition it deserves by the UN, the US and other countries.
There has to be an alternative for Japanese foreign policy around the UN peace 
operations, while the UN and other Western countries need to accept Japan’s 
difficulties and its current responsibilities in financial contributions and 
diplomatic efforts as equal to personnel contributions2. This is why the Japanese 
government has sought international recognition for so long -  to further its cause 
amidst the criticism.
The current state o f affairs
The fundamental shift in Japanese foreign policy in adapting to changes in the 
international system is leading to an extensive reshaping of domestic institutions. 
The Yoshida strategy of concentrating on economic growth during the Cold War 
period left many political issues unresolved. The domestic reforms which have 
been made in the post-Cold War era shows Japan’s genuine desire for change. 
Most of all, Japan became seriously engaged in revising die pacifist constitution 
in order to define the role of SDF within the concept of collective security. Public 
polls show a strong majority of the Japanese public favour revision of Article 9, 
so political parties, Diet committees, the academic society, and the media have 
began to draft revisions. Reaching a consensus on how to replace Article 9 will
2 Many MOFA diplomats made this same comment on the evaluation and recognition Japan is 
getting on its role in UN peace operations. Heads of UN offices in Tokyo, Ms. Yuge from UNDP, 
and Ms Tamamura from WFP, also made similar comments on this point.
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take time. However, it is clear that Japan will not be deterred from revisions, and 
negative reactions by neighbouring countries cannot effect the decision making 
process. Revision in the electoral law in 1994 and administrative reforms in 1999 
and 2001 had the effect of restraining the prime minister’s role while increasing 
the influence of public opinion and voices of younger politicians. Prime Minister 
Koizumi was the turning point for Japan’s political reforms, and raised both the 
awareness and the expectations of Japanese public on political issues, something 
which had not taken place in more than few decades.
Soon after the events of 11 September 2001, P.M. Koizumi responded quickly to 
US demands for cooperation in the “war against terrorism”. The Anti-terror 
Special Measures Law was quickly drafted and passed the Diet in October 2001. 
It was the swiftest deliberation of any security issue in Japanese political history. 
On 9 November 2001, Japanese naval vessels with seven hundred SDF personnel 
abroad, sailed to the Indian Ocean to supply fuel to US and British forces 
operating in Afghanistan. It was the first foreign dispatch of Japanese forces since 
1945, and the very first step of Japan’s collective-self defence action. The next 
large step was taken in May 2003. A commitment was made by Prime Minister 
Koizumi to President George. W. Bush that Japan would dispatch SDF units to 
Iraq. With strong public support for his administration, Koizumi was not going to 
miss a chance to prove Japan’s capability and prove its new stance in response to 
the international crisis. The dispatch was legal as long as there was a UN 
resolution, and there was no integration of the SDF with other militaries using 
force. UN resolution 1483 which supported the reconstruction of Iraq was 
approved during Koizumi’s visit to US. What Koizumi and LDP members feared 
the most was to repeat the same mistakes from the Golf War in the new century.
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In January 2004, the SDF was dispatched to Samawah, a reportedly a “non­
combat zone”, in southern Iraq. The SDF units had to be defended by British and 
Dutch forces because the Japanese were not permitted to use force. The SDF 
engaged solely in civil engineering, and building public facilities until 2006.
Fifty-three years after its establishment, the Defence Agency was elevated to 
ministry status and, from 9 January 2007, has officially been called The Ministry 
of Defence. The rules of engagement for the SDF were modified to deal more 
forcefully with incursions into Japanese territories of sea and air space. The threat 
of a possible terrorist attack and Japan’s vulnerabilities increased both popular 
and political appreciation of the existence of the SDF, and there was a desire fir it 
to take a more active role in national security.
Participation in UN peace operations for more than a decade fulfilled the Japanese 
peoples wish to see their country, as one of the leading countries in the world, 
make greater international contributions. During the political process of 
dispatching the SDF, Japan found its own distinctive way to take a part in UN 
activities that would not require a debate on the pacifist constitution or bring up 
the past. It is clear that Japan has become more active and engaged in 
international issues and legally better prepared since the beginning of the 1990s. 
Japan’s experiences in UN peace operations through the 1990s without a major 
incident and with strong public support gave Japan the confidence and 
reassurance to assume more active roles and missions in the new century.
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Japan s challenges in the new century: becoming a country with a voice in the UN
arena
Japan must establish a new consensus of national goals if it wants to achieve a 
vital political role in UN and elsewhere. Since the first experiences in Cambodia, 
Japanese contributions to UN peace operations and collective security missions 
have greatly expanded. However, the fundamental issue of Japan’s constitution, 
the interpretation of Article 9 and the existence of the SDF, is sill untouched and it 
should be under serious consideration for change.
Japan started to express its opinion to the United Nations after a half century of 
playing the role of silent financial contributor. Japan, the second largest financial 
contributor to the UN budget, decided to cut its support by one-quarter from the 
year 2004. The Japanese government claimed that Japan’s GDP (Gross Domestic 
Products) accounts for 14.1% of the global economy, however Japan pays 19.5% 
of the UN budget that is almost US$1 billion a year3. Japan’s plan is partly 
motivated by the nation’s worsening financial condition. However, after a decade 
of experiences in UN operations, Japan wants more appreciation from the UN and 
other member states on its role. There are two particular counts Japan is feeling 
uncomfortable about. Firstly, besides all the contribution Japan has been made, 
the UN Charter still refers to Japan as “former enemy” after six decades4. 
Secondly, a proposal to reform the UN Security Council has continued to fail, and 
the Japanese desire to take a permanent seat in the Council has been declining 
over the past few years. Japan’s new attitude of “No taxation without 
representation” was the first attempt by Japan to stand up for its principles. Some
3 The US accounts for 30% of world gross domestic product, and pays 22% according to MOFA.
4 A comment by Mr. Okamoto of the Prime Minister’s office during Koizumi administration.
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of the UN officials claim that Japan was sending the wrong message to UN, if  its 
quest is for the Security Council seat5. Japan’s commitment to the UN is stronger 
than ever after a decade of contributions to the peace operations, and the Japanese 
public has become more accepting of taking responsibility outside the country. 
Now, the Japanese government and MOFA need more recognition from the 
United Nations to take the next necessary step for the domestic changes which 
will enable Japan to take a more active role in UN peace operations and related 
activities6.
It is clear that Human Security is more than a practical approach to development 
support. Most of the conflicts since the end of the Cold War were internal 
conflicts that meant securing the country by deploying a peace operation could not 
cope with a complex humanitarian emergency. However, the concept of human 
security can fulfil those insecurities by shifting concentration from the national 
level to the individual level, and would not require a military presence but a wide 
range of non-military civilian power. After a decade of experiences in post-Cold 
War progress, Japan found the opportunity to prove its ability by non-military 
means in peace operations. Japan’s assistance to development support through the 
Trust Fund for Human Security has increased every year, and the wide range of 
support is making progress in all locations. The Japanese government is viewing 
the promotion of human security as one way to reduce pressure from UN and 
other member states, especially the US, on SDF participation in military 
operations. This cannot be an alternative for risking the lives of SDF personnel,
5 The New York Times 22 January 2003.
6 From interviews with several MOFA diplomats in Tokyo and NYC. They all stated that without 
UN recognition by eliminating the status of “enemy state” and/or permanent membership in the 
Security Council, Japan cannot make serious domestic changes.
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and the Japanese government is not trying to replace that role. Nevertheless, the 
Japanese government and public need to face the reality of the outside world by 
amending the constitution to legalise the right of collective security, and admit to 
the maintenance of own military such as SDF. Nearly half a century of hiding 
behind the US is over, and Japan is seeking more roles in the international 
community.
After a decade of experiences, Japan has reached the point where it recognizes the 
most unique way in which it can positively contribute to UN peace operations. 
What was discovered in Cambodia and East Timor was that if there was enough 
regional support, and political will as well as logistical support, financial and 
personnel, this could lead to UN peace operations achieving their mandates. 
However, after the withdrawal of the UN operations, both countries suffered small 
internal strife again due to their unstable economic and social structure indicating 
the Japanese concept of Human Security has significant value in maintaining 
peace. There will be increased regional as well as non-regional roles that Japan 
will be required to play and the UN will be/is in a position to rely upon Japan’s 
contributions.
The UN peace operations: what has been learned and what kind o f  support is 
needed?
What has the UN learned from its experiences in peace operations since the end of 
the Cold War? Not only Japan but also the UN has been through major changes 
and challenges for the past decade and a half. If we compare the UN experiences 
in the first half of the beginning of the 1990s with the latter half in same decade,
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there are certain rules UN has created to improve its ability in the area of peace 
operations.
The primary responsibility of the United Nations is the maintenance of 
international peace and security and the second major responsibility is 
development. When the UN went into the chaotic era of internal conflicts, the 
concept of peace operations became rather vague and unclear. The UN did not 
have a clear image or purpose for peace operations except “stop fighting on the 
ground and establish peace” as a mission mandate for most of the cases.
In the first decade of the post-Cold War era, the United Nations was confronted 
with a significant change in the types of conflicts that demanded the 
organization’s attention. The post-Cold War conflicts were predominantly intra­
state conflict or civil war, ethnic conflict, and terrorism. In several situations, 
conflicts entailed civil chaos resulting from the post Cold War phenomenon of 
failed states. It is a well-known UN lesson that peacekeepers cannot function 
where there is no peace to keep. The need for clear and achievable mandates and 
matching military and financial resources has long been recognised, however it 
has never been achieved. What become clearer in the late 1990s was that the UN 
needed a long-term plan of rehabilitation and reconstruction of its failed system 
and this required continuous support from developed countries. Japan’s new 
concept of Human Security is one of the possibilities for this new challenge of the 
UN, and Japan is willing to take a leading role in this area.
The reform of the UN’s organizational structure to plan and conduct more 
sufficient peace operations is gradually being implemented. The challenges
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recommended by the Brahimi Report in 2000 are in progress step by step, with 
continuing efforts to improve the organization’s system.
On 20 December 2002, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 57/300 by 
consensus, allowing the Secretary General to implement most of his initiatives 
and requested additional information regarding to UN’s new agendas. The 
Secretary General indicated that the UN’s programme of work, Medium Term 
Plan, and budget would reflect the MDGs (Millennium Development Goals)7 as 
agreed upon by the member states at the Millennium Summit in 2000. MDGs are 
development goals that 189 countries and 23 international organizations have 
agreed to achieve by the year 2015 which include reducing extreme poverty, 
reducing child mortality rates, fighting disease epidemics such as HIV, and also 
developing a global partnership for development8. In the new century, the UN 
started to focus on one root of conflict -  poverty -  to prevent possible further 
conflicts in developing countries, particularly in the African region. So far, the 
UN and its member states have made substantial progress; still it is not fully on 
track to fulfil the overreaching goals. Japan is also putting itself into this 
commitment. As one of the components of the MDG, Japan hosted TICAD IV in 
2008, and brought up this particular issue of poverty at the G8 summit in 
Hokkaido-Tokyo in the same year. Japan, in addition, reflects the MDG in its 
ODA policy, and has set short-term priority areas to support over the next three to 
five years9. Japan has made its support primarily through ODA and now intends to 
increase its ODA budget by US$10 billion in aggregate over the next five years.
7 Resolution adopted by the General Assembly. 55/2. United Nations Millennium Declaration
8 Source: Millennium Development Goals, http://www.un.org/millenniunigoals/bkgd.shtml
9 Japan’s Efforts towards the Achievements of MDGs. (September 2008)
Source: http://www.g8summit.go.ir)/doc/pdf/20080929 02.pdf
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Japan’s intention to play a bigger role in UN activities especially in development 
support is clear, and it is willing to provide comprehensive assistant in this area in 
the future.
New challenges for the UN to prevent possible conflict through focus on the 
causes of conflict caught the world’s attention. However, the UN still has to face a 
lot of difficulties in planning and conducting peace operations to prepare for more 
satisfactory future operations.
For rapid and effective deployment in order to achieve is mandates, active 
cooperation from all member states is essential. As the Brahimi Report said, peace 
operations would require the active political, logistical and/or military support of 
one or more great powers or of major regional powers.10 The painful experiences 
of the 1990s, such as those in Somalia and Yugoslavia, influenced the domestic 
political will of member states’ to send their troops into conflict zones, especially 
the Western countries. One of the basic problems in the late 1990s was a lack of 
political will by member states to contribute to peace operation. However, for the 
last few years 77 % of troops active in UN operations were contributed by 
developing counties. The main contributors are:11 Pakistan, Bangladesh, and India 
from the South Asian Region, with Nigeria, Kenya, and Ghana from the African 
region as other significant active contributors. All the contributing states are 
within the British tradition of military training. This means their national 
contingents are trained along common lines, and share procedures in signalling
10 Ibid. Para23
11 Ibid. Para 103-104. Monthly Summary of Military and Civilian Police Contribution to United 
Nations Peacekeeping Operations.
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contribiitors/Qctober2003Summarv.pdf
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and command, which perfectly matched with urgent needs by the UN for troops. 
Since, the contribution of national troops is on a voluntary ad hoc basis from 
member states, deploying the similarly trained contingents is the best option for 
the UN. Also, the troops from Commonwealth countries can solve an underlying 
problem for the past few years of poorly trained and under-equipped 
peacekeepers.
Jan  2003
Top 10 Contributors No o f Troops
Jan  2004
Top 10 Contributors No o f Troops
Pakistan 4290 Pakistan 6750
Bangladesh 4229 Bangladesh 6426
Nigeria 3279 Nigeria 3380
India 2750 India 2922
Ghana 2160 Ghana 2303
Kenya 1775 Nepal 2294
Uruguay 1662 Uruguay 1873
Jordan 1622 Jordan 1822
Ukraine 1146 Kenya 1794
Australia 929 South Africa 1453
Table 6.1
In Cambodia, the quality of personnel was inconsistent and a lack of sensitivity 
served to damage the UN’s reputation. The UN received complaints of sexual 
harassment and drunkenness from civilians during the operations. Importantly, 
UN medics predicted that at least 150 peacekeepers would return to their homes 
with AIDS.12 One of the lessons from past operation is that countries contributing
12 In 1993, WHO reported that 75 % of blood donors in the capital Phnom Penh were HIV positive, 
and a single German Hospital was treating as average forty cases of venereal disease amongst UN 
troops every day.
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troops who cannot meet the terms of the memoranda of understanding must not 
contribute personnel. It is also important for the UN Secretariats to cooperate with 
the member states to maintain the minimum standards of training and equipment 
for the troops deployed in UN peace operations. For this viewpoint, Japan’s SDF 
troops always distinguished themselves as, morally, the best behaved in all the 
operations in which they participated. In both Cambodia and East Timor, local 
people respected their work and behaviour, and this lead to a lessening of the 
misgivings surrounding Japan’s re-militarisation.
Measures for the implementation of peacekeeping reform are continuing. With 
staffing shortages in the DPKO, the member states started to focus their attention 
on the problem of slow deployment times caused by procurement delays.13 As a 
response, the General Assembly authorised funds14 in the amount of US$ 141.5 
million for the establishment of Strategic Deployment Stocks (SDS) at the UN 
Logistics Base in Brindisi, Italy15 for the quick deployment of an operation. 
Drastic changes were made in July 2007 when Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s 
proposal for the reform of die DPKO was approved by the General Assembly. He 
recommended dividing the department into two different functions, management 
and operations, to improve the situation of the numbers of peacekeepers on the 
ground16. The General Assembly accepted the Secretary General’s proposal and 
approved creating the Department of Field Support to handle management and 
logistics, leaving the DPKO to focus only on operations.
13 The US Department of State Annual Report to the Congress. “US participation in the United 
Nations.” Year 2002.
14 The General Assembly Resolution. 56/292 on 18 July 2002. The Concept of strategic 
deployment stocks and its implementation
15 The initial plan for the SDS had included enough equipment to outfit both a large, complex 
mission of approximately 10,000 troops, and a smaller, traditional mission of up to 5,000 troops.
16 In 2007, the numbers of peacekeepers on the ground reached 100,000 around the world which 
was the highest number in UN history.
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In 2006, the UN experienced difficulties in deploying a large number of 
peacekeepers around the world. The UN deployed 13,000 peacekeepers to 
southern Lebanon, where Hezbollah guerrillas fought a 34-day war with Israel. 
The UN also sent police officers to help restore order in East Timor after weeks of 
political violence. The U.N. has nearly 9,000 peacekeepers in Haiti, often waging 
gun battles with armed gangs, and 18,000 in Congo, its largest mission. The 
biggest challenge in 2006 was to gather enough peacekeepers to send to the 
Darfur region of Sudan. In a major diplomatic breakthrough that government
1 7recently approved the deployment of a 23,000 joint U.N.-AU force . The current 
increase in UN peace operations strained the institutional capacities of the UN 
Secretariats again. Secretary General Ban’s reform is only a beginning in a series 
of changes for the UN to manage peace operations in a better way.
Maybe, there will be no end to the process of reforming the UN capacities for X. 
the management of peace operations. The nature and origins of conflicts keep 
changing and so as of necessity do peace operations in terms of size, mandate, and 
character, and it will not get any easier as we look back over the past few decades. 
More than ever, strong support and cooperation is needed from member states, 
especially from those counties with capacity to contribute in this particular area of 
UN activities. Japan and other member states are ready to take the necessary 
action to improve the UN capacity in this field.
17 A report on the Evolution of UN peacekeeping (2): Reforming DPKO. Friedrich Elbert 
Foundations New York. November 2007.
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In the end, a proposal for Security Council reform must be considered, and it must 
include all regional representatives, as one of the reforms of the UN organization 
in the near future. Considering the power the Security Council has on the UN 
decision-making process, the current membership does not reflect the 
international community today. The possible reform Japan and other member 
states, Germany, Brazil, India18, has been promoting could not get enough support 
in the General Assembly. Their plan to create 10 new council seats, which would 
take total membership from 15 to 25, includes six new permanent members would 
not come with veto power for the first 15 years. The plan of this group four was to 
enable the United Nations to reflect the interests of the vast majority of its 
member states. However, the difficulties of adding new members to the Security 
Council are apparent. The United States has already advocated the addition of 
Germany and Japan as permanent Council members while Russia, the PRC, UK 
and France have remained deliberately vague19. Germany and Japan, who are still 
referred to as enemy states in the United Nations Charter, have proven their 
contributions to the United Nations in a wide range of areas include financially 
and politically, especially after the end of the Cold War. As for the rest of the 
possible seats on the Security Council, the selection of a single county, or possibly 
two, depending on the number of the countries on a continent, from each of Asia, 
Africa, and South America, is not an easy task because of the power struggles in 
each location.
18 The four countries are called “Group of Four”
19The Next Step: Security Council Reform. An Agenda for Peace Update, Issue No. 2, pg. 1,4 
United Nations Association in Canada. Source:
http://www.ncrb.unac.org/unreform/selected/Screform.htTOl.
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Since the end of the Cold War, the United Nations has not been able to cope with 
the increase in the number of conflicts around the world, and the unevenness in 
the Security Council’s response and interest to various conflicts has resulted in 
questions of the United Nations’ ability as an international institution. The 
effectiveness of peace operations will depend greatly upon the reforms made to 
the United Nations Organizations, including the Security Council. The UN needs 
to move forward from the original ideas since its establishment in 1946 and adapt 
to modem day situations in the 21st century. Japan is one of the leading countries 
in the reform of the Security Council, and will promote this issue in the UN arena 
until the actual reform takes place.
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